Wes Joines, MPA
Unless Congress acts between now and the end of 2011, at least one group will not be experiencing a happy New Year: physicians who provide services to Medicare patients. Under current law, starting in 2012, reimbursement for Medicare-provided services will be reduced by an estimated 30%. Why is this happening? It is all related to policies enacted nearly 15 years ago in an earlier iteration of debt reduction efforts.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 was signed into law on August 5, 1997 and was designed to balance the federal budget by 2002. Of its $160 billion in spending cuts during that time period, $112 billion was applicable to the Medicare program, which is the primary health coverage program for older and some disabled Americans. A key component of the cuts to Medicare included, for the first time, a budgetary restraint on Medicare’s total expenditures to maintain budget neutrality. Known as the sustainable growth rate (SGR), it is a major component of the current formula for determining annual updates to physician reimbursement. While Medicare payment rate increases since 1992 had been tied to trends in physician utilization (i.e. efficient use of medical tests and facilities by a doctor), in 1997, for the first time, the implementation of the SGR meant that Medicare reimbursement changes would be linked to four factors: 1) changes in input costs, 2) changes in Medicare fee-for-service enrollment, 3) changes in the volume of physician services relative to growth in the national economy, and 4) changes in expenditures due to changes in law and/or regulation.
The SGR resulted in annual increases to the Medicare fee schedule until 2002, when a 4.8% reduction took place. Since that time, rate reductions called for by the formula have been deferred, although Congress has not changed the underlying SGR formula or the cumulative spending targets. Because of vast increases in the volume and complexity of health care services for the Medicare population in recent years, especially when compared to the SGR designers’ projections, the formula specifies cuts in physician payments that become more severe with each passing year. In fact, at a cost of $19 billion, a last-minute December 2010 vote delayed a scheduled 25% reduction in the SGR that was to take place in January 2011.
So, here we are again, this time in late 2011, deciding whether or not reimbursement for Medicare providers will be cut. Even before the current debt reduction debate and increasing prevalence of political gridlock in Congress, policy movement regarding the SGR involved numerous short-term fixes. For example, from 2003 through 2010, Congress included provisions in 13 separate pieces of legislation to forestall reimbursement cuts. As a long-term fix for the SGR – e.g. replacing it with a current fee freeze – would be extremely costly to the taxpayer (some estimates currently peg it around $300 billion over 10 years), short-term fixes have generally proved to be an easier bargain (as much as they have irritated physicians and their respective trade associations).
At this point, anyone’s guess is as good as another’s regarding the level of reimbursement for Medicare services on January 1, 2012. Although the current political climate is not one that generally supports massive spending to doctors that would be required for a long-term fix, many believe that cuts of the magnitude prescribed by the SGR would not be conducive to ensuring beneficiary access to services. Therefore, another short-term fix might be in the works as a stop-gap measure. However, there is also a chance that the currently-convened deficit reduction “Super Committee” might address the SGR as part of its proceedings.
If compromise is within reach, within or outside of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, it may be similar to a plan recently recommend by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), which ironically enough, was also established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and serves as an independent advisor to Congress. MedPAC’s plan, which would cost $200 billion over 10 years (instead of the $300 billion of the fee freeze), would protect both primary care and specialty physicians from the deep cuts called for by SGR. Primary care physicians would see physician fees associated with Medicare services frozen for 10 years, while specialists would see smaller cuts (of 5.9% per year) over the first three years that would then remain frozen for the remaining seven years in the budget window.
Granted, MedPAC’s suggestion is not a panacea, but it is a good start. At the very least, it should focus us on attempting to resolve this looming crisis.
Friday, November 11, 2011
Skip Over Low-Hanging Fruit to Reach the Millennium Development Goals
Leslie Lai, MPA
In 2000, the UN established the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to improve the social and economic conditions of the world’s poorest countries by 2015. Of the eight MDGs, two specifically target the reduction of child mortality and the improvement of maternal health. Despite increased aid in the past decade from foundations, bilateral donors, and multilateral organizations, several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will fail to reach these two goals in the next four years.
The main reason for this is the lack of an equity focus in the planning processes of national health ministries. For economic and political reasons, governments have focused on targeting “low hanging fruit,” or populations that are most easily reached, through the expansion of traditional delivery service mechanisms such as hospitals. While there has been significant progress in health outcomes due to increased international aid, improvements in national averages conceal widening disparities in poverty and worsening health outcomes for the most marginalized populations. Furthermore, the perceived difficulty and economic inefficiency in reaching the poorest hinders donors from targeting technical assistance to those who need the most help.
A practical solution to this challenge is to show evidence that integrating an equity focus into health planning can actually be cost-effective. Organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has proven this with a bottleneck analysis budgeting software created with the World Bank to assess the marginal costs of scaling up coverage of proven high-impact interventions. The tool incorporates over 186,000 input variables including the building of new facilities, vaccine transport costs, training of community health workers, etc. It also measures the potential number of lives saved per US $1 million invested depending on the mix of health services delivered and to whom.
Using health data from 68 developing countries, UNICEF used the software to show that each of these countries could not only provide essential health services to the most deprived in an economical fashion, but could also potentially achieve the health-related MDGs by 2015. Surprisingly, UNICEF’s analysis also showed that countries ignoring the hardest-to-reach would miss the MDG targets. So just what exactly does a country need to do to reach the MDGs and expand coverage to its hardest-to-reach beneficiaries?
Ethiopia is a successful example of a country that has successfully incorporated the bottleneck analysis tool into its national health plan to expand coverage to its underserved. Ethiopia’s key intervention is the training and deployment of Health Extension Workers (HEWs), young women who provide immunizations and maternal health services to children and women in rural areas. Based on marginal budgeting calculations, Ethiopia could potentially save 68.1 children’s lives per US $1 million spent with the HEW program compared to only 52.9 lives saved without. To achieve this, donors and technical assistance would need to enhance the HEW program or implement similar types of interventions.
Since Ethiopia has historically experienced serious health problems among women and children, it is an ideal model for Sub-Saharan African countries with similar issues. Unfortunately, political matters may obstruct successful implementation in other countries. And in the meantime, the clock is running out…
In 2000, the UN established the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to improve the social and economic conditions of the world’s poorest countries by 2015. Of the eight MDGs, two specifically target the reduction of child mortality and the improvement of maternal health. Despite increased aid in the past decade from foundations, bilateral donors, and multilateral organizations, several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will fail to reach these two goals in the next four years.
The main reason for this is the lack of an equity focus in the planning processes of national health ministries. For economic and political reasons, governments have focused on targeting “low hanging fruit,” or populations that are most easily reached, through the expansion of traditional delivery service mechanisms such as hospitals. While there has been significant progress in health outcomes due to increased international aid, improvements in national averages conceal widening disparities in poverty and worsening health outcomes for the most marginalized populations. Furthermore, the perceived difficulty and economic inefficiency in reaching the poorest hinders donors from targeting technical assistance to those who need the most help.
A practical solution to this challenge is to show evidence that integrating an equity focus into health planning can actually be cost-effective. Organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has proven this with a bottleneck analysis budgeting software created with the World Bank to assess the marginal costs of scaling up coverage of proven high-impact interventions. The tool incorporates over 186,000 input variables including the building of new facilities, vaccine transport costs, training of community health workers, etc. It also measures the potential number of lives saved per US $1 million invested depending on the mix of health services delivered and to whom.
Using health data from 68 developing countries, UNICEF used the software to show that each of these countries could not only provide essential health services to the most deprived in an economical fashion, but could also potentially achieve the health-related MDGs by 2015. Surprisingly, UNICEF’s analysis also showed that countries ignoring the hardest-to-reach would miss the MDG targets. So just what exactly does a country need to do to reach the MDGs and expand coverage to its hardest-to-reach beneficiaries?
Ethiopia is a successful example of a country that has successfully incorporated the bottleneck analysis tool into its national health plan to expand coverage to its underserved. Ethiopia’s key intervention is the training and deployment of Health Extension Workers (HEWs), young women who provide immunizations and maternal health services to children and women in rural areas. Based on marginal budgeting calculations, Ethiopia could potentially save 68.1 children’s lives per US $1 million spent with the HEW program compared to only 52.9 lives saved without. To achieve this, donors and technical assistance would need to enhance the HEW program or implement similar types of interventions.
Since Ethiopia has historically experienced serious health problems among women and children, it is an ideal model for Sub-Saharan African countries with similar issues. Unfortunately, political matters may obstruct successful implementation in other countries. And in the meantime, the clock is running out…
Thursday, October 27, 2011
Separating the Tree from the Forest: Tackling deforestation independently to make progress on climate change
Jessica Duncan, MPA
In early 2007, there was a palpable sense of a growing global consensus on the need for a multilateral climate change agreement. US presidential candidates were discussing their plans for domestic legislation, many European nations had already enacted ambitious policies, and the Chinese government had declared pollution – carbon emissions included – as a top priority. However, the 2008 financial crash and the resulting credit crunch, falling gas prices, and a return to protectionism quickly wiped out both capital and political will for the climate change agenda. At the time, commentators said it would take a year for the economy to bounce back and climate change would again return to the docket. President Obama and others spoke of the opportunity presented by clean energy industries to foster, rather than limit, American economic growth.
Four years since that cautiously optimistic time, and few of the predictions have come true. Indeed, climate change has all has absolutely disappeared from Washington. While American politics on energy have often been fickle, European’s sudden silence on climate change is more surprising. Across the globe, it appears that multilateral environmental agreements couldn’t be further from political leaders’ priorities.
In this political and economic context, what is the most productive next step to foster international climate change consensus? If we assume that something should be done on climate change but realize carbon pricing simply will not be implemented in the current economic climate, what do we do?
Way Ahead: Divide and Conquer
The most influential forum for climate policy, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), should take areas of growing consensus and separate negotiations and policies on these issues from the broader UN international climate change process, e.g. deforestation and technology transfer policies. (This article will focus on the former.) While far from ideal, this pragmatic division of labor will enable the US and other major emitters to invest in components of the climate policy that do not threaten their domestic economies in such a rough economic time. They can work aggressively on these areas until their domestic politics and economies better align to allow stronger mitigation policies in the future.
With regard to deforestation policy, in recent rounds of UN climate talks there has been remarkable convergence of international opinion on its importance, including the launch of the United Nations’ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) program to better coordinate UN efforts to combat climate change by providing incentives to decrease deforestation. However, these promising developments have been overshadowed by the lack of movement in other areas of climate change policy and by the ongoing turbulence of the global economy. Overall, leaders have been prevented from doing all they can in this area because of a larger stalemate around carbon pricing and binding emissions cuts. A division of the international negotiation process that tackles deforestation policy separately will capitalize on positive developments even when countries remain at different ends of the table on other issues.
What can be done on deforestation alone?
Deforestation accounts for an estimated 20% of global carbon emissions each year. Slowing emissions from the destruction of forests will help keep global emissions at sustainable levels even if there is delayed action on more contentious areas of mitigation. While it may take decades to stop reliance on fossil fuel, it is possible to slow or halt deforestation far sooner. Reforestation also presents a very cost-effective opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with far greater returns on each dollar invested than most other mitigation options. In addition, deforestation should be separated from the broader climate agenda because it has potential to alter regional and international economic and political landscapes by giving developing countries, from Indonesia to Congo to Brazil, massive value in their forests. If these new carbon assets are managed correctly, so that current incentives are reversed and forests are more valuable left standing than cut down, carbon sinks – reservoirs that store carbon, removing it from the atmosphere – could become a tremendous resource for the populations of these developing nations. However, if they are poorly regulated, carbon sinks could feed corruption, giving governments leverage which could disrupt geopolitical relations and even potentially drive conflict. It is vital for the international community to establish sound deforestation policies now since it will be far harder to reform them down the line.
Summary
The UNFCCC should separate deforestation policy from a broader post-Kyoto agreement for the following reasons:
Success on reforestation will not only cut global emissions in the near-term, but it will also – perhaps even more importantly – feed back into, strengthen, and drive progress on a more comprehensive global environmental negotiation in the future.
In early 2007, there was a palpable sense of a growing global consensus on the need for a multilateral climate change agreement. US presidential candidates were discussing their plans for domestic legislation, many European nations had already enacted ambitious policies, and the Chinese government had declared pollution – carbon emissions included – as a top priority. However, the 2008 financial crash and the resulting credit crunch, falling gas prices, and a return to protectionism quickly wiped out both capital and political will for the climate change agenda. At the time, commentators said it would take a year for the economy to bounce back and climate change would again return to the docket. President Obama and others spoke of the opportunity presented by clean energy industries to foster, rather than limit, American economic growth.
Four years since that cautiously optimistic time, and few of the predictions have come true. Indeed, climate change has all has absolutely disappeared from Washington. While American politics on energy have often been fickle, European’s sudden silence on climate change is more surprising. Across the globe, it appears that multilateral environmental agreements couldn’t be further from political leaders’ priorities.
In this political and economic context, what is the most productive next step to foster international climate change consensus? If we assume that something should be done on climate change but realize carbon pricing simply will not be implemented in the current economic climate, what do we do?
Way Ahead: Divide and Conquer
The most influential forum for climate policy, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), should take areas of growing consensus and separate negotiations and policies on these issues from the broader UN international climate change process, e.g. deforestation and technology transfer policies. (This article will focus on the former.) While far from ideal, this pragmatic division of labor will enable the US and other major emitters to invest in components of the climate policy that do not threaten their domestic economies in such a rough economic time. They can work aggressively on these areas until their domestic politics and economies better align to allow stronger mitigation policies in the future.
With regard to deforestation policy, in recent rounds of UN climate talks there has been remarkable convergence of international opinion on its importance, including the launch of the United Nations’ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) program to better coordinate UN efforts to combat climate change by providing incentives to decrease deforestation. However, these promising developments have been overshadowed by the lack of movement in other areas of climate change policy and by the ongoing turbulence of the global economy. Overall, leaders have been prevented from doing all they can in this area because of a larger stalemate around carbon pricing and binding emissions cuts. A division of the international negotiation process that tackles deforestation policy separately will capitalize on positive developments even when countries remain at different ends of the table on other issues.
What can be done on deforestation alone?
Deforestation accounts for an estimated 20% of global carbon emissions each year. Slowing emissions from the destruction of forests will help keep global emissions at sustainable levels even if there is delayed action on more contentious areas of mitigation. While it may take decades to stop reliance on fossil fuel, it is possible to slow or halt deforestation far sooner. Reforestation also presents a very cost-effective opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with far greater returns on each dollar invested than most other mitigation options. In addition, deforestation should be separated from the broader climate agenda because it has potential to alter regional and international economic and political landscapes by giving developing countries, from Indonesia to Congo to Brazil, massive value in their forests. If these new carbon assets are managed correctly, so that current incentives are reversed and forests are more valuable left standing than cut down, carbon sinks – reservoirs that store carbon, removing it from the atmosphere – could become a tremendous resource for the populations of these developing nations. However, if they are poorly regulated, carbon sinks could feed corruption, giving governments leverage which could disrupt geopolitical relations and even potentially drive conflict. It is vital for the international community to establish sound deforestation policies now since it will be far harder to reform them down the line.
Summary
The UNFCCC should separate deforestation policy from a broader post-Kyoto agreement for the following reasons:
- Effective international regulation in these areas is essential to cut global greenhouse emissions at the scale and with the urgency dictated by science – it’s more important than ever to protect carbon sinks since we have been unable to cut carbon emissions.
- Regulation of these areas will provide opportunities for developing nations to profit from the climate agenda rather than be burdened by it.
- As deforestation policy helps emerging economies become more invested in the international climate agenda, these nations may become more willing and able to take on binding emissions reductions targets.
Success on reforestation will not only cut global emissions in the near-term, but it will also – perhaps even more importantly – feed back into, strengthen, and drive progress on a more comprehensive global environmental negotiation in the future.
Chugga Chugga Moo Moo: Developing Cow Power
Carol Lu, MPA
While solar and wind power have become synonymous with renewable energy, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has made it a priority to support the commercialization of a much less glamorous source of energy – dairy biogas from digester systems. Biogas (bio-gas) is gas produced by the biological breakdown of organic matter in the absence of oxygen, and digester systems are industrial structures designed to capture that material. Located on the dairy farms themselves, digesters capture biogas from manure, transforming waste to energy. These systems benefit the environment by reducing water pollution from nutrient run-off. And, they represent a potential business opportunity. Even in this win-win situation, the current nascent digester industry is not economically sustainable: electricity sales to the wholesale market don’t justify capital costs. Entrepreneurs may make inroads to costs through “learning” on operations, but more is needed to push the industry toward profitability.
As a key environmental player with strong connections to local regulatory agencies and regulated entities, the EPA can help to increase digester project revenues in two ways:
While solar and wind power have become synonymous with renewable energy, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has made it a priority to support the commercialization of a much less glamorous source of energy – dairy biogas from digester systems. Biogas (bio-gas) is gas produced by the biological breakdown of organic matter in the absence of oxygen, and digester systems are industrial structures designed to capture that material. Located on the dairy farms themselves, digesters capture biogas from manure, transforming waste to energy. These systems benefit the environment by reducing water pollution from nutrient run-off. And, they represent a potential business opportunity. Even in this win-win situation, the current nascent digester industry is not economically sustainable: electricity sales to the wholesale market don’t justify capital costs. Entrepreneurs may make inroads to costs through “learning” on operations, but more is needed to push the industry toward profitability.
As a key environmental player with strong connections to local regulatory agencies and regulated entities, the EPA can help to increase digester project revenues in two ways:
- Reduce barriers to co-digestion. Because restaurant grease has high energy potential, co-digestion of these wastes with manure would allow projects to generate double or triple the electricity at nearly the same costs. In addition, digester developers could charge restaurants a tipping fee to dispose of their grease. These additional revenue streams could make a project profitable. Unfortunately, co-digestion in areas like California is nearly impossible because of strict environmental permitting standards. The EPA should work with local agencies to develop a fast-tracked permitting exception for diary digester projects in states where co-digestion is not permitted.
- Facilitate direct partnerships between large electricity end-users and digester projects. By directly providing electricity to an end-user rather than selling electricity to the wholesale market, a project developer is able to obtain a higher price for its renewable energy. Higher prices mean higher revenues. As an agency that regulates both large industrial electricity users and small dairies, the EPA is in a unique position to match these parties together. Thus, the EPA should develop an internal process in which those that work with large electricity users in the air permitting office collaborate with those that work with dairies in the water and agriculture offices. With sufficient support from the top, this intra-agency working group has the potential to bridge this critical gap.
What Do We Do With Data Soup?
Katherine DiSalvo, MPA
As policy professionals, we’re likely to encounter messes of contradictory findings more and more throughout our careers.
There is contradictory data on important issues like the real level of US poverty, whether moving people out of a neighborhood of concentrated poverty improves their chances in life, the success of charter schools, or the effectiveness of giving away free bed-nets to combat malaria.
Do you know what to do with data soup? At the Woodrow Wilson School, I don’t think we students learn this sufficiently.
According to R. Kent Weaver, in Ending Welfare as We Know It (Brookings, 2000), the 1980s and 1990s saw a “multiplication” of policy research with “differing assumptions and conclusions.” Simultaneously, interest groups were adopting social science techniques and creating “a welter of conflicting findings.” In a separate article Weaver and a colleague assert that this may result in the “devaluation of the currency” of policy research. Weaver argues that it may “cause legislators to simply dismiss all evidence that does not fit their personal or constituency preferences.”
Devaluation of policy research is becoming commonplace. Even in the era of “data-driven” education leadership, Brenda Welburn, the head of the National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE), recently told a WWS workshop team researching “School Choice and Impacts on Cities” that State Boards of Education members don’t know whose data to trust. As board members attempt to make state education policy and funding decisions, sometimes they don’t know how to do it with facts. “We [at NASBE] are dealing with perceptions, often,” Welburn said.
I don’t think it’s easy to digest data soup, and I think the Woodrow Wilson School needs to do more to help its students develop this ability. You may scoff and tell me you know how to wade through the stew. You know statistics! You know what research methods matter!
I don’t think any policy professional can rely on statistical prowess alone. The statistics program at the Wilson School is strong, and its decision to expand statistics requirements was a good one. However, with our limited time we students (not to mention professionals) cannot dig into data sets, look at assumptions, and evaluate every conclusion we read for ourselves. While some such analysis might be possible before an important policy decision or publication, we consume too much information to scrutinize it all.
The best proof that policy students won’t always use technical skills to sort through conflicting data professionally is that Woodrow Wilson students don’t always do so here! When I encounter conflicting data in classes, I’m too often told we students should dig deeper and decide who’s right…later.
We can’t rely exclusively on the “the gold standard” professors teach us to love: data generated by randomized control trials (RCTs). This creates an easy top tier of information on too few topics. Additionally, all the emphasis we hear on the “gold standard” may lead us to trust in RCT-based research too easily. The best part of the WWS course on data-based decision making is hearing Professor Lorenzo Moreno talk about how complicated it can be to do the right thing in the evaluation field. All that glitters…
We policy students need more practice criticizing questionable research. We need more practice wading through data mess and taking and defending a stand – not on politics, as we do in the introductory 501 course, Politics and Public Policy, but a stand on what we think is the truth. We need more sophisticated conversations about what data to trust and about how to evaluate vendors of policy research when we cannot evaluate each product. We need more shorthand than one “gold” standard.
We also need to talk about making policy in a world where different “facts” are consumed by different constituencies, and the truth is always up for debate. It’s the world in which we live, and it’s likely to get worse. If the Woodrow Wilson School could prepare us to digest data soup and to help change these cooking trends, that would truly be in the nation’s service and in the service of all nations.
As policy professionals, we’re likely to encounter messes of contradictory findings more and more throughout our careers.
There is contradictory data on important issues like the real level of US poverty, whether moving people out of a neighborhood of concentrated poverty improves their chances in life, the success of charter schools, or the effectiveness of giving away free bed-nets to combat malaria.
Do you know what to do with data soup? At the Woodrow Wilson School, I don’t think we students learn this sufficiently.
According to R. Kent Weaver, in Ending Welfare as We Know It (Brookings, 2000), the 1980s and 1990s saw a “multiplication” of policy research with “differing assumptions and conclusions.” Simultaneously, interest groups were adopting social science techniques and creating “a welter of conflicting findings.” In a separate article Weaver and a colleague assert that this may result in the “devaluation of the currency” of policy research. Weaver argues that it may “cause legislators to simply dismiss all evidence that does not fit their personal or constituency preferences.”
Devaluation of policy research is becoming commonplace. Even in the era of “data-driven” education leadership, Brenda Welburn, the head of the National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE), recently told a WWS workshop team researching “School Choice and Impacts on Cities” that State Boards of Education members don’t know whose data to trust. As board members attempt to make state education policy and funding decisions, sometimes they don’t know how to do it with facts. “We [at NASBE] are dealing with perceptions, often,” Welburn said.
I don’t think it’s easy to digest data soup, and I think the Woodrow Wilson School needs to do more to help its students develop this ability. You may scoff and tell me you know how to wade through the stew. You know statistics! You know what research methods matter!
I don’t think any policy professional can rely on statistical prowess alone. The statistics program at the Wilson School is strong, and its decision to expand statistics requirements was a good one. However, with our limited time we students (not to mention professionals) cannot dig into data sets, look at assumptions, and evaluate every conclusion we read for ourselves. While some such analysis might be possible before an important policy decision or publication, we consume too much information to scrutinize it all.
The best proof that policy students won’t always use technical skills to sort through conflicting data professionally is that Woodrow Wilson students don’t always do so here! When I encounter conflicting data in classes, I’m too often told we students should dig deeper and decide who’s right…later.
We can’t rely exclusively on the “the gold standard” professors teach us to love: data generated by randomized control trials (RCTs). This creates an easy top tier of information on too few topics. Additionally, all the emphasis we hear on the “gold standard” may lead us to trust in RCT-based research too easily. The best part of the WWS course on data-based decision making is hearing Professor Lorenzo Moreno talk about how complicated it can be to do the right thing in the evaluation field. All that glitters…
We policy students need more practice criticizing questionable research. We need more practice wading through data mess and taking and defending a stand – not on politics, as we do in the introductory 501 course, Politics and Public Policy, but a stand on what we think is the truth. We need more sophisticated conversations about what data to trust and about how to evaluate vendors of policy research when we cannot evaluate each product. We need more shorthand than one “gold” standard.
We also need to talk about making policy in a world where different “facts” are consumed by different constituencies, and the truth is always up for debate. It’s the world in which we live, and it’s likely to get worse. If the Woodrow Wilson School could prepare us to digest data soup and to help change these cooking trends, that would truly be in the nation’s service and in the service of all nations.
Sunday, October 23, 2011
African Energy Access: Is China a game-changer?
Phillip M. Hannam, PhD candidate
This summer in Nairobi, Kenya, I would often go vegetable shopping at a local open-air market. To my surprise, many of the vendors – native Kenyans – spoke Mandarin with the Chinese clientele, who had a distinct presence throughout the market. Nearby, massive concrete pillars and cantilevered steel beams rising above the city – the first elevated highway system in Kenya, courtesy of China – are a visible manifestation of growing development cooperation between China and Africa. Many Chinese and African scholars regard these investments as “win-win” partnerships, though Chinese state-owned institutions have also garnered criticism over resource interests and the disregard of humanitarian and environmental concerns in project planning.[1]
Beyond highways, hospitals, municipal water and waste systems, stadiums, and government buildings, China is also heavily invested in Africa’s electricity generation infrastructure. The scale of China’s involvement could provide electricity to millions in Africa who need it. And the energy could be renewable. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Seychelles, Jean-Paul Adam, recently expressed his optimism to the UN General Assembly:
Approximately 1.4 billion people lack access to electricity globally, and one billion more have unreliable electricity access.[3] Lack of modern energy services impairs attainment of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The World Bank predicts that an underperforming energy system results in a loss of 1-2% of annual economic growth potential.[4] Yet of the US$35-40 billion needed annually from now until 2030 to achieve universal energy access, only about 5% of this amount is expected through traditional development institutions. At this rate, the proportion of people with energy access is unlikely to improve significantly by 2030, the year the UN has called for universal access to modern energy services. Thus, China’s energy investments around the world – though hardly altruistic – could still help bring this goal into reach.
It is too early to tell if China’s investments in Africa will significantly change the outlook for the people of this resource-rich, but chronically energy-poor, continent. Nonetheless, I posit a few initial observations, expanded below:
1. China is a new major player for African energy access: According to a study by the World Bank, 34% of Chinese investments in African infrastructure are in electricity.[5] Of this, the vast majority is hydropower. A watchdog group, International Rivers, reports that Chinese financial institutions are building over 250 hydropower projects across the developing world, mostly in Africa and Southeast Asia. Large hydropower projects, on the scale that China builds them, are highly controversial. Chinese dams in Ethiopia, Sudan, Ghana, and elsewhere face intense opposition because of ecosystem damage and displacement of indigenous groups. Chinese developers remain unapologetic, and most African policymakers support the projects. The Gibe III project on the Omo River in Ethiopia, as one example, will provide 1,800MW of electricity – effectively doubling Ethiopia’s generating capacity.[6] The energy access provided by the project is weighted against the dam’s impact on hundreds of thousands of people who rely on the Omo River and its ecosystems for their livelihoods.[7]
Better governance of international development cooperation could make such projects more tolerable. The World Commission on Dams delineates how large hydropower may be sustainable in an environmental, social, and economic context, though the recommendations have largely been dismissed by Chinese developers (and the World Bank, for that matter).
Fortunately, China is investing beyond hydropower. China Longyuan Power Group is investing in several wind power projects in South Africa, on the scale of 100MW.[8] Hydrochina International Engineering Company is building wind farms at two sites in Ethiopia. Another Chinese state-owned company, Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., is supplying the wind turbines for the project.[9] A subsidiary of Chinese oil giant Sinopec has invested US$18.7 million to develop geothermal power potential across Kenya and the Rift Valley. China is also emerging in Africa’s nuclear power sector, exporting its domestic nuclear technology. China National Nuclear Corporation is considering developing a new nuclear power station in collaboration with South Africa. A Chinese-built nuclear power station is also under discussion for east Africa.[10]
2. China views Africa as a growth market: Beyond building new power stations, Chinese firms are investing in renewable energy manufacturing across Africa. Western solar power companies were active in the Kenyan market in the 1990s, but most pulled out due to high costs and low sales.[11] Today, the African renewables market is changing. Policies to incentivize grid-connected solar power are being considered in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda. For now, all solar panels demanded in Africa must be shipped from outside the continent – a financial and logistical problem that stifles growth of the industry.
China’s Tianpu Xianxing Enterprises, a prominent Chinese integrated solar manufacturer with exports around the world, is negotiating a major manufacturing hub in Nairobi. By creating a production base within Africa, shipping costs would be reduced and sale prices for panels may drop from US$310 to US$77 for a typical home system.[12]
In 2010, Suntech, China’s largest solar panel manufacturer, began investing several hundred million US dollars in a manufacturing base in South Africa capable of producing 100MW of capacity annually. The plant is expected to supply the growing South African solar market, which some analysts predict could reach US$1 billion annually. The creation of a manufacturing base within Africa increases the potential for skilled-job creation and technology transfer – desperately needed for the development of Africa’s fledgling electricity sector. It could also keep educated Africans from fleeing to jobs outside the region, as manufacturers within Africa put a premium on local skilled labor and technical skills.
3. Trends in Chinese investments following the World Bank: The World Bank has come under intense scrutiny in recent years regarding its role in financing large carbon intensive projects in energy and extractive industries. Coal is oftentimes the cheapest option when the price of carbon isn’t internalized. As a concession to international pressure, in 2011 the World Bank strictly limited future lending for coal power to the very poorest (non-IDA countries) countries. The World Bank’s energy strategy supports hydropower explicitly, calling it low-carbon electricity (though much evidence contests this) and noting that 90% of the hydropower resource in sub-Saharan Africa remains undeveloped.
Given China’s experience with coal domestically (which supplies 80% of Chinese electricity), Chinese investment in coal projects globally could fill the void left by the Bank’s exit from coal power in some countries. While no complete database exists of Chinese international projects, my own research indicates that Chinese firms have been involved in roughly 4GW of fossil power in Africa since 2000. China has several coal projects in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Senegal, and Botswana, as well as natural gas projects in Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana.[13]
Encouragingly, none of these projects were announced in the past two years, while most of the non-hydro renewable energy projects mentioned above were initiated during that time. It remains to be seen how China’s investment portfolio will change as a result of World Bank policy, but for now I am optimistic that China is investigating opportunities beyond hydropower and coal for its African energy investments.
Conclusion
Renewable energy is playing a growing role in Africa. China is a champion of this trend, particularly as it explores investing in renewable energy manufacturing capacity in southern and eastern Africa. Western firms remain largely absent in this market. Indeed, it appears that in the arena of development aid and development finance – once dominated by western powers – China is increasingly emerging as a leading player.
While huge investments in hydropower are disastrous for biodiversity and have significant human impacts, the electricity generated bodes well for energy access goals. Moreover, while China frequently comes under direct criticism for its development projects, China’s energy investment portfolio seems to be consistent with that of the World Bank. Stronger institutions are needed to ensure that large scale projects, whether invested by China or Western institutions, maximize benefits while eliminating humanitarian and environmental costs to the extent possible.
---------------------
References:
[1] Deborah Brautigam at American University is particularly fair and thorough in her treatment of China’s engagements in Africa. Visit her blog here.
[2] UN 65th Session. Quote from AE-Africa (27 September 2010). Link.
[3] International Energy Agency (2010). “World Energy Outlook”. Executive Summary. Link
[4] World Bank (2009). “Africa’s infrastructure, a time for transformation.” World Bank Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic.
[5] Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C. and Pushak, N. (2009). “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financer for Sub-Saharan Africa”. Trends and Policy Options, No.5. Link
[6] BBC, 26 March 2009: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7959444.stm
[7] Last month’s decision by the Burmese Government to shelve the $3.6 billion Myitsone hydropower project being developed by a Chinese parastatal company was celebrated as a victory for local and international activists. Yet by most guesses, Chinese hydropower investment will continue unabated.
[8] Wee, S. and Walet, L. (26 August 2010). “UPDATE 1-Suntech signs MOU to build S.Africa solar plants.” Reuters. Link.
[9] iStockAnalyst (10 January 2011). “Goldwind signs wind poer equipment contract with HydroChina in Ethiopia.” Link.
[10] Reuters (25 May 2011). “China interested in building nuclear power plant in E.Africa, IBI Corp says” Alertnet. Link.
[11] Japan is an exception to recent Western neglect of the African solar market. Japan donated US$7.4 million to Morocco to build a 1MW PV installation, another US$13.7 million for a 1MW station in Botswana, and a grant to Malawi for construction of a solar array on the Kamuzu International airport (AE-Africa 2010b).
[12] Disenyana, T. (February 2009). “China in the African Solar Energy Sector: Kenya Case Study.” South African Institute of International Affairs: Occassional Paper No.25 – China in Africa Project. Link.
[13] Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C. and Pushak, N. (2009). “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financer for Sub-Saharan Africa.” Trends and Policy Options, No.5. Link.; Macauhub (13 June 2006). "China’s CITIC to finance Brazilian thermoelectric power plant in Rio Grande do Sul." Link.
This summer in Nairobi, Kenya, I would often go vegetable shopping at a local open-air market. To my surprise, many of the vendors – native Kenyans – spoke Mandarin with the Chinese clientele, who had a distinct presence throughout the market. Nearby, massive concrete pillars and cantilevered steel beams rising above the city – the first elevated highway system in Kenya, courtesy of China – are a visible manifestation of growing development cooperation between China and Africa. Many Chinese and African scholars regard these investments as “win-win” partnerships, though Chinese state-owned institutions have also garnered criticism over resource interests and the disregard of humanitarian and environmental concerns in project planning.[1]
Beyond highways, hospitals, municipal water and waste systems, stadiums, and government buildings, China is also heavily invested in Africa’s electricity generation infrastructure. The scale of China’s involvement could provide electricity to millions in Africa who need it. And the energy could be renewable. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Seychelles, Jean-Paul Adam, recently expressed his optimism to the UN General Assembly:
“China and Africa have an ideal opportunity to work together to set an example for the world on best practices [in] eco-friendly technology transfer, to enhance the development of renewable energy.”[2]
Approximately 1.4 billion people lack access to electricity globally, and one billion more have unreliable electricity access.[3] Lack of modern energy services impairs attainment of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The World Bank predicts that an underperforming energy system results in a loss of 1-2% of annual economic growth potential.[4] Yet of the US$35-40 billion needed annually from now until 2030 to achieve universal energy access, only about 5% of this amount is expected through traditional development institutions. At this rate, the proportion of people with energy access is unlikely to improve significantly by 2030, the year the UN has called for universal access to modern energy services. Thus, China’s energy investments around the world – though hardly altruistic – could still help bring this goal into reach.
It is too early to tell if China’s investments in Africa will significantly change the outlook for the people of this resource-rich, but chronically energy-poor, continent. Nonetheless, I posit a few initial observations, expanded below:
- China is a new major player in Africa’s electricity sector: China’s presence in a range of renewable energies across the continent is welcome from the standpoint of increasing energy access and helping to achieve the UN MDGs. Unfortunately, the vast majority is in hydropower, which carries its own deleterious baggage.
- China views Africa as a growth market: Chinese companies see Africa as a new frontier for renewable energy – using China’s domestically-honed comparative advantages in solar, wind, and hydropower technology to employ Chinese firms, open market opportunities, and base manufacturing capacity within Africa. Western companies reticent to invest in Africa may miss emerging opportunities for renewable energy across the continent.
- The World Bank is shifting away from coal. China’s focus is likewise migrating to renewables: Chinese energy investments closely parallel those at the World Bank, where the focus is (slowly) shifting away from coal. While this unfortunately means a lot of new hydropower, it could also mean a lower coal and carbon trajectory for African development.
1. China is a new major player for African energy access: According to a study by the World Bank, 34% of Chinese investments in African infrastructure are in electricity.[5] Of this, the vast majority is hydropower. A watchdog group, International Rivers, reports that Chinese financial institutions are building over 250 hydropower projects across the developing world, mostly in Africa and Southeast Asia. Large hydropower projects, on the scale that China builds them, are highly controversial. Chinese dams in Ethiopia, Sudan, Ghana, and elsewhere face intense opposition because of ecosystem damage and displacement of indigenous groups. Chinese developers remain unapologetic, and most African policymakers support the projects. The Gibe III project on the Omo River in Ethiopia, as one example, will provide 1,800MW of electricity – effectively doubling Ethiopia’s generating capacity.[6] The energy access provided by the project is weighted against the dam’s impact on hundreds of thousands of people who rely on the Omo River and its ecosystems for their livelihoods.[7]
Better governance of international development cooperation could make such projects more tolerable. The World Commission on Dams delineates how large hydropower may be sustainable in an environmental, social, and economic context, though the recommendations have largely been dismissed by Chinese developers (and the World Bank, for that matter).
Fortunately, China is investing beyond hydropower. China Longyuan Power Group is investing in several wind power projects in South Africa, on the scale of 100MW.[8] Hydrochina International Engineering Company is building wind farms at two sites in Ethiopia. Another Chinese state-owned company, Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., is supplying the wind turbines for the project.[9] A subsidiary of Chinese oil giant Sinopec has invested US$18.7 million to develop geothermal power potential across Kenya and the Rift Valley. China is also emerging in Africa’s nuclear power sector, exporting its domestic nuclear technology. China National Nuclear Corporation is considering developing a new nuclear power station in collaboration with South Africa. A Chinese-built nuclear power station is also under discussion for east Africa.[10]
2. China views Africa as a growth market: Beyond building new power stations, Chinese firms are investing in renewable energy manufacturing across Africa. Western solar power companies were active in the Kenyan market in the 1990s, but most pulled out due to high costs and low sales.[11] Today, the African renewables market is changing. Policies to incentivize grid-connected solar power are being considered in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda. For now, all solar panels demanded in Africa must be shipped from outside the continent – a financial and logistical problem that stifles growth of the industry.
China’s Tianpu Xianxing Enterprises, a prominent Chinese integrated solar manufacturer with exports around the world, is negotiating a major manufacturing hub in Nairobi. By creating a production base within Africa, shipping costs would be reduced and sale prices for panels may drop from US$310 to US$77 for a typical home system.[12]
In 2010, Suntech, China’s largest solar panel manufacturer, began investing several hundred million US dollars in a manufacturing base in South Africa capable of producing 100MW of capacity annually. The plant is expected to supply the growing South African solar market, which some analysts predict could reach US$1 billion annually. The creation of a manufacturing base within Africa increases the potential for skilled-job creation and technology transfer – desperately needed for the development of Africa’s fledgling electricity sector. It could also keep educated Africans from fleeing to jobs outside the region, as manufacturers within Africa put a premium on local skilled labor and technical skills.
3. Trends in Chinese investments following the World Bank: The World Bank has come under intense scrutiny in recent years regarding its role in financing large carbon intensive projects in energy and extractive industries. Coal is oftentimes the cheapest option when the price of carbon isn’t internalized. As a concession to international pressure, in 2011 the World Bank strictly limited future lending for coal power to the very poorest (non-IDA countries) countries. The World Bank’s energy strategy supports hydropower explicitly, calling it low-carbon electricity (though much evidence contests this) and noting that 90% of the hydropower resource in sub-Saharan Africa remains undeveloped.
Given China’s experience with coal domestically (which supplies 80% of Chinese electricity), Chinese investment in coal projects globally could fill the void left by the Bank’s exit from coal power in some countries. While no complete database exists of Chinese international projects, my own research indicates that Chinese firms have been involved in roughly 4GW of fossil power in Africa since 2000. China has several coal projects in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Senegal, and Botswana, as well as natural gas projects in Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana.[13]
Encouragingly, none of these projects were announced in the past two years, while most of the non-hydro renewable energy projects mentioned above were initiated during that time. It remains to be seen how China’s investment portfolio will change as a result of World Bank policy, but for now I am optimistic that China is investigating opportunities beyond hydropower and coal for its African energy investments.
Conclusion
Renewable energy is playing a growing role in Africa. China is a champion of this trend, particularly as it explores investing in renewable energy manufacturing capacity in southern and eastern Africa. Western firms remain largely absent in this market. Indeed, it appears that in the arena of development aid and development finance – once dominated by western powers – China is increasingly emerging as a leading player.
While huge investments in hydropower are disastrous for biodiversity and have significant human impacts, the electricity generated bodes well for energy access goals. Moreover, while China frequently comes under direct criticism for its development projects, China’s energy investment portfolio seems to be consistent with that of the World Bank. Stronger institutions are needed to ensure that large scale projects, whether invested by China or Western institutions, maximize benefits while eliminating humanitarian and environmental costs to the extent possible.
---------------------
References:
[1] Deborah Brautigam at American University is particularly fair and thorough in her treatment of China’s engagements in Africa. Visit her blog here.
[2] UN 65th Session. Quote from AE-Africa (27 September 2010). Link.
[3] International Energy Agency (2010). “World Energy Outlook”. Executive Summary. Link
[4] World Bank (2009). “Africa’s infrastructure, a time for transformation.” World Bank Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic.
[5] Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C. and Pushak, N. (2009). “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financer for Sub-Saharan Africa”. Trends and Policy Options, No.5. Link
[6] BBC, 26 March 2009: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7959444.stm
[7] Last month’s decision by the Burmese Government to shelve the $3.6 billion Myitsone hydropower project being developed by a Chinese parastatal company was celebrated as a victory for local and international activists. Yet by most guesses, Chinese hydropower investment will continue unabated.
[8] Wee, S. and Walet, L. (26 August 2010). “UPDATE 1-Suntech signs MOU to build S.Africa solar plants.” Reuters. Link.
[9] iStockAnalyst (10 January 2011). “Goldwind signs wind poer equipment contract with HydroChina in Ethiopia.” Link.
[10] Reuters (25 May 2011). “China interested in building nuclear power plant in E.Africa, IBI Corp says” Alertnet. Link.
[11] Japan is an exception to recent Western neglect of the African solar market. Japan donated US$7.4 million to Morocco to build a 1MW PV installation, another US$13.7 million for a 1MW station in Botswana, and a grant to Malawi for construction of a solar array on the Kamuzu International airport (AE-Africa 2010b).
[12] Disenyana, T. (February 2009). “China in the African Solar Energy Sector: Kenya Case Study.” South African Institute of International Affairs: Occassional Paper No.25 – China in Africa Project. Link.
[13] Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C. and Pushak, N. (2009). “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financer for Sub-Saharan Africa.” Trends and Policy Options, No.5. Link.; Macauhub (13 June 2006). "China’s CITIC to finance Brazilian thermoelectric power plant in Rio Grande do Sul." Link.
Kenya's Operation Protect the Nation: Yet another foreign intervention in Somalia
Beza Tesfaye, MPA
What is the first thing that comes to mind when someone mentions Somalia? Failed state. Sadly Somalia is indeed the epitome of what state failure entails—a weak government with power limited to the capital Mogadishu, a famine that threatens the lives of millions, rampant piracy and lawlessness, and an amorphous militia claiming to control most of the country under a strict version of Sharia Law. Yet Somalia’s recent and historical problems can only be fully understood in light of external involvement in Somali politics. The recent move by the Kenyan government to send troops into Somalia to fight Al Shabab warrants a brief discussion of how foreign invasions contribute to the perpetual crisis in Somalia.
Many of us vaguely remember seeing images of dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu on the evening news. Before this decisive turning point, a UN humanitarian mission backed by US forces was involved in a large-scale humanitarian intervention to bring famine relief to starving Somalis. At the time, the US made an imprudent decision to kill and/or capture Somalia’s most powerful warlord, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The mission ended in failure and embarrassment for the US government and with a tacit agreement to no longer directly interfere in the volatile nation’s affairs.
Some time passed and it seemed Somalia had fallen off everyone’s radar, with new crises emerging in other African countries like Rwanda, Liberia, and Congo. The popular image of Somalia remained, a “basket-case” country without a fixed state and governed by clan-based warlords. However, it was during this time that a semblance of stability and governance began to emerge under a network of Islamist courts known as the Islamist Courts Union (ICU). This loosely-organized group was able to bring peace and began to provide basic social services such as education and healthcare that had been non-existent for years.
Despite this brief window of stability in the early 2000s, the situation in Somalia has deteriorated far worse than anyone could have imagined. For reasons that have never been well articulated, the Ethiopian army – with financial and military support from the US – invaded Somalia in 2006, destabilizing the ICU. Three years later, the Ethiopian forces gave up the intractable military mission having achieved nothing and inadvertently fueling the growth of an unmanageable force that has since consumed Somalia—Al Shabab.
Less than three years after Ethiopia’s failed invasion and departure, Kenya has now joined the class of nations that try to “fix” the Somali problem through force. On October 16th, Kenya launched Operation Protect the Nation, sending hundreds of troops across the border into neighboring Somalia. Despite the Kenyan government’s rationalization that sending troops into Somalia was for the purpose of maintaining territorial sovereignty after a recent string of kidnappings within Kenya, this action has been met with mixed reactions. Below I highlight a few issues of concern that question the rationality of this decision:
1) First, it is important to note that Al Shabab has not claimed responsibility for the recent kidnappings of foreign tourists and aid workers along the Somalia/Kenya border (a rare precedent for an organization that has never shied away from limelight when it comes to acts of terror it has committed—e.g. the July 2010 bombings in Kampala, Uganda). More likely, the crimes were committed by Somali pirates or bandits seeking ransom rather than any type of political statement. This raises the important point that the problem with Somalia is not just Al Shabab—it is also lawlessness, underdevelopment, poverty, and a lack of institutions to effectively govern the fragmented society. A foreign invasion, even if it is able to rid Somalia of Al Shabab, is probably unlikely and unwilling to address these deeper-rooted structural sources of conflict and instability in Somalia that have inevitably spilled over into neighboring countries like Kenya.
2) The Kenyan government for some time has maintained a hands-off approach towards Somalia, seeking to secure its porous border areas, rather than involving itself directly in Somali internal affairs. Kenya has also been accommodating towards hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees and the beleaguered transitional government of Somalia. It is surprising, then, that Nairobi should suddenly make such an unpredictable policy change at this point—possibly opening the nation up for retaliatory attacks from aggrieved extremists. It should be noted, for example, that northwestern Kenya has been plagued for years by attacks from Ethiopian Toposas and Merrile cattle raiders, but the idea of invading southern Ethiopia to stop these killings has never been entertained. Succinctly put, Kenya is not an aggressive nation, and the recent declaration of war raises important questions about what or who urged the Kenyan government to invade Somalia.
3) Most importantly, what will this new foreign intervention mean for Somalis who are already suffering from the worst famine to hit the region in 50 years? The implications are hard to predict but what is certain is that fighting between Al Shabab and Kenyan troops as well as Kenyan air raids are likely to result in civilian casualties. Inevitably, this is a common cost of any armed conflict but one that is often justified by clear positive outcomes. In this situation, it is unclear what end results the Kenyan government seeks to achieve. If the aim is to completely eradicate Al Shabab, then Kenya is setting itself up for a long and potentially unwinnable conflict against a militant group that may be able to diffuse into Somali society and remerge even stronger. This is particularly likely if Somalis perceive the invasion as an unwelcome foreign incursion on their homeland, as was the case with the Ethiopian and U.S. military interventions. By attacking Somalia when Al Shabab was beginning to lose legitimacy and control in the country (having retreated from Mogadishu just this summer), Kenya may have grant the extremist group an unexpected lifeline. Without speculating too much of what will happen in the coming months, it suffices to say that war is detrimental to Somalis, especially a poorly-planned invasion with only vague objectives.
What is the first thing that comes to mind when someone mentions Somalia? Failed state. Sadly Somalia is indeed the epitome of what state failure entails—a weak government with power limited to the capital Mogadishu, a famine that threatens the lives of millions, rampant piracy and lawlessness, and an amorphous militia claiming to control most of the country under a strict version of Sharia Law. Yet Somalia’s recent and historical problems can only be fully understood in light of external involvement in Somali politics. The recent move by the Kenyan government to send troops into Somalia to fight Al Shabab warrants a brief discussion of how foreign invasions contribute to the perpetual crisis in Somalia.
Many of us vaguely remember seeing images of dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu on the evening news. Before this decisive turning point, a UN humanitarian mission backed by US forces was involved in a large-scale humanitarian intervention to bring famine relief to starving Somalis. At the time, the US made an imprudent decision to kill and/or capture Somalia’s most powerful warlord, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The mission ended in failure and embarrassment for the US government and with a tacit agreement to no longer directly interfere in the volatile nation’s affairs.
Some time passed and it seemed Somalia had fallen off everyone’s radar, with new crises emerging in other African countries like Rwanda, Liberia, and Congo. The popular image of Somalia remained, a “basket-case” country without a fixed state and governed by clan-based warlords. However, it was during this time that a semblance of stability and governance began to emerge under a network of Islamist courts known as the Islamist Courts Union (ICU). This loosely-organized group was able to bring peace and began to provide basic social services such as education and healthcare that had been non-existent for years.
Despite this brief window of stability in the early 2000s, the situation in Somalia has deteriorated far worse than anyone could have imagined. For reasons that have never been well articulated, the Ethiopian army – with financial and military support from the US – invaded Somalia in 2006, destabilizing the ICU. Three years later, the Ethiopian forces gave up the intractable military mission having achieved nothing and inadvertently fueling the growth of an unmanageable force that has since consumed Somalia—Al Shabab.
Less than three years after Ethiopia’s failed invasion and departure, Kenya has now joined the class of nations that try to “fix” the Somali problem through force. On October 16th, Kenya launched Operation Protect the Nation, sending hundreds of troops across the border into neighboring Somalia. Despite the Kenyan government’s rationalization that sending troops into Somalia was for the purpose of maintaining territorial sovereignty after a recent string of kidnappings within Kenya, this action has been met with mixed reactions. Below I highlight a few issues of concern that question the rationality of this decision:
1) First, it is important to note that Al Shabab has not claimed responsibility for the recent kidnappings of foreign tourists and aid workers along the Somalia/Kenya border (a rare precedent for an organization that has never shied away from limelight when it comes to acts of terror it has committed—e.g. the July 2010 bombings in Kampala, Uganda). More likely, the crimes were committed by Somali pirates or bandits seeking ransom rather than any type of political statement. This raises the important point that the problem with Somalia is not just Al Shabab—it is also lawlessness, underdevelopment, poverty, and a lack of institutions to effectively govern the fragmented society. A foreign invasion, even if it is able to rid Somalia of Al Shabab, is probably unlikely and unwilling to address these deeper-rooted structural sources of conflict and instability in Somalia that have inevitably spilled over into neighboring countries like Kenya.
2) The Kenyan government for some time has maintained a hands-off approach towards Somalia, seeking to secure its porous border areas, rather than involving itself directly in Somali internal affairs. Kenya has also been accommodating towards hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees and the beleaguered transitional government of Somalia. It is surprising, then, that Nairobi should suddenly make such an unpredictable policy change at this point—possibly opening the nation up for retaliatory attacks from aggrieved extremists. It should be noted, for example, that northwestern Kenya has been plagued for years by attacks from Ethiopian Toposas and Merrile cattle raiders, but the idea of invading southern Ethiopia to stop these killings has never been entertained. Succinctly put, Kenya is not an aggressive nation, and the recent declaration of war raises important questions about what or who urged the Kenyan government to invade Somalia.
3) Most importantly, what will this new foreign intervention mean for Somalis who are already suffering from the worst famine to hit the region in 50 years? The implications are hard to predict but what is certain is that fighting between Al Shabab and Kenyan troops as well as Kenyan air raids are likely to result in civilian casualties. Inevitably, this is a common cost of any armed conflict but one that is often justified by clear positive outcomes. In this situation, it is unclear what end results the Kenyan government seeks to achieve. If the aim is to completely eradicate Al Shabab, then Kenya is setting itself up for a long and potentially unwinnable conflict against a militant group that may be able to diffuse into Somali society and remerge even stronger. This is particularly likely if Somalis perceive the invasion as an unwelcome foreign incursion on their homeland, as was the case with the Ethiopian and U.S. military interventions. By attacking Somalia when Al Shabab was beginning to lose legitimacy and control in the country (having retreated from Mogadishu just this summer), Kenya may have grant the extremist group an unexpected lifeline. Without speculating too much of what will happen in the coming months, it suffices to say that war is detrimental to Somalis, especially a poorly-planned invasion with only vague objectives.
Immigration: The costs of a broken system
Sebastian Chaskel, MPA
On October 14th and 15th Princeton’s campus hosted Voz Latina 2011, the third annual symposium organized by the university’s Office of Academic Affairs and Diversity and the Latino Graduate Student Association in honor of Latino Heritage Month. This year’s topic: "Immigration in the 21st Century—the Costs of a Broken System."
The conference organizers could not have chosen a more opportune moment for a conversation on immigration. While the percentage of foreign-born residents in the United States has skyrocketed from 5% in the 1960s to 13% today, some state governments are implementing the strongest anti-immigrant policies the country has ever seen, reflecting a strong xenophobia in certain regions. The United States’ 11.2 million undocumented immigrants—half of them Mexican—now represent 5% of the US labor force. Yet they continue to work in the shadows, lacking the rights and protections that the rest of the population enjoys. As Princeton Professor Douglas Massey commented in his presentation, the structural conditions are being created for a semi-permanent underclass in the United States.
The symposium’s guests highlighted the elevated costs of a broken system. Enrique Morones, the founder of Border Angels, mentioned that about 10,000 people have died on the US-Mexico border attempting to cross it. His organization places water, blankets, and food on the border in an attempt to prevent further deaths, and records the stories of those that have perished in order to give a human face to the statistics. Professor Jorge Bustamante from Notre Dame University commented on his findings as UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants from 2005 to 2011. During this time, he witnessed constitutional violations executed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) agents who entered homes without warrants and seized occupants without legal bases. At the time the US government questioned Bustamante’s accusation, but a 2009 report by the Immigration Justice Clinic at Yeshiva University's Cardozo Law School, Constitution on Ice, seconded Bustamante’s findings, “reveal[ing] an established pattern of misconduct by ICE agents” in the region covered by the study.
Princeton Professor Patricia Fernandez-Kelly argued that undocumented immigrants are more likely than others to suffer from the country’s broken health system. Her research shows that those that choose to immigrate to the United States are healthier than the average person in their countries of origin, but health problems emerge once they enter the United States. As immigrants assimilate, they and their descendents pick up unhealthy smoking, drinking, and eating habits, along with the diseases that accompany them, such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease. Their health is further impaired by limited access to health services due to state and local policies nationwide which limit immigrant access to basic medical care. New Jersey and Miami-Dade County stand out for the services they offer immigrant populations, while San Diego is notorious for its barriers to health access.
Professor Marta Tienda focused on Latino education trends, lamenting that although 16% of the American population is Hispanic, only 6% of college degree holders identify as such. She implored the Latino students present to do their part by encouraging and assisting other Hispanics in their college application processes. “Bring along two others, one in each hand,” Professor Tienda urged.
The national immigration correspondent for the New York Times, Julia Preston, explained that the harsh state anti-immigration laws being implemented across the country, such as Alabama’s HB56, and Arizona’s SB 1070, reflect the disagreements between states and the federal government over immigration reform. Professor Massey argued that these and other restrictive developments, such as greater border control, have not decreased illegal immigration, but have encouraged illegal immigrants to “hunker down” in the US, as the costs of traveling home and returning have increased. “Coyotes,” or smugglers, now charges $5,000-$7,000 per person brought to the country, compared to $1,000 or $2,000 just five years ago. Illegal migration has dropped in recent years, but this is due to decreased job openings in the United States, greater legal migration opportunities, and reduced fertility in Mexico. As a result, there is a net inflow of zero illegal immigrants to the U.S. now—fewer people are coming, but fewer people are also going back.
In terms of what should be done, both Professor Bustamante and Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) Professor Denise Dresser argued that the ideal policy response would be a bilateral agreement between Mexico and the United States on immigration. Legislative reform by nature is unilateral, Bustamante explained, and will therefore not be able to solve a bilateral problem. Such an agreement was on the table when Vicente Fox and George W. Bush led Mexico and the US, respectively, but the notion of a bilateral agreement disappeared on September 11, 2001. Immigration is now seen through a prism of security and thus such an agreement is no longer a viable option.
Professor Massey argued that the US is closer to passing comprehensive immigration reform than most think. The border is now secure and a system by which Mexicans and others can apply to work in the United States is already in place. The one outstanding issue is dealing with the 11.2 million unauthorized immigrants in the country, and Massey sees the only feasible and humane policy choice as 1) granting automatic legal status to everyone who was brought illegally to the US as a child, and 2) creating a system by which those that came as adults can gain citizenship.
Julia Preston predicted that policymakers will not touch immigration reform until after the 2012 presidential election due to the sensitivity of the subject to constituents. Professor Massey explained that the uneasiness many middle-age Americans feels about the increasing level of foreign-born residents in the US can be partly explained in that they came to age in the 1950s-60s, a time in which the foreign-born percentage of US residents was at an exceptional low of about 5%. The current 14% is closer to the country’s historical record, but it is nevertheless s a new reality for that generation. Professor Dresser emphasized that it is in both the United States’ and Mexico’s interest to find a sustainable solution and encouraged those interested in seeing reform, including the Mexican government, to pressure American legislators at a local level in order to create the incentives for reform.
A population of 11 million residing in the US without access to basic rights clashes with the values American society purports to uphold. While there was variance among the participants as to the best policy choice and the most efficient strategy to achieve reform, there was unanimous agreement in recognizing that the current situation is inhumane, dangerous, and unsustainable. Lest the United States become a country with permanent first- and second-class citizens, with different sets of rights and protections, immigration reform should be an urgent priority for the country’s decision makers.
On October 14th and 15th Princeton’s campus hosted Voz Latina 2011, the third annual symposium organized by the university’s Office of Academic Affairs and Diversity and the Latino Graduate Student Association in honor of Latino Heritage Month. This year’s topic: "Immigration in the 21st Century—the Costs of a Broken System."
The conference organizers could not have chosen a more opportune moment for a conversation on immigration. While the percentage of foreign-born residents in the United States has skyrocketed from 5% in the 1960s to 13% today, some state governments are implementing the strongest anti-immigrant policies the country has ever seen, reflecting a strong xenophobia in certain regions. The United States’ 11.2 million undocumented immigrants—half of them Mexican—now represent 5% of the US labor force. Yet they continue to work in the shadows, lacking the rights and protections that the rest of the population enjoys. As Princeton Professor Douglas Massey commented in his presentation, the structural conditions are being created for a semi-permanent underclass in the United States.
The symposium’s guests highlighted the elevated costs of a broken system. Enrique Morones, the founder of Border Angels, mentioned that about 10,000 people have died on the US-Mexico border attempting to cross it. His organization places water, blankets, and food on the border in an attempt to prevent further deaths, and records the stories of those that have perished in order to give a human face to the statistics. Professor Jorge Bustamante from Notre Dame University commented on his findings as UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants from 2005 to 2011. During this time, he witnessed constitutional violations executed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) agents who entered homes without warrants and seized occupants without legal bases. At the time the US government questioned Bustamante’s accusation, but a 2009 report by the Immigration Justice Clinic at Yeshiva University's Cardozo Law School, Constitution on Ice, seconded Bustamante’s findings, “reveal[ing] an established pattern of misconduct by ICE agents” in the region covered by the study.
Princeton Professor Patricia Fernandez-Kelly argued that undocumented immigrants are more likely than others to suffer from the country’s broken health system. Her research shows that those that choose to immigrate to the United States are healthier than the average person in their countries of origin, but health problems emerge once they enter the United States. As immigrants assimilate, they and their descendents pick up unhealthy smoking, drinking, and eating habits, along with the diseases that accompany them, such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease. Their health is further impaired by limited access to health services due to state and local policies nationwide which limit immigrant access to basic medical care. New Jersey and Miami-Dade County stand out for the services they offer immigrant populations, while San Diego is notorious for its barriers to health access.
Professor Marta Tienda focused on Latino education trends, lamenting that although 16% of the American population is Hispanic, only 6% of college degree holders identify as such. She implored the Latino students present to do their part by encouraging and assisting other Hispanics in their college application processes. “Bring along two others, one in each hand,” Professor Tienda urged.
The national immigration correspondent for the New York Times, Julia Preston, explained that the harsh state anti-immigration laws being implemented across the country, such as Alabama’s HB56, and Arizona’s SB 1070, reflect the disagreements between states and the federal government over immigration reform. Professor Massey argued that these and other restrictive developments, such as greater border control, have not decreased illegal immigration, but have encouraged illegal immigrants to “hunker down” in the US, as the costs of traveling home and returning have increased. “Coyotes,” or smugglers, now charges $5,000-$7,000 per person brought to the country, compared to $1,000 or $2,000 just five years ago. Illegal migration has dropped in recent years, but this is due to decreased job openings in the United States, greater legal migration opportunities, and reduced fertility in Mexico. As a result, there is a net inflow of zero illegal immigrants to the U.S. now—fewer people are coming, but fewer people are also going back.
In terms of what should be done, both Professor Bustamante and Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) Professor Denise Dresser argued that the ideal policy response would be a bilateral agreement between Mexico and the United States on immigration. Legislative reform by nature is unilateral, Bustamante explained, and will therefore not be able to solve a bilateral problem. Such an agreement was on the table when Vicente Fox and George W. Bush led Mexico and the US, respectively, but the notion of a bilateral agreement disappeared on September 11, 2001. Immigration is now seen through a prism of security and thus such an agreement is no longer a viable option.
Professor Massey argued that the US is closer to passing comprehensive immigration reform than most think. The border is now secure and a system by which Mexicans and others can apply to work in the United States is already in place. The one outstanding issue is dealing with the 11.2 million unauthorized immigrants in the country, and Massey sees the only feasible and humane policy choice as 1) granting automatic legal status to everyone who was brought illegally to the US as a child, and 2) creating a system by which those that came as adults can gain citizenship.
Julia Preston predicted that policymakers will not touch immigration reform until after the 2012 presidential election due to the sensitivity of the subject to constituents. Professor Massey explained that the uneasiness many middle-age Americans feels about the increasing level of foreign-born residents in the US can be partly explained in that they came to age in the 1950s-60s, a time in which the foreign-born percentage of US residents was at an exceptional low of about 5%. The current 14% is closer to the country’s historical record, but it is nevertheless s a new reality for that generation. Professor Dresser emphasized that it is in both the United States’ and Mexico’s interest to find a sustainable solution and encouraged those interested in seeing reform, including the Mexican government, to pressure American legislators at a local level in order to create the incentives for reform.
A population of 11 million residing in the US without access to basic rights clashes with the values American society purports to uphold. While there was variance among the participants as to the best policy choice and the most efficient strategy to achieve reform, there was unanimous agreement in recognizing that the current situation is inhumane, dangerous, and unsustainable. Lest the United States become a country with permanent first- and second-class citizens, with different sets of rights and protections, immigration reform should be an urgent priority for the country’s decision makers.
Monday, October 17, 2011
Attention Women: RUN!
Christina Henderson, MPA
Back in the day when Michele Bachmann was leading in the Republican presidential primary (i.e., this summer), I was doubled over with grief at the idea that she could be first. Call me crazy, but I hope whoever achieves the honor of becoming the first woman to win the presidential nomination of major political party does not have to be convinced that the Founding Fathers did not in fact outlaw slavery.
Now that Bachmann’s star has fallen, I am concerned that neither political party has a deep enough bench to field a viable female candidate for president in the next three years. Currently, there are only six women serving as governors, 17 women in the United States Senate, and 72 in the House of Representatives. If we control for age, experience, name recognition, likability, alternative ambitions, and public displays of wackiness (yes, this is applies to male candidates too because wackiness knows no bounds), the numbers look even bleaker. We have got to get more women off the sidelines and into the field!
A 2009 study conducted by Stanford University and the University of Chicago found that on average, women in Congress introduce more legislation, attract more co-sponsors, and secure more resources for their districts and states than their male counterparts. In general, women in government are known to get things done and not take no for an answer. This is not to diminish the impact of men, but there are times when the fortitude and deep abiding commitment of women is stronger than that of said counterparts. And at this time in our nation’s history, it is needed.
In the last ten months, we’ve witnessed an unbelievable war on women across the country. From "forcible rape" to Planned Parenthood, from the assault on public employees (the majority of whom are female) to allowing hospitals to deny pregnant women life-saving care, can we please call off the vultures?! Now, I am not expecting every woman who decides to run for office to be progressive and pro-choice (it would be nice, but I’m realistic). However, when a city decides to decriminalize domestic violence over a budget dispute with its county counterparts, I would hope all the women could come together as a collective and say: “Are you serious?!”
We need more women running and serving in public office. Now, I would be remiss not to mention the difficulties involved in running for office. As a veteran campaign staffer, I know campaigns are not for the fainthearted. They are tough—physically, mentally, and spiritually. And for women—Democrat or Republican—it’s harder in ways men cannot even fathom. You will get frustrated, you may want to quit, and yes, it is possible that you may even lose your race. But know that hopefully because of your efforts the next time a woman runs, it will be a little easier that go around. When you are woman seeking to break political glass ceilings, the process is as much about you as the next five who follow. (Hillary to Bachmann: “You’re welcome.”) Don’t sit this opportunity out. Join the other incredible women in our nation’s history who have dared to define the role women play in politics on their own terms. Your country needs you.
Back in the day when Michele Bachmann was leading in the Republican presidential primary (i.e., this summer), I was doubled over with grief at the idea that she could be first. Call me crazy, but I hope whoever achieves the honor of becoming the first woman to win the presidential nomination of major political party does not have to be convinced that the Founding Fathers did not in fact outlaw slavery.
Now that Bachmann’s star has fallen, I am concerned that neither political party has a deep enough bench to field a viable female candidate for president in the next three years. Currently, there are only six women serving as governors, 17 women in the United States Senate, and 72 in the House of Representatives. If we control for age, experience, name recognition, likability, alternative ambitions, and public displays of wackiness (yes, this is applies to male candidates too because wackiness knows no bounds), the numbers look even bleaker. We have got to get more women off the sidelines and into the field!
A 2009 study conducted by Stanford University and the University of Chicago found that on average, women in Congress introduce more legislation, attract more co-sponsors, and secure more resources for their districts and states than their male counterparts. In general, women in government are known to get things done and not take no for an answer. This is not to diminish the impact of men, but there are times when the fortitude and deep abiding commitment of women is stronger than that of said counterparts. And at this time in our nation’s history, it is needed.
In the last ten months, we’ve witnessed an unbelievable war on women across the country. From "forcible rape" to Planned Parenthood, from the assault on public employees (the majority of whom are female) to allowing hospitals to deny pregnant women life-saving care, can we please call off the vultures?! Now, I am not expecting every woman who decides to run for office to be progressive and pro-choice (it would be nice, but I’m realistic). However, when a city decides to decriminalize domestic violence over a budget dispute with its county counterparts, I would hope all the women could come together as a collective and say: “Are you serious?!”
We need more women running and serving in public office. Now, I would be remiss not to mention the difficulties involved in running for office. As a veteran campaign staffer, I know campaigns are not for the fainthearted. They are tough—physically, mentally, and spiritually. And for women—Democrat or Republican—it’s harder in ways men cannot even fathom. You will get frustrated, you may want to quit, and yes, it is possible that you may even lose your race. But know that hopefully because of your efforts the next time a woman runs, it will be a little easier that go around. When you are woman seeking to break political glass ceilings, the process is as much about you as the next five who follow. (Hillary to Bachmann: “You’re welcome.”) Don’t sit this opportunity out. Join the other incredible women in our nation’s history who have dared to define the role women play in politics on their own terms. Your country needs you.
The Colonization of Africa, Part II: Energy
Jared Crooks, MPA
It’s been almost 60 years since the British government gave up its audacious plan to build an African transcontinental railroad from Cape Town to Cairo. The first question that should come to mind is, “How is that even possible?” Well, it was. Just take a look at the map showing the division of the African continent at the height of colonialism. All of the light blue territory belonged to the UK.
I won’t start a lengthy diatribe on territorial rights, because that debate has been over for a long time. The last African country to gain independence did so in the 1990s.
But what was the point of African colonization? Well, certain parts of Africa are rich in natural resources (gold, diamonds, coffee, rubber etc.), which makes them highly desirable and attainable by the militarily-able countries. But now in the technology and information era, countries are in need of a certain kind of natural resource far more valuable than rubber: energy!
Yes, yes, we have all seen the graphs that show the trending line for the world’s energy needs for the next 50 years. But just in case: in a word, the world’s supply of oil is drying up and our demand is ever-increasing. Hence, our concentration on alternative energy solutions. (Well, that and climate change.)
Africa is chock full of potential alternative energy waiting to be tapped. If used correctly, 1/3 of the continent of Africa could be powered by solar energy trapped in the Sahara desert, 1/3 of the continent could also be powered by hydro-energy trapped by its rivers (e.g. the Nile) and amazingly 1/3 of the continent could be powered by geothermal energy (i.e. natural hot springs). Pause for math: 1/3 + 1/3 + 1/3 = 1!
Yes, the whole continent of Africa could be powered by alternative energy alone. Unfortunately, emphasis on “could.” Sadly what we are beginning to see now is the next era of African colonization. The European Union plans to build a huge solar energy plant in the Sahara…and export it back to Europe. Tunisia is setting up to transfer 200 Megawatts of “green energy” to Europe.
If this isn’t enough to make you pause and check the year on your calendar then I don’t know what is. But it isn’t all doom and gloom. Ethiopia is launching a project to take hydro-energy generated from the Nile to help power the country, but sadly this is just one of few examples of African ownership of resources.
The policy practically writes itself:
It’s been almost 60 years since the British government gave up its audacious plan to build an African transcontinental railroad from Cape Town to Cairo. The first question that should come to mind is, “How is that even possible?” Well, it was. Just take a look at the map showing the division of the African continent at the height of colonialism. All of the light blue territory belonged to the UK.
I won’t start a lengthy diatribe on territorial rights, because that debate has been over for a long time. The last African country to gain independence did so in the 1990s.
But what was the point of African colonization? Well, certain parts of Africa are rich in natural resources (gold, diamonds, coffee, rubber etc.), which makes them highly desirable and attainable by the militarily-able countries. But now in the technology and information era, countries are in need of a certain kind of natural resource far more valuable than rubber: energy!
Yes, yes, we have all seen the graphs that show the trending line for the world’s energy needs for the next 50 years. But just in case: in a word, the world’s supply of oil is drying up and our demand is ever-increasing. Hence, our concentration on alternative energy solutions. (Well, that and climate change.)
Africa is chock full of potential alternative energy waiting to be tapped. If used correctly, 1/3 of the continent of Africa could be powered by solar energy trapped in the Sahara desert, 1/3 of the continent could also be powered by hydro-energy trapped by its rivers (e.g. the Nile) and amazingly 1/3 of the continent could be powered by geothermal energy (i.e. natural hot springs). Pause for math: 1/3 + 1/3 + 1/3 = 1!
Yes, the whole continent of Africa could be powered by alternative energy alone. Unfortunately, emphasis on “could.” Sadly what we are beginning to see now is the next era of African colonization. The European Union plans to build a huge solar energy plant in the Sahara…and export it back to Europe. Tunisia is setting up to transfer 200 Megawatts of “green energy” to Europe.
If this isn’t enough to make you pause and check the year on your calendar then I don’t know what is. But it isn’t all doom and gloom. Ethiopia is launching a project to take hydro-energy generated from the Nile to help power the country, but sadly this is just one of few examples of African ownership of resources.
The policy practically writes itself:
- To African countries – Wake up and get your act together! Green energy is a great way to create jobs and compete globally.
- To potential energy colonizers – Merely gaining approval from local governments to extract energy doesn’t rid you of obligation. Take precaution so that extraction efforts actually benefit locals and ensure that the domestic population isn’t being denied its rightful access to local energy due to corrupt elites. Either that or harvest Helium from moon dust.
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