Will Senegal Get a New President? An Analysis of the February 2012 Elections

By Jennifer Browning, MPA

Senegal’s elections are today. After months of mass protests against the current President Abdoulaye Wade’s candidacy, election day has finally arrived, amidst great anticipation and uncertainty. Many people are worried that President Wade, who is at least 85 years old, will win a controversial third term and worse, use his next term to install his son, Karim Wade. I am going to Harlem soon where there is a large Senegalese diaspora to follow news on the RTS (Radio Télévision Sénégalaise) and other Senegalese channels if available.

As is often stated, Senegal is the only country in West Africa that has had uninterrupted elections without military rule since Independence. It is considered by the international community to be a stable democracy that has escaped the fate of its neighbors.

Above, President Abdoulaye Wade, Feb. 23, 2012, approximately 85 years old.

And regional instability is a fact. I lived and worked in Senegal for three years until returning to the U.S. for graduate school last July 2011. During one nine month period (August 2008- March 2009), three of the five countries bordering Senegal experienced a coup. The fourth (internal) neighbor, The Gambia, has been ruled since 1994 by a dictator.

Senegal’s democracy stands in stark contrast to this trajectory. Senegal has achieved political stability, almost too much one could argue. For the first forty years, Senegal had only two different Presidents, Léopold Sédar Senghor followed by Abdou Diouf who both were part of the Socialist Party. Wade, leader of the Socialist Democratic Party, was the first opposition leader to be elected President in 2000. Despite the lack of power sharing in its first forty years, Senegal’s democracy stands as a great achievement post-colonialism in West Africa. Here we will not explore the possible contributions by the international community to some of this history of instability. Rather I want to focus on how the protests in Senegal have shown the importance of Senegalese people’s agency and commitment to democracy.

In late spring 2011, President Wade attempted to amend the constitution in a flagrant attempt to facilitate his victory today. He wanted to lower the percentage it would take to win the first round of the election (to win easily over a divided opposition) and create a Vice Presidency position (people worried for his son). On June 23, 2011, the biggest protests in a decade occurred in front of National Assembly in downtown Dakar and accompanied to a lesser extent, in cities throughout the country. The protests were successful in forcing Wade to withdraw his reform. They marked a turning point, and suddenly most radios and television stations aired aggressive critiques of Wade.

Protests on June 23, 2011 in Dakar against Wade’s proposed constitutional amendments.

I liked what candidate (and former longtime Minister of Foreign Affairs under Wade) Cheikh Tidiane Gadio said on a television interview I saw while visiting Senegal in early January 2012. To paraphrase loosely from my memory, Gadio stated, “June 23 has shown that Senegal can handle its own problems. Senegal does not need the international community to solve its domestic problems.” Certainly, the protesters handled the threat to their constitution with a mass mobilization and succeeded in forcing Wade to back down from the constitutional amendment.

Equally interesting, rappers have played a crucial role in the resistance against Wade. Senegal has one of the world’s most important hip hop scenes, and nothing mobilizes the youth in Senegal like smart, politically charged rap. A contingent of rappers formed the group “Y en a marre” or “We’ve had enough/We are fed up” to protest Wade’s candidacy and to call for voter registration and citizen participation in the elections. While this group along with M23, the Movement of the 23rd of June, have been very successful at mobilizing huge protests and using social and traditional media to get out their views, they do not officially endorse a candidate in the opposition.

Y en a marre rappers and protesters in Dakar.

A major obstacle to their movement has been the divided opposition. The protesters agree that Wade has to go, but there is no agreement on who should replace him. At a panel I attended at Columbia University a couple of weeks ago, Professor Mamadou Diouf highlighted three leading candidates Moustapha Niasse (who was a former strongman of the Socialist Party), Idrissa Seck (current Mayor of Thies and former Prime Minister under Wade for the Social Democratic Party (PDS)), and Macky Sall (who followed Idrissa Seck as Prime Minister under Wade).

Several opposition candidates, most famously the international music star, Youssou Ndour, were not allowed to run in the controversial decision by the Constitutional Court, who also issued a decision that Wade could run for a third term. I want to emphasize that the exclusion of Youssou Ndour’s candidacy has probably made him more important than if he had been allowed to run. I was in Senegal when he announced his decision to seek the Presidency early January 2012. While his declaration made international headlines, my impression was that most people take him seriously as a musician but not as a candidate. They often cited that he little formal schooling and therefore not qualified. However, his exclusion from being a candidate has made him an even more vocal critic and visible participant in the mass protests.

Youssou Ndour at a protest in Dakar where he was injured.

The constitutional court decision on January 27, 2012 that allowed Wade to seek a third term has been highly criticized by the opposition. However, Awadi, a leading rapper and intellectual in Senegal, may have found the most clever way of mocking the legality of President Wade’s candidacy. At the end of his new music video, Mame Boye, if you scroll to minute 2:46, Awadi creates a parody of the ataya tea drinking custom to criticize Wade’s bid for a third term. After meals in Senegal, people drink Mauritanian mint tea, ataya. In this highly ritualized tradition, you are offered a first cup of tea which is more bitter and then as the tea cooks down more, you are offered a second cup of tea which is sweeter.

For those that do not speak French, I will try to translate what unfolds...

In Awadi’s video, we have an old man (representing Wade) next to a younger, paler man (representing Karim whose mother is French and who speaks little Wolof, the dominant African language in Senegal). Wade asks for a second cup of tea, but the other young men making the ataya point out that he already drank his second cup. They then point to the “ataya constitution” that the old man has posted on the wall, clearly limiting everyone to two cups. Wade insists that he did not get a second cup, prompting a young man asks if he is losing his memory (a reference to his advanced age). So Wade finally asks for a third cup. When they refuse, he takes down the constitution and stands on it, saying, “Fine, I said only two; well, I take it back” referring to when he at one time said he would only stand for two terms. The ending caption says that “any resemblance to actual persons or events was entirely on purpose and not accidental. And that what is coming next [i.e. the elections] should really be watched.”

Awadi also mocks Wade’s attempt to install Karim in power by having Wade say when he learned that Karim bought the real Mauritanian tea, “ I will tell your mom that you did a good job./ Je dirais a ta maman que tu as bien travaillé.” In reality, Wade uttered this now famous phrase when praising Karim for his mdirection in organizing the Organization of the Islamic Conference meetings in Dakar in March 2008. The management of the OIC meetings was later criticized as being corrupt.

Local elections setback for presidential succession plans.

Despite the strong and highly mediatized protests by Y en a marre, M23, and other opposition groups, many people will vote for Wade. There have also been large protests in favor of Wade, although some people claim that Wade pays these supporters to show up. But Wade does have many legitimate supporters, and faced with a divided opposition, people may choose the evil that they know rather than the one they do not.

However, I believe though that if elections are transparent today, no candidate will get a majority and elections will thus advance to a second round with just two candidates, Wade and an opposition candidate. This may give the opposition the unity it has been lacking around one candidate.

I don’t want to see the hope broken for youth who have protested in this movement and tried to take charge of their democracy. I want what I want for my own country, that we believe the system can still be changed and we act to change it.

I’m off to Harlem.

Establishing an Enduring Peace: A way forward in Darfur

Joshua Owens, MPA


For over five years, peace talks between Darfur rebel groups and the Government of Sudan (GoS) have failed to yield a substantive agreement. Low-level fighting and lawlessness continues, and recent developments indicate a potential relapse into serious conflict. Over the summer major clashes erupted along the North-South border between GoS and Southern-aligned groups (the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North, or SPLM-N) in Kordofan, which was not allowed to secede with the rest of South Sudan. In November SPLM-N and the main Darfur rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice for Equality Movement (JEM), united to establish the “Sudanese Liberation Front,” with the aim of launching coordinated military attacks across Sudan and forcefully overthrowing the Bashir regime. According to a recent International Crisis Group report, “...the growing war on multiple fronts poses serious dangers for the country, for its future relationship with the Republic of South Sudan and for the stability of the region as a whole."

To build enduring peace, the international community must first realize that the current mediation strategy of facilitating negotiations between insurgent groups and the GoS is fundamentally flawed. Peace talks have failed because they have neglected (1) traditional tribal leaders and (2) building civil society. My reflections are based on my two-year experience as a development program manager in rebel-held territory in the heart of Darfur – near the fighting lines between Darfuri rebels and GoS forces (together with their Janjaweed allies). While there, I worked on a UNDP project to study and address root causes of ongoing conflict and recognized these pitfalls in the peace-building process.

1. Breakdown of the Traditional Leadership Structure
According to local accounts, a strong tribal leadership structure facilitated relatively stable relations between African and Arab tribes in Darfur for decades before the war. Tribal elders led this structure, and it provided the mechanism for maintaining the balance of power equilibrium between tribes and mediating occasional conflicts.

However, during the 1990s, a new group of young, political activists emerged from the African tribes (Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit) to protest their enduring socio-economic marginalization under Arab hegemony from Khartoum. As this group (Sudanese Liberation Movement or SLM/SLA) amassed support from neighboring Chad and the people in the isolated tribal areas of Darfur, the balance of power shifted from legitimate tribal elders to young insurgent leaders.

When the SLM finally militarized and attacked Sudanese Armed Forces in early 2003, the GoS responded by arming Arab tribes in Darfur and authorizing them to eradicate African tribes. This intervention further disrupted the delicate balance of power that had long existed between Darfuri tribes.

Nevertheless, peace talks are framed primarily as a negotiation between the GoS and rebel groups. Though these insurgents purport to represent the best interests of the African tribes, their primary concern is their own survival. SLA and JEM present unreasonable demands in peace talks and perpetuate the conflict because peace would deprive these young, zealous rebels of their raison d’être and the basis of their authority. Rebel groups continue to wield considerable power and maintain popular support only because local populations are wholly dependent on them for protection.

Therefore, effective peace negotiations and reconciliation must also engage the traditional tribal leaders. These elders are the only legitimate representatives of the best interests of the tribes, and their continued exclusion will undermine any settlement attempt.

2. Shoring Up Civil Society
Second, in order to facilitate long-term peace-building, the international community must help these areas build strong, village-level civil society institutions. According to conventional social science definitions, civil society is the space that (a) exists between the family and the state, (b) connects different families and individuals, and (c) is independent of the state. (Varshney 2001) Civil society organizations are modern and voluntary and generally take the form of cultural, social, economic, or political associations. For example, in Darfuri villages, we attempted to establish agricultural extension networks, community water and health committees, women’s trade groups, and English classes.

Most scholars of conflict agree that civil society play an important role in mitigating violence because these associations connect people from diverse backgrounds, build trust and reciprocity, and facilitate the exchange of view on public issues. In Darfur, building civil society now is vital for peace-building for two reasons: First, civilian-led organizations will help offset the power and voice of armed rebel groups and promote the legitimate leadership of civilian tribal leaders. Second, these organizations can facilitate the ethnic reconciliation process in Darfur by gradually establishing links with civil society groups in rival tribes with similar interests.

Conclusion
Taken together, these steps will help resolve the impasse of negotiations over Darfur. Though international attention has shifted in the past year to the plight of South Sudan, this lingering crisis in the country is no less important.

A Self-Defense Mission Abroad: Enhancing Japanese peacekeeping forces in South Sudan and beyond

Atsuko Tsuda, MPA


This January, about 300 Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces (JGSDF) will arrive in South Sudan to join the ongoing United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) there. Security challenges are mounting in this newborn country; accordingly, local leaders as well as their international friends face daunting tasks. Stepping up to face these challenges head-on, Japan can turn this PKO mission into a pivotal opportunity to further advance its commitment to peace and stability in the region and to make headway in synergizing the 3Ds – diplomacy, development, and defense – in its foreign policy.

Two months after Japan established diplomatic relations with South Sudan on July 9th, newly-minted Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced Japan’s new commitments to South Sudan at his debut at the UN General Assembly. As a start, Japan sent two JGSDF personnel as staff officers of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) Headquarters in November at the UN’s request. Japan is now preparing to dispatch JGSDF’s engineering unit to Juba, the capital, next year. These efforts are commendable and the government should continue to expand its defense commitment in South Sudan and around the world.

Dispatching more defense forces is an excellent opportunity for Japan to further contribute internationally by combining two areas in which it already excels – Official Development Assistance (ODA) and PKOs. JICA, Japan’s aid implementation organization, has an outstanding presence in South Sudan and has long been contributing to nation-building in the country. But as impressive as Japanese diplomacy and development currently is, expanding its defense efforts could create true co-equal synergies across these components of international assistance.

Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF) has a high reputation both inside and outside Japan. Domestically, SDF increased its public support through its work following the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, and it played a critical role during this year’s natural disaster in the Tohoku area. Regarding international cooperation, the SDF is renowned for its fine-tuned and local-oriented approach, and its engineering units in particular have received special commendation. The technical training provided by Japan’s engineering units is highly regarded and the units are well-known for their diligence and politeness. SDF units have been sent to PKOs in Cambodia, Timor-Leste (East Timor), the Golan Heights, Haiti, and Mozambique.

Granted, in Japan there are legitimate concerns about sending an expanded contingent of SDF to South Sudan. SDF’s operations are constrained by the Constitution – which renounces the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes – and other relevant laws. The 1992 law on Peacekeeping Operations prohibits “the use of force” and constrains the use of small weapons to the minimum: Self-Defense officials may use stipulated weapons “within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives of others or prevent bodily harm to themselves, other SDF Personnel or Corps Personnel who are with them on the scene, or individuals who have come under their control during the performance of duties” (emphasis mine).

Let me paint you a picture as to what this truly means at the operational level. Suppose SDF personnel are facing a heavily-armed group. There is an imminent threat, but they are not allowed to fire immediately. Instead, they have to follow a four-level procedure: oral warning, warning shots, point-blank shots, and only then, finally, sharpshooting.

Yet despite the constraints that the SDF bears, Japan has been seeking to extend its support in the areas of nation-building and PKOs wherever possible. This is a welcome development and should be continued. On the whole, the Japanese public supports Japan’s contribution to PKOs; a public opinion poll conducted last year shows more than 85% of respondents supported the idea that Japan’s cooperation to PKOs should increase or at least remain at the current level. The international community also expects further contributions from Japan, not only because it is the third largest economy but also because of its good work.

There are three UN peacekeeping operations between the two Sudanese republics: UNAMID in Darfur, UNISFA in Abyei, and UNMISS in South Sudan. This not only represents the war-torn history of the two countries but also the attention granted to it by the international community. Although Juba is relatively calm, the border area is still haunted by a possibility of a full-scale war. Therefore, while an ever-growing presence of SDF may be good both for Japan and South Sudan, given the security concerns and the Japanese forces’ severe restrictions, a careful examination of some clauses of the Japanese PKO Act may be necessary to truly fulfill its higher mission.

Atsuko Tsuda is a foreign service officer for the government of Japan. This piece represents the personal observations and opinions of the author. It does not reflect the views, nor represent an official position, of the government of Japan.

The Dragon has been Domesticated: A benign view on the rise of China

Ankit Panda, BA

As early as 1941, historian Henry Luce controversially called the 20th century the “American Century.” And today, just 11 years in, many are ready to bestow the 21st century honors to China. In retrospect, one may argue it makes sense to dub the previous century an “American” one because the United States did, in a sense, singlehandedly drive the normative alignment of modern international institutions and norms, albeit only after Luce’s declaration. So China’s impressive growth and greater face on the international stage should cause at least some change, right? Conventional realist wisdom would have us think so, but there is good evidence that the People’s Republic, and the Chinese Communist Party, have neither the interest nor the ability to do so.

Under any regime of international law (institutional or treaty-based), states have options to 1) comply with statutes and norms, 2) create statues and norms, and 3) “evade” statutes and norms. Starting with the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the PRC has moved more from a rule-evading country towards one more interested in complying with existing institutions. Although conventional wisdom and the media might paint a very different picture of Chinese compliance, a quick look at China’s record at the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in addition to its response to the 2008 financial crisis, provides strong evidence to believe otherwise.

At the IMF, the PRC, once chastised for its stalwart rule-evading (and frankly, rule-ignoring) behavior, has moved towards greater compliance. While the ongoing Article IV consultations on China’s controversial monetary policy and the depreciation of the renminbi remain a source of friction, notably, Chinese rhetoric in defense of this policy emphasizes mutual interests (between the West and China) and demonstrates a real stake in the continued “success” of the global financial system. Similarly, China’s reaction to the financial crisis in 2008 was swift and in line with systematic recommendations from the IMF and the US – a $580 billion asset-relief program similar to TARP in the US. Furthermore, Chinese support of the Eurozone during its sovereign debt woes demonstrates a further willingness to take a stake in the success of the status quo (although this final point may be more politically-motivated than I’m willing to admit in this short post).

The PRC’s short history at the WTO so far also demonstrates a mixed compliance record trending towards greater compliance over the years. Initially, Chinese accession encountered several obstacles, but it ultimately managed to convince the organization that without China, the WTO wasn’t truly a “world” trade organization. The WTO is struggling with China, which, as a mechanically-complex economy based on a particular set of normative principles, refuses in several cases to acquiesce to the exogenous and incompatible norms of the institution. On the other hand, China's victory over the European Union in a December 2010 case demonstrates an example of Chinese rule-taking and compliance with the WTO. Granted, this paints China as a rule-taker when the rules enforce its self-interest. Such victories come at the cost of leverage for the West, but bring with them greater Chinese stakes in the success of the rules-based order. The liberal international order is slowly beginning to accommodate China.

While experts like Robert Kaplan and C. Fred Bergsten may identify the many political and security threats that result from a stronger China, it’s important to consider the less-exciting but equally important economic perspective. It’s difficult to say definitively that there is one lens through which we should view China – frankly that would be an oversimplification – but overall, it’s important to recognize that China has been accommodated into the current system of international political economy and that this accommodation has made it an important stakeholder in the success of that system. Unfortunately for the US, even the liberal international order will move us away from the “American Century” towards a more complex and multi-polar global order.

Game Changer: Israel’s new calculus on attacking Iran

Jordan Reimer, MPA


After a long hiatus, there is renewed international focus on Iran’s nuclear program, from hyperventilating Israeli media reports last month on an imminent attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities to the recent release of an unprecedented International Atomic Energy Agency report pointing to Iranian activities “relevant to the development of a nuclear device.”

In the international debate on what to do about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, for those who advocate taking military action against the Islamic Republic the conventional wisdom has settled on Israel doing the world’s dirty work – as it did against Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. Those who oppose Iran's nuclear activities but are still circumspect of this course of action advance a counterargument that falls essentially along two lines of thought: logistical infeasibility and geopolitical inadvisability.

The first contention details several obstacles: a) the vast geographic distance between Iran and Israel, b) the fact that Iranian nuclear sites are dispersed throughout the country (a lesson learned no doubt from Iraq’s vulnerability), c) the reality that such sites are situated in hardened bunkers located either underground or deep inside mountain ranges, and d) the possible existence of secret sites unknown to Israeli and American intelligence.

A successful action plan would therefore mandate continuous multi-sortie strikes over several parts of the country by Israeli fighter jets. (Israel does have a long-range missile program, but such a weapon is inappropriate for precision strikes.) However, an attack of this sort would soon fall susceptible to advanced Iranian anti-aircraft capabilities. Israeli airplanes would therefore be limited to execute only a quick once-over before returning home. And, in light of Israel’s deep concern for the lives of its soldiers, given the distance between Jerusalem and Tehran a viable plan would require mid-air refueling to guarantee the pilots’ safe return, a near impossibility considering the non-hospitable airspace Israel must traverse to reach Iran.

With all of these constraints, even if Israel did successfully pull off this type of limited mission, it would hardly improve Israel’s national security: experts assume Israel would set back Iranian efforts only a few years at the most. If anything, it would be merely a strategic victory, signaling the resolve behind Israel’s rhetoric and indicating its sincere desperate determination to prevent Iran from going further in its nuclear work.

For all of these reasons, an Israeli attack with potential to severely cripple Iranian nuclear ambitions was largely considered a fantasy.

No longer. On February 21st, 2010, Israel Aerospace Industries unveiled a new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the Heron TP, nicknamed “Eitan.” Able to fly at medium-to-high altitudes for over 20 hours while carrying a variety of payloads, equipped with a silent engine ensuring stealth, and significantly, capable of reaching Iran, the drone relieves Israeli military logisticians of concerns regarding refueling and the safety of its airmen against anti-aircraft artillery. The drones could be mass-produced and then flown incessantly until all Iranian nuclear sites are obliterated. Even if the drones are shot down, it would come at a relatively modest cost (the price tag might be steep but it would be infinitely better than an Israeli soldier in Tehran’s hands). The UAVs could be equipped with self-detonation devices should they be captured to avoid Iran gaining insight into Israeli military technology.

Importantly, the second line of reasoning against an attack – geopolitical considerations – remains unchanged: bombing Iran is still a terrible idea. It will indefinitely delay the moribund Middle East peace process, inflame the Arab and Muslim world against the US at a time when it has a legitimate chance to turn over a new leaf, force a wedge between both US-Israel and US-Arab/US-Muslim relations, and almost certainly provoke Hezbollah and possibly Hamas to launch retaliatory attacks against the Israeli civilian populace. Not least, it could conceivably convince Iran to finally declare its intention for a nuclear weapon as a deterrent against future Israeli aggression, a stand which it has consistently refused to take.

To (mis)quote Rudy Giuliani, “The use of military force against Iran would be very dangerous. It would be provocative.” Yes. And it shouldn’t be done. (Though it’s outside the purview of this article, let me at least acknowledge that though there is no silver bullet, a healthy mix of sanctions, coalition-building, and containment should be sufficient to keep Iran at bay, should it develop the dreaded weapon.)

The revelation of the “Eitan,” then, is both a blessing and a curse. On the positive side it signals to Iran Israel’s credible conventional deterrent against development of a bomb (no doubt why the UAV’s unveiling was so public), which might induce the ayatollahs to rethink any potential attempts to acquire such a weapon. And yet, on the other hand, it removes the only barrier that Israel’s security hawks faced in their myopic and monomaniacal desire to carry out a strike on Iran. We can only hope that cooler heads prevail and the remaining reasons buttressing the argument not to attack remain foremost in the minds of Israeli policymakers and American interlocutors.

Kenya's Operation Protect the Nation: Yet another foreign intervention in Somalia

Beza Tesfaye, MPA


What is the first thing that comes to mind when someone mentions Somalia? Failed state. Sadly Somalia is indeed the epitome of what state failure entails—a weak government with power limited to the capital Mogadishu, a famine that threatens the lives of millions, rampant piracy and lawlessness, and an amorphous militia claiming to control most of the country under a strict version of Sharia Law. Yet Somalia’s recent and historical problems can only be fully understood in light of external involvement in Somali politics. The recent move by the Kenyan government to send troops into Somalia to fight Al Shabab warrants a brief discussion of how foreign invasions contribute to the perpetual crisis in Somalia.

Many of us vaguely remember seeing images of dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu on the evening news. Before this decisive turning point, a UN humanitarian mission backed by US forces was involved in a large-scale humanitarian intervention to bring famine relief to starving Somalis. At the time, the US made an imprudent decision to kill and/or capture Somalia’s most powerful warlord, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The mission ended in failure and embarrassment for the US government and with a tacit agreement to no longer directly interfere in the volatile nation’s affairs.

Some time passed and it seemed Somalia had fallen off everyone’s radar, with new crises emerging in other African countries like Rwanda, Liberia, and Congo. The popular image of Somalia remained, a “basket-case” country without a fixed state and governed by clan-based warlords. However, it was during this time that a semblance of stability and governance began to emerge under a network of Islamist courts known as the Islamist Courts Union (ICU). This loosely-organized group was able to bring peace and began to provide basic social services such as education and healthcare that had been non-existent for years.

Despite this brief window of stability in the early 2000s, the situation in Somalia has deteriorated far worse than anyone could have imagined. For reasons that have never been well articulated, the Ethiopian army – with financial and military support from the US – invaded Somalia in 2006, destabilizing the ICU. Three years later, the Ethiopian forces gave up the intractable military mission having achieved nothing and inadvertently fueling the growth of an unmanageable force that has since consumed Somalia—Al Shabab.

Less than three years after Ethiopia’s failed invasion and departure, Kenya has now joined the class of nations that try to “fix” the Somali problem through force. On October 16th, Kenya launched Operation Protect the Nation, sending hundreds of troops across the border into neighboring Somalia. Despite the Kenyan government’s rationalization that sending troops into Somalia was for the purpose of maintaining territorial sovereignty after a recent string of kidnappings within Kenya, this action has been met with mixed reactions. Below I highlight a few issues of concern that question the rationality of this decision:

1) First, it is important to note that Al Shabab has not claimed responsibility for the recent kidnappings of foreign tourists and aid workers along the Somalia/Kenya border (a rare precedent for an organization that has never shied away from limelight when it comes to acts of terror it has committed—e.g. the July 2010 bombings in Kampala, Uganda). More likely, the crimes were committed by Somali pirates or bandits seeking ransom rather than any type of political statement. This raises the important point that the problem with Somalia is not just Al Shabab—it is also lawlessness, underdevelopment, poverty, and a lack of institutions to effectively govern the fragmented society. A foreign invasion, even if it is able to rid Somalia of Al Shabab, is probably unlikely and unwilling to address these deeper-rooted structural sources of conflict and instability in Somalia that have inevitably spilled over into neighboring countries like Kenya.

2) The Kenyan government for some time has maintained a hands-off approach towards Somalia, seeking to secure its porous border areas, rather than involving itself directly in Somali internal affairs. Kenya has also been accommodating towards hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees and the beleaguered transitional government of Somalia. It is surprising, then, that Nairobi should suddenly make such an unpredictable policy change at this point—possibly opening the nation up for retaliatory attacks from aggrieved extremists. It should be noted, for example, that northwestern Kenya has been plagued for years by attacks from Ethiopian Toposas and Merrile cattle raiders, but the idea of invading southern Ethiopia to stop these killings has never been entertained. Succinctly put, Kenya is not an aggressive nation, and the recent declaration of war raises important questions about what or who urged the Kenyan government to invade Somalia.

3) Most importantly, what will this new foreign intervention mean for Somalis who are already suffering from the worst famine to hit the region in 50 years? The implications are hard to predict but what is certain is that fighting between Al Shabab and Kenyan troops as well as Kenyan air raids are likely to result in civilian casualties. Inevitably, this is a common cost of any armed conflict but one that is often justified by clear positive outcomes. In this situation, it is unclear what end results the Kenyan government seeks to achieve. If the aim is to completely eradicate Al Shabab, then Kenya is setting itself up for a long and potentially unwinnable conflict against a militant group that may be able to diffuse into Somali society and remerge even stronger. This is particularly likely if Somalis perceive the invasion as an unwelcome foreign incursion on their homeland, as was the case with the Ethiopian and U.S. military interventions. By attacking Somalia when Al Shabab was beginning to lose legitimacy and control in the country (having retreated from Mogadishu just this summer), Kenya may have grant the extremist group an unexpected lifeline. Without speculating too much of what will happen in the coming months, it suffices to say that war is detrimental to Somalis, especially a poorly-planned invasion with only vague objectives.

The Colonization of Africa, Part II: Energy

Jared Crooks, MPA


It’s been almost 60 years since the British government gave up its audacious plan to build an African transcontinental railroad from Cape Town to Cairo. The first question that should come to mind is, “How is that even possible?” Well, it was. Just take a look at the map showing the division of the African continent at the height of colonialism. All of the light blue territory belonged to the UK.

I won’t start a lengthy diatribe on territorial rights, because that debate has been over for a long time. The last African country to gain independence did so in the 1990s.

But what was the point of African colonization? Well, certain parts of Africa are rich in natural resources (gold, diamonds, coffee, rubber etc.), which makes them highly desirable and attainable by the militarily-able countries. But now in the technology and information era, countries are in need of a certain kind of natural resource far more valuable than rubber: energy!

Yes, yes, we have all seen the graphs that show the trending line for the world’s energy needs for the next 50 years. But just in case: in a word, the world’s supply of oil is drying up and our demand is ever-increasing. Hence, our concentration on alternative energy solutions. (Well, that and climate change.)

Africa is chock full of potential alternative energy waiting to be tapped. If used correctly, 1/3 of the continent of Africa could be powered by solar energy trapped in the Sahara desert, 1/3 of the continent could also be powered by hydro-energy trapped by its rivers (e.g. the Nile) and amazingly 1/3 of the continent could be powered by geothermal energy (i.e. natural hot springs). Pause for math: 1/3 + 1/3 + 1/3 = 1!

Yes, the whole continent of Africa could be powered by alternative energy alone. Unfortunately, emphasis on “could.” Sadly what we are beginning to see now is the next era of African colonization. The European Union plans to build a huge solar energy plant in the Sahara…and export it back to Europe. Tunisia is setting up to transfer 200 Megawatts of “green energy” to Europe.

If this isn’t enough to make you pause and check the year on your calendar then I don’t know what is. But it isn’t all doom and gloom. Ethiopia is launching a project to take hydro-energy generated from the Nile to help power the country, but sadly this is just one of few examples of African ownership of resources.

The policy practically writes itself:

• To African countries – Wake up and get your act together! Green energy is a great way to create jobs and compete globally.
• To potential energy colonizers – Merely gaining approval from local governments to extract energy doesn’t rid you of obligation. Take precaution so that extraction efforts actually benefit locals and ensure that the domestic population isn’t being denied its rightful access to local energy due to corrupt elites. Either that or harvest Helium from moon dust.

Africa for Africans? State-sanctioned foreign “land grabs” in Ethiopia

Feker Tadesse, MPA


Coming back to Princeton from JFK airport, an Indian gentleman struck up a conversation with me, inquiring where I was from. When I told him I was from Ethiopia, he proceeded to talk positively about the recent developments in the country, particularly leasing of land to foreign investors. Relieved as I was that the mention of “Ethiopia” didn’t automatically prompt him to lament about droughts and famine, nevertheless I was hard pressed to share his optimism for what’s been dubbed “The Land Grab of Africa.”

The Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, recently expounded on what leasing land to foreign investors would mean to the country’s economy. His argument was simple enough: there was plenty of idle land in the countryside that communities had neither agricultural nor settlement use for. Hence, foreign investors would transfer technology, create jobs for the locales, and increase government revenue. Thus far, some regions such as Benishangul Gumuz have leased around 2 million hectares to Saudi investors.

Critics are quick to point out the irony of a country that is dependent on food aid leasing out masses of fertile land so that countries like Saudi Arabia can ensure national food security. Moreover, the premise that the land being leased is idle land is under strong scrutiny. Stories regarding displacement of local populations have been circulating in the media. Secondly, environmental degradation is a real concern, particularly with the introduction of intensive agricultural ventures like horticulture that leave the land no longer viable for agricultural purposes. Finally, the prime minister’s argument that the agricultural sector in Ethiopia will not grow unless large scale mechanized farms come to its rescue is far from convincing. There are countless studies that claim quite the opposite: increasing the productivity of smallholder farmers is by far a better strategy to tackle rural poverty.

Given that the “land grab” issue is fairly recent, there is a lack of clear information on what exactly is taking place on the ground. While the PM’s arguments make sense theoretically, if recent allegations, particularly those on displacement of the local population hold true, this can hardly be praised as a government’s initiative towards foreign direct investment.

Buying local: Will the US troop pullout pull the afghan out from under the Afghan economy?

Andrew Shaver, MPA


American military officials have initiated plans to withdraw the first contingent of US forces from Afghanistan this year despite the Afghan government’s dependence upon US operations for its own security and political survival. No less important, though infrequently mentioned, is the very uncertain economic future for Afghanistan in the wake of American withdrawal. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee cautioned earlier this summer that, without proper planning, Afghanistan “could suffer a severe economic depression when foreign troops leave…” Meanwhile, the Congressionally-mandated Commission on Wartime Contracting (an independent, bipartisan group established to study wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan) warned in its final report this summer that many social and security programs developed in Afghanistan by the US government likely cannot be sustained by the government of Afghanistan.

While significant investigation has been done into the nature and possible effects of the significant State, Defense, and USAID spending in Afghanistan, similar scrutiny has not been applied to a major Department of Defense (DoD) program established in 2006 under which many billions of dollars have been spent on goods and services procured from Afghan firms.

Last month, Defense officials provided me with data recently made public on all contractual obligations made to Afghan firms by US Central Command’s primary contracting entity. The data are impressive. Based on commitments already made this year, DoD is on track to make more than $2 billion in obligations with Afghan firms by in fiscal year 2011. (To put matters in perspective, Afghanistan’s 2010 gross domestic product was roughly $27 billion.) While the US military begins to reduce its presence in Afghanistan, CentCom spending on goods and services provided by Afghan firms continues to increase significantly – obligations this fiscal year are 100% greater than 2009 and are set to exceed 2010 obligations by more than half a billion dollars.

Policymakers should consider possible effects on Afghanistan’s security conditions of terminating, quickly or slowly, billions of dollars in business with local firms. Has DoD business with local firms created industries that will remain functional in the years following America’s withdrawal? Has military spending created bubbles of economic activity that threaten to implode as the war effort grinds to a halt, leaving ranks of young males unemployed and susceptible to terrorist recruiting?

It is possible that the effect will be minimal. Of the roughly $1.7 billion already committed this fiscal year, nearly $1 billion are slated for purchases of various commodities. Because contracting guidelines do not require that Afghan businesses satisfy strict local-content or local-hiring requirements, little deters these firms from importing such commodities from abroad. Thus, the cessation of spending in Afghanistan may do little more than sound the death knell for an inflated market of Afghan middlemen. My discussions with contracting officials deployed in theater tend to corroborate this possibility. However, no formal study has been undertaken in this regard.

However, on the services side, data indicates that there may be jobs at stake, albeit within a somewhat narrow set of industries. Of the remaining approximately $700 million obligated this fiscal year, most are designated for the provision of “professional, administrative and management support services,” “utilities and housekeeping services,” and “transportation, travel, and relocation services.” Central Command also reported recently employing over 46,000 Afghans and estimated that a further 18,000 Afghans are employed as private security contractor personnel. Granted, many of these jobs may remain in place following a draw-down. But research into the way such industries have developed through US military spending is needed to provide policymakers with better understanding of how the timing and magnitude of troop withdrawal might ultimately affect Afghanistan’s economy.

Getting at such a question may not be as challenging as might otherwise be the case. Last year, now-retired General David Petraeus *85 *87 and Admiral Mike Mullen established Task Force 2010 to examine whether the Department’s contractual spending in Afghanistan is undermining efforts to stabilize the country. So far, this mandate has translated into investigations into whether funds have fallen into the hands of insurgency members, culminating with this summer’s finding that that the Taliban has extracted rents on US transportation spending. Yet, as an organization created to “follow the money,” as Petraeus testified to Congress, Task Force 2010 not only enjoys senior-level support but employs the type of civilian and military experts qualified to consider the broader effects of major contract spending on the country and the implications for its withdrawal. If properly resourced and directed, the task force could offer policymakers a unique way forward. Let’s hope.


A version of this article was published earlier this month by the Small Wars Journal blog, and is accessible here.

Smells Like Teen Xenophobia: Chinese “Angry Youth” and anti-Japanese nationalism

Keqin Wei, MPA


In spite of the growing economic cooperation and cultural exchange between China and Japan in recent years, the number of “Angry Youth” in China is also rising commensurately. The phenomenon of “Angry Youth” refers to young Chinese ultra-nationalists with a visceral hatred of Japan. Since most “Angry Youth” were born after the 1980s, they did not live through the Sino-Japanese War of the 1940s, but nevertheless demonstrate much stronger anti-Japanese sentiment than former generations. Importantly, these youth are generally highly educated and children of the internet age – blogs and chat rooms are often the repository for their anti-Japanese polemics. While there are many reasons for the growing numbers of “Angry Youth,” the most salient are the censored media in China and the way history is taught to students.

“The Modern History of China” is an important course in both Chinese middle school and high school. Stereotypes aside about China’s infatuation with inculcating math and science, great efforts have been made to teach students their national history from the Opium War of the 19th century to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Particular concentration is placed on the eight-year Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s-40s. This curriculum is also included on important exams, such as the College Entrance Exam, in order to encourage students to spend more time learning history. For most Chinese young people, having received the compulsory education, Japanese wartime atrocities are described in such vivid details that it becomes deeply ingrained in their memories. In comparison, other aspects of Japan, such as its culture, economy, and politics, are largely neglected.

Furthermore, the internet provides biased reports of modern-day Japan by amplifying its conflicts with China and reiterating tense historical issues. Just a few months ago, if one searched for “Japan” on Baidu, the most popular Chinese internet search engine, the top three news hits were: “Crisis in Fukushima,” “Japan claims its sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands,” and “Japanese history textbooks deny the Nanjing Massacre.” If it were not for the disaster in Japan, there would also very likely be articles criticizing the “basic quality” of Japanese people among the top news articles. As these “Angry Youth” spend their leisure time on the internet and browsing the websites that host such articles, this kind of information is constantly repeated, which intensifies the stereotype of Japanese brutality and hostility towards China.

Psychological research shows that people often make judgments based on accessible information. Most “Angry Youth” don’t have the opportunity to visit Japan, so the information available to them from textbooks and media is often the main resource to make their judgments. Their attitudes towards Japan are biased based on these historical memories and prejudiced news source.

Social norms also help shape people’s behavior, especially in a country like China which has a strong tradition of collectivism. As framed by former PRC president Jiang Zemin: “Forgetting the humiliating Chinese modern history means betraying your country.” In this environment, forgetting or even forgiving Japanese aggression is tantamount to treason. A second example comes from a popular Chinese movie about the Nanjing Massacre, “Nanjing, Nanjing” (2009). The Nanjing Massacre of 1937 is widely regarded as evidence of Japanese soldiers’ brutality and is still a hot topic given current Japanese leaders’ reluctance to apologize for its occupation of China. Upon the film’s release, one influential movie critic was quoted as follows: “You are not qualified to be Chinese if you do not watch this movie.” The assertion that failure to appreciate a movie about Japanese wartime brutality means losing one’s Chinese identity puts extreme pressure on those who do not plan to see the film.

While these social norms partly explain the expansion of anti-Japanese nationalism, why does the anti-Japanese sentiment in the “Angry Youth” surpass that of other age groups, including older generations who actually lived through the brutality of occupation?

One would not be surprised to find out that peer pressure plays a large role in shaping this attitude for teens. The Chinese internet, which is notorious for its censorship of sensitive political topics, has no problem with the proliferation of nationalist comments. Allowing the “Angry Youth” to be the only outspoken adolescent political group in the country gives the false impression that they are the only politically-oriented youth in China. When “Angry Youth” spread their anti-Japanese comments on internet, people their age with similar education backgrounds tend to take this movement as a reference group, and modify their own attitudes accordingly.

Nationalism proves to be an effective tool for totalitarian states to suppress dissidents and maintain social stability. To date, it seems China has been successful at stoking nationalist themes and training “Angry Youth” to vent their frustrations in politically-acceptable directions. Unfortunately, it seems that these “Angry Youth” have already begun to transform their attitudes into behaviors, as evidenced by frequent anti-Japan demonstrations that have taken place since 2004. One way to assuage the hostile attitudes towards Japan is to expand the information channels about Japan, by introducing Japanese cartoons and movies in China in order to show different aspects of the island nation; and most importantly, to revise Chinese modern history textbooks to show the Chinese people that modern Chinese history is much richer than an eight-year war with its neighbor.


Thanks to Eddie Skolnick for his comments and editing.

O, Canada…has voted! (In case you missed it.) And it matters.

Julian Lee, MPA


To the casual outside observer, it looks like the Canadian federal elections on May 2nd didn’t produce much change; after all, Stephen Harper is still Canada’s Conservative prime minister, as he has been for four years. But look a little closer, and you will observe something of a sea change.

The center-left Liberal Party—long dubbed Canada’s “natural governing party” due to its 69-year reign in the 20th century—was decimated, earning only 34 of parliament’s 308 seats, its worst showing in history.

The Liberal Party leader, former Oxford, Cambridge, and Harvard intellectual Michael Ignatieff, was long better-known in his adoptive home countries of England and the US than in Canada before he returned after 30 years to enter politics. The Conservative Party never ceased to attack his foreign residence and his supposed elitist arrogance; the Canadian electorate proved sufficiently parochial to buy the message. It didn’t help that Ignatieff seemed unable to communicate what he stood for. Adding insult to injury, he failed to regain his seat in parliament.

Into the left-of-center vacuum stormed the social democratic New Democratic Party (NDP). Led by the affable, energetic Jack Layton, the party achieved the unthinkable: in Quebec, it dethroned the separatist Bloc Québécois, which since 1993 had a stranglehold on the sovereigntist left vote there. The Bloc plunged from 49 seats to a mere 4, which enabled the NDP to be become the second-strongest parliamentary force for the first time in history.

In another first, in Mr. Harper’s third successive electoral victory, voters have endowed him with a parliamentary majority. Granted, only 39.6% of ballots were cast in his favor, but in Canada’s first-past-the-post electoral system, a minority of votes can give you a majority of seats.

The big deal: Changing values

As I mentioned, all of this amounts to a sea change in Canadian politics. With his new-found majority, Harper will no longer need to rely on compromise in order to push through his agenda. Though in his acceptance speech, he promised to “be the government of all Canadians,” his record to date casts some doubt on that claim. Harper has consistently ignored the views of groups that do not form part of his power base even while forming a minority government.

More importantly however, this election points to shifting Canadian values. The political left has been outraged by Mr. Harper’s autocratic style of governing: he suspended parliament when a parliamentary investigation into the abuse of Afghan detainees transferred from Canadian custody became uncomfortable for his government; he slapped a gag order on bureaucrats, barring them from speaking to the press without his office’s authorization in order to control his government’s messaging; and his government was the first ever to be found in contempt of Parliament for withholding costing information for several big-ticket expenditures. Yet none of these episodes gained traction with an electorate that was focused on an economy that was humming along better than in most developed countries.

The Liberal Party used to be able to count on the immigrant vote, but that has shifted to the Conservative Party. Whereas immigrants used to be predominantly European and settle in the east, they now come mainly from Asia and more of them go west. This development has gone hand-in-hand with an economic shift: Canada’s Ontario- and Quebec-based manufacturing base has been in decline for years, whereas western Canada has done well with its natural resources, services, and Asian outlook.

As the economy has gone west, so has politics. Stephen Harper hails from Alberta, often nicknamed “Canada’s Texas” by Easterners not only for its oil wealth and cattle ranches, but for its small-government, conservative political bent. His power base lies there, but crucially, he has convinced many in the former Liberal heartland of Ontario that his vision of more a limited government is the way of the future.

The Canada that emerged on May 2nd is questioning the role of government and the social-democratic state it built during the 20th century. This is the most important lesson from this year’s elections. It will take the left-of-center parties years to adapt to this new reality.

A Conservative future?

But it won’t just be smooth sailing for the Conservatives. Their party is still more conservative than the average voter and will have to avoid the temptation to govern roughshod and alienate newly-acquired supporters. The NDP will have to learn how to be an effective opposition with a large caucus of neophytes, while representing Quebec for the first time and probably moving to the center in an effort to widen its appeal. As for the Liberal Party, it will have to pick up the pieces and start rebuilding its identity from scratch.

As the two leftist parties figure out their new roles, it would be unsurprising if Canada were in for more than one Conservative term. That would suit Mr. Harper well. By his own admission, his goal is to shift Canada permanently rightward, positioning the Conservatives as Canada's new “natural governing party."

The challenges facing an expanded Japanese role in US-Japan security alliance

Ani Akinbiyi, MPA


Following the conclusion of World War II, Japan became one of the United States’ most important global allies, and ever since the US-Japan security alliance has grown increasingly more important to maintaining the stability of the East Asia. And yet, despite its pivotal role in the US’s global security strategy, there have recently been calls from within the US policymaking establishment to reevaluate America’s security partnership with Japan. Officials claim that Japan has not carried its equal weight within the alliance, and that the Japanese have come to take the American security umbrella for granted. They conclude that Japanese unwillingness to take on more responsibility within the alliance indicates their lack of commitment to the partnership, and that perhaps the US should consider downgrading its military ties to the island nation. However, this view fails to consider the possibility that Japan is simply unable to assume greater responsibility within this relationship because it is bound by domestic political realities and because the two countries may not share the same objectives for the alliance itself. In essence, Japan has yet to decide, one way or the other, what its defense posture will be and what role the US security alliance will play in that strategy.

Since the end of World War II, the Japanese government has had a difficult time galvanizing public support for an increased role for its military, in self-defense matters or otherwise. After the war, not only did the people of Japan have to deal with the consequences of a nuclear attack, they also had to come to terms with the aftermath of a US firebombing campaign in which, according to former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, “50-90% of the people in 67 Japanese cities” were killed, and more than two-thirds of those cities were between 40-99% destroyed. This profound level of physical and human destruction left the nation with a deep-seated mistrust of the military – which many Japanese blamed for taking the country to war – and a sense that their government did not have the capacity to adequately control it.

This sense of mistrust has lingered over the course of the 60 years since the post-war constitution came into effect. During that time, attempts to increase the range and scope of military responsibility have been met with significant popular resistance, and what has emerged is a society where anti-militarism is so profound that successive Japanese governments have gone beyond constitutional restrictions to impose additional restraints on its military potential, such as banning the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the development of power-projection capabilities, and arms exportation. Thus, in the face of such popular support for a debilitated military, it is no surprise that the democratically-elected Japanese government has had trouble mustering the political will necessary to make changes to its military structure.

Japan’s squeamishness with militarism is also evident from its limited overseas operations, which are only approved on a case-by-case basis. In early 2010 the newly-empowered Democratic Party of Japan cancelled its Indian Ocean refueling mission, stationed in support of the US’s war in Afghanistan. While shifts in foreign policy are expected with the introduction of a new administration, such flip-flopping gives the impression that Japan lacks a vision for its military and makes Tokyo’s allies and enemies alike question why Japan seems so intent on remaining defensively castrated.

This is further baffling when one looks at the very real threats in Japan’s front yard. Japan may be taking for granted America’s willingness to remain a regional protector indefinitely, gambling that as long as the US protects its own interests in the region Japan’s interests will also be served. While this gambit has proved successful in the past, there is no guarantee that the US’s strategic configuration will remain unchanged, especially as Washington tries its best to avoid military postures that antagonize China and increase the likelihood of entanglement with its second-largest trading partner.

Given this reluctance for military assertiveness, it is no surprise that there is a disconnect between what Washington wants from its alliance with Japan and what Tokyo is able to provide. The US wants to see the Diet contribute more to Japan’s homeland defense and increase its out-of-area military commitments. Unfortunately, it seems that the US would do well to have Japan focus solely on its domestic defense, as the Japanese parliament has shown diminished capacity to successfully juggle both security objectives. The Liberal Democratic Party, Japan’s former ruling political party, tried to use the success of recent overseas engagements to bolster arguments for an expansion of the Self-Defense Forces mandate. However, it was unable to turn overseas successes into the concrete political will necessary to make the needed changes at home. Exacerbating this dead loss is the fact that these missions have only served to siphon critical resources away from the development of Japan’s domestic defense capabilities.

In sum, Japan’s self-defense policy appears directionless, with policymakers seemingly not knowing where best to focus the government’s efforts. With a new political party in control, an emboldened China, a sabre-rattling North Korea, and an increasingly impatient US, the Japanese need to get their act together and demonstrate some decisiveness about their desired defense posture. Currently it is a hodge-podge of components that together do not make an impressive statement. The new government must also find a way to move the Japanese citizenry past the fear and pacifism that shackle Tokyo’s ability to increase its military capability. Only with these two obstacles behind them will the Japanese be able to support the US-Japan alliance in a meaningful way.

Islamophobia and the etymological roots of the King hearings, part II: The emerging Western semantics of Islam and Muslims

Editor’s Note: This is the second of a three-part series on Islamophobia in America. Part I discusses the premises and implications of the King hearings. Part III examines Islamophobic language trends in major English and Arabic media outlets and their implications for public policy.

Nazir Harb, MPA


Ludwig Wittgenstein said, “The limits of my language are the limits of my mind. All I know is what I have words for.” I recently gave a talk on the semantics of talking about Islam and Muslims in America as part of a new series, Islamic Literacy at the Woodrow Wilson School, which took place throughout April. During the talk we briefly examined the etymology of Islamophobia—that is, the words, phrases, and orthographies that exist in our language and its history that convey anti-Muslim or Islamophobic sentiment. While some of these terms have fallen out of popular usage, they are increasingly coming up on anti-Muslim and Islamophobic websites and in books and articles written by Islamophobes. As future policymakers it is important, if only for analytical purposes, to be able to identify these thinly-veiled lexical forms of bigotry.

Descriptor or epithet?
The word “Moor” is a derogatory term for a Muslim that arguably stems to 8th century Muslim Spain—it is related to the Greek adjective for “black” and referred to someone from Mauritania. It took on a racist connotation when it became the slur used to refer to all Muslims. Another egregious term for Muslim is “Saracen”: a Roman Crusader word for Muslims that harks back to the 11th century. Some may also come across the word “Mohammedan,” or its derivation, Mohammedanism. This is an archaic construction that referred to a Muslim and was common in Western and English literature, taken from the 14th century Latin word “Macamethe.” The use of such words today is not only inaccurate, as they are no longer conventional, but it’s also derisive: it disregards the words and names that Muslim people have chosen for themselves and for their religion. It should therefore be avoided by anyone who is trying to maintain a measure of inter-communal tolerance or by academics attempting to use sterile terminology.

Moslem or Muslim?
While not always necessarily Islamophobic, the way a word is spelled might also raise a red flag; like other groups, Muslims have reached a consensus regarding the preferred spellings of words that pertain to their identity. As such, “Moslem” is now obsolete. The preferred spelling is “Muslim,” as it better approximates the correct pronunciation of the word. “Muslim” is a proper noun, and so one can refer to “a Muslim” or to “Muslims” in the plural. “Muslim” is also the adjective that pertains to a Muslim, so while it is grammatically appropriate to refer to a “Muslim person,” “Muslim man,” “Muslim woman,” or the “Muslim people,” it is incorrect to write, “Islamic person.” (Needless to say, "Islamic" is exclusively an adjective, so certainly "an Islamic" is also not a correct way to refer to a Muslim person.) Furthermore, a country cannot be “Islamic”—it may contain a population that has a Muslim majority, in which case it is a “Muslim majority country” or “Muslim majority society,” but it is not an “Islamic country,” nor is there an “Islamic world.” “Islam” refers to the religion and “Islamic” is an adjective that is reserved for cases wherein something has a distinctly Islamic property, as opposed to “Muslim” that refers to something or someone pertaining to a Muslim person or persons, i.e. Muslim identity.

Thus, an “Islamic government” is a government which is, or asserts itself to be, in accordance with sharia (Islamic law), not merely one that presides over a preponderance of Muslim adherents or is run by government officials who are Muslim. (Note though, that it is usually a misnomer, or at least a subjective articulation. Many Muslims take issue with claims by governments in the Middle East, North Africa, and South East Asia that claim to be "Islamic" or assert that they govern in accordance to sharia because such usage disingenuously implies that there is indeed one clearly-defined way to govern Islamically or that sharia somehow exists in a book or a written decree that can readily be referred to, easily interpreted, and facilely lends itself to political implementation.)

Similarly, while the awkward phrase “Islamic terrorism” has become a frequently used buzz word in popular discourse, I would argue that it is, strictly speaking, grammatically incorrect. It would be better (grammatically) to say “Muslim terrorist,” as neither the act of terrorism nor the actor carrying out the terrorist action is “Islamic.” One way to employ the phrase without legitimating it grammatically is to write it between quotation marks.

Mohammed or Muhammad?
On a related note, “Muhammad” is the standard spelling of the name when it refers to the last prophet of Islam; “Mohammed” is a common spelling for other people who have that name. The spelling is the same in Arabic in either case, but in Arabic the Prophet’s name is customarily followed by an honorific. In English, the honorific usually appears in parenthesis immediately after every use of the Prophet’s name. The one generally used is “(pbuh),” an acronym for “peace and blessings be upon him.”

Koran or Quran?
While some continue to argue that the spelling “Koran” is “more germanic” and better follows standard English spelling conventions, this spelling is largely considered obsolete and most Muslim scholars or scholars of Islam use the spelling “Quran.” This is due to the fact that Arabic has two different letters, “kaf” and “qaf,” each pronounced differently. The first is pronounced similar to the English “K” while the second has a more guttural sound, officially transliterated with a “Q” (with no necessary “u” to follow, as in Iraq). The holy book of Islam is spelled with the latter. Thus while in English the pronunciation is “kəˈrän” (kor-aan), the word should be spelled “Quran” (alt. Qur’an, Qur’ān).

Islam or ‘Islām?
Not to worry – “Islam” is the correct and conventional spelling. (‘Islām is the official academic transliteration.) It is grammatically correct to refer to “the religion of Islam” or, similarly, “the religion of Muslims,” or “the Islamic faith.” However, “Muslim religion” is inaccurate and ungrammatical because “Muslim” is either a noun or an adjective that describes someone who practices Islam—the religion of Islam is not “Muslim.”

Moderate or Mainstream
In response to the uptick in the use of phrasings that conflate Muslims with extremism, fanaticism, radicalization, fundamentalism, “jihadism,” and terrorism, many – including some Muslims – have started adding the word “moderate” as a neutralizing adjective to indicate a Muslim who is not radicalized. However, scholars such as Saba Mahmood and Talal Asad agree that this only perpetuates the collapsing of the terms “Muslim” and “terrorist”—thus, appending the word “moderate” before “Muslim” implies that “Muslim” itself is inherently pejorative. Without “moderate,” a Muslim is therefore presumed to be a violent extremist or a terrorist. If this newfound convention prevails, then Western discourse would have accepted al-Qaeda’s worldview wherein “(true) Muslims” sympathize with or engage in violent global jihad. For al-Qaeda, Muslims who do not sympathize with them are “nominal Muslims,” a term which refers to the same people as the phrase “moderate Muslims.”

“Al-Qaedaist,” Not Islamic or Islamist
There are 1.5 billion Muslims across the globe; al-Qaeda’s total membership is less than 30,000 people. Academics and specialists agree that for those relatively few Muslims who join al-Qaeda or affiliated networks, Islam is not the primary motivating factor, let alone the only one. Al-Qaeda pulls from Islamic and non-Islamic sources alike—they quote Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations alongside Islamic sources (usually quoting him in context while distorting Islamic sources). Still, al-Qaeda’s actions are not characterized as “Huntingtonian terrorism”—it is wrong to allow al-Qaeda to appropriate and unquestionably claim Islam, Islamism, and Islamic terminology. It is best then to describe their operations and ideological tenets as “al-Qaedaist,” (granted, a bit tautological) as well as for the actions and conceptions of those who are affiliated with al-Qaeda or sympathize with their views and methods.

Al-Qaeda’s “Jihad”
It is critical to consider that in the phrase “commit jihad,” for example, what is implied is that jihad is in itself an action (or even a crime) that is committed—this is at least true on the syntactical level. That connotation, however, is not correct according to mainstream Islam and is disingenuous to Muslims for whom the term maintains a certain spiritual, completely non-violent, resonance. In avoiding the use of al-Qaeda’s vocabulary, it is important to resist its militant misappropriations of spiritual and theological terms like “jihad.”

Arab/Muslim
When talking about American Muslims, it is important to consider that most estimates hold that there are between 6-7 million Muslims in the United States. Most of them are of South Asian origin. Thirty-eight percent are African American, born and raised in the US. Only a minority are Arabs or of Middle Eastern origin. Additionally, though the Arabian Peninsula is the birthplace of Islam, only 12% of all Muslims are Arab. The top five largest Muslim majority countries are Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and China—none of them an Arab country. Moreover, not all Arabs are Muslim. In fact, in the US most Arab-Americans are Christian.

Next week I will discuss the implications of this terminology (and its use in the media) for public policy.

Get involved! Please sign our petition to stop the targeting of American Muslims: http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/hearings/

Rot in my backyard: The importance of engaging with communities hosting nuclear power plants

Sophia Peters, MPA


More than a month after the devastating earthquake and near meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, on April 22nd the Japanese government finally imposed a mandatory evacuation zone of 12 miles surrounding the plant. Those who lived near the damaged plant flocked to the area before the midnight deadline, collecting whatever they could to bring into their new lives.[1] Some remain, refusing to change the way they have lived for decades.

As the cleanup begins, now is a good time to reflect on the relationship between communities and the nuclear power plants they host.

It was only on April 12th that Japanese officials raised the severity rating of the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima plant to the highest level possible on the international nuclear disaster scale – on par with the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. An official from Tokyo Electric Power Company stated that “the amount of leakage could eventually reach that of Chernobyl or exceed it.”[2] This reality check reinforced the sense that this nuclear emergency will persist longer and cause more problems than first predicted by the government, which had consistently downplayed long-term safety concerns. The Japanese government’s hesitation to be clear about their level of knowledge of what was occurring at the Fukushima plant has troubling implications for the area’s residents and sets a dangerous precedent for how nuclear energy agencies engage with host communities.

The Japanese government owes the local community a rational and reasoned assessment of the impacts of the destabilized reactors and spent fuel storage containers. Yet while the US and Australian governments advised their citizens to remain 50 miles away from the plant and the IAEA issued repeated warnings to expand the evacuation zone, Japan had had consistently refused to do so.[3] Furthermore, officials refuse to admit their confusion as to how much nuclear fuel was released in the initial hydrogen explosions and whether radioactive fuel is leaking into the containment structures.[4] When government officials do engage with the community to share facts about the situation at the plant, they do so by presenting raw data without any explanation of its practical relevance.[5] This has serious and dangerous consequences for the community surrounding the plant.

This behavior is consistent with a larger pattern on the part of the international nuclear industry and its supporters to shield the full truth from communities that host nuclear power plants and a refusal to talk candidly about the risks, costs, and implications of living near a nuclear facility. This originates from the belief of nuclear engineers and utility managers that the less the community knows, the more likely it is to accept the siting of a nuclear facility. Unfortunately, this could not be farther from the truth. From Yucca Mountain in Nevada to Anmyeon Island in South Korea, history has shown repeatedly that this is not the case.

But it does not have to be this way. In fact, recent events show that engaging with the community facilitates the construction of the nuclear power plant or the spent fuel repository. In South Korea, the government was able to site a low and intermediate nuclear waste repository in Wolsong province with a near-90% local approval rate.[6] In Finland, the government entered into an extended dialogue and candid negotiation with several communities in order to find a host for its spent fuel final repository. It was eventually sited in Eurajoki, where it was met with widespread community support and a 20-7 vote in favor of its construction by the local council. Together with Sweden, these two Nordic countries are the only ones that have been able to site final waste repositories.

Barring any major breakthroughs, we will have to heavily utilize nuclear power if we want to avert the unjust and unequal consequences of global climate change. There is no other energy technology that can compete economically with coal as a base load power substitute. But in the world of nuclear physicists and mechanical engineers, conversations about Fukushima still center on the location of the liquid storage pool and the technical specifications of the reactor casing. We need to remember that the reason we care about these important scientific details is because of the impact that they have on the community that houses the nuclear power plant and the people throughout the country that depend on nuclear energy as a source of power. Helping ensure that these communities benefit from hosting power plants, mitigating the risks they could potentially suffer from being close to radioactive waste, and prioritizing their needs in the rare case of a terrible accident should be the focus of policymakers hoping to expand nuclear power in the future.


Editor’s Note: You can read more about this subject in “A Proposal for Spent-fuel Management Policy in East Asia,” a WWS graduate policy workshop final report on current and future spent-fuel management policy in China, Japan, and South Korea. Unfortunately, this work has become more relevant today than when the project began. Available here.

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References:
[1] Andrew Pollack, “Japanese Visit the Nuclear Zone While They Can,” New York Times, April 21, 2011.
[2] Chico Harlan, “Japan Rates Nuclear Crisis at Highest Severity Level,” Washington Post, April 12, 2011.
[3] Hiroko Tabuchi and Keith Bradsher, “Japan Put on Par with Chernobyl,” New York Times, April 12, 2011.
[4] Hiroko Tabuchi and Keith Bradsher, “Lack of Data Heightens Japan’s Nuclear Crisis,” New York Times, April 8, 2011.
[5] Ibid.
[6] “Nuclear Power in South Korea,” World Nuclear Association, March 2011.

Islamophobia and the etymological roots of the King hearings, part I: The premises and implications of the King hearings

Editor’s Note: This is the first of a three-part series on Islamophobia in America. Part II discusses the emerging semantics of Islam and Muslims in the West. Part III examines Islamophobic language trends in major English and Arabic media outlets and their implications for public policy.

Nazir Harb, MPA


Despite opposition from the Obama administration and a wide array of American minority groups, especially major Arab-American and American Muslim organizations, on March 10th the House Committee on Homeland Security convened a hearing entitled “The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community’s Response.” It was truly a tragic event in our nation’s history but unfortunately only the beginning of a year-long series of hearings that attempt to put Islam and Muslims on trial. The next hearing is supposed to take place in the next few weeks. Representative Peter King (R-NY), who chairs the committee and is the driving force behind the hearings, has been rather enigmatic about the exact dates of these show trials.

The title of King’s hearings is telling in and of itself, as it reveals the innate biases of the Congressman and his witnesses. The hearings attempt to legitimize a premise that is not only baseless and untrue, but also brazenly racist, prejudicial, and provocative. They antagonize a susceptible, peaceful community that constitutes a diverse multi-national and multi-cultural American minority with a longstanding history of contributions to the United States and the world.

Obama administration officials have stressed that the hearings are condemnable and that their premise must be amended to investigate radicalization in America in general as a phenomenon independent of Islam or Muslims. Instead, the hearings present a forgone conclusion damning an American minority without so much as giving it the opportunity to speak for itself. Indeed, during the first hearing, each of the speakers was well-known for harboring and fomenting Islamophobic and anti-Muslim sentiments (save Rep. Keith Ellison, a Muslim congressman from Minnesota). Their testimonies that day predictably served King’s fear-mongering and self-aggrandizing political agenda. While some of King’s witnesses were “practicing Muslims” who admittedly had very negative—but undoubtedly unrepresentative—experiences with Islam and Muslims inside or outside of the US, their testimonies thus far have supported the sort of abominable and unwarranted claims that Rep. King has recently made, such as that “85% of mosques in America are ruled by the extremists.” To quote King, who has faced relatively little castigation for such statements, his hearings are meant to demonstrate that Muslims in the United States are “an enemy living amongst us.”

Notably, countless American Muslims and non-Muslims who have requested to testify, including specialists who would represent the counterargument to these allegations and provide for real debate on the topic, have been declined the right to testify. There could therefore be no doubt that these hearings are political show trials which target a vulnerable minority that is politically difficult to defend in public. Fortunately at least Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) had the fortitude to use his own bully pulpit for such a noble purpose and convened a Senate hearing on March 29th on threats to American Muslim civil rights.

Sadly such mistrust and public aspersions on the loyalty of American citizens is not without precedent in our recent history. These events recall the regrettable and horrific treatment of Japanese Americans following the tragedy of Pearl Harbor. True, these hearings don’t rise to the level of mass internment (though something of the sort did take place immediately following 9/11), but we cannot stand by as another American minority is profiled, singled out, and blamed for a foreign attack. American Muslims have begun protests and educational programs to emphasize that this is a critical matter of civil rights which concerns every American, and is not what Rep. King has characterized as strictly a “Muslim problem.” Attorney General Eric Holder is right to assert that anti-Muslim bigotry is “the civil rights issue of our time.”

Get involved! Please sign our petition to stop the targeting of American Muslims: http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/hearings/