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Showing posts with label psychology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label psychology. Show all posts

Friday, September 23, 2011

Smells Like Teen Xenophobia: Chinese “Angry Youth” and anti-Japanese nationalism

Keqin Wei, MPA


In spite of the growing economic cooperation and cultural exchange between China and Japan in recent years, the number of “Angry Youth” in China is also rising commensurately. The phenomenon of “Angry Youth” refers to young Chinese ultra-nationalists with a visceral hatred of Japan. Since most “Angry Youth” were born after the 1980s, they did not live through the Sino-Japanese War of the 1940s, but nevertheless demonstrate much stronger anti-Japanese sentiment than former generations. Importantly, these youth are generally highly educated and children of the internet age – blogs and chat rooms are often the repository for their anti-Japanese polemics. While there are many reasons for the growing numbers of “Angry Youth,” the most salient are the censored media in China and the way history is taught to students.

“The Modern History of China” is an important course in both Chinese middle school and high school. Stereotypes aside about China’s infatuation with inculcating math and science, great efforts have been made to teach students their national history from the Opium War of the 19th century to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Particular concentration is placed on the eight-year Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s-40s. This curriculum is also included on important exams, such as the College Entrance Exam, in order to encourage students to spend more time learning history. For most Chinese young people, having received the compulsory education, Japanese wartime atrocities are described in such vivid details that it becomes deeply ingrained in their memories. In comparison, other aspects of Japan, such as its culture, economy, and politics, are largely neglected.

Furthermore, the internet provides biased reports of modern-day Japan by amplifying its conflicts with China and reiterating tense historical issues. Just a few months ago, if one searched for “Japan” on Baidu, the most popular Chinese internet search engine, the top three news hits were: “Crisis in Fukushima,” “Japan claims its sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands,” and “Japanese history textbooks deny the Nanjing Massacre.” If it were not for the disaster in Japan, there would also very likely be articles criticizing the “basic quality” of Japanese people among the top news articles. As these “Angry Youth” spend their leisure time on the internet and browsing the websites that host such articles, this kind of information is constantly repeated, which intensifies the stereotype of Japanese brutality and hostility towards China.

Psychological research shows that people often make judgments based on accessible information. Most “Angry Youth” don’t have the opportunity to visit Japan, so the information available to them from textbooks and media is often the main resource to make their judgments. Their attitudes towards Japan are biased based on these historical memories and prejudiced news source.

Social norms also help shape people’s behavior, especially in a country like China which has a strong tradition of collectivism. As framed by former PRC president Jiang Zemin: “Forgetting the humiliating Chinese modern history means betraying your country.” In this environment, forgetting or even forgiving Japanese aggression is tantamount to treason. A second example comes from a popular Chinese movie about the Nanjing Massacre, “Nanjing, Nanjing” (2009). The Nanjing Massacre of 1937 is widely regarded as evidence of Japanese soldiers’ brutality and is still a hot topic given current Japanese leaders’ reluctance to apologize for its occupation of China. Upon the film’s release, one influential movie critic was quoted as follows: “You are not qualified to be Chinese if you do not watch this movie.” The assertion that failure to appreciate a movie about Japanese wartime brutality means losing one’s Chinese identity puts extreme pressure on those who do not plan to see the film.

While these social norms partly explain the expansion of anti-Japanese nationalism, why does the anti-Japanese sentiment in the “Angry Youth” surpass that of other age groups, including older generations who actually lived through the brutality of occupation?

One would not be surprised to find out that peer pressure plays a large role in shaping this attitude for teens. The Chinese internet, which is notorious for its censorship of sensitive political topics, has no problem with the proliferation of nationalist comments. Allowing the “Angry Youth” to be the only outspoken adolescent political group in the country gives the false impression that they are the only politically-oriented youth in China. When “Angry Youth” spread their anti-Japanese comments on internet, people their age with similar education backgrounds tend to take this movement as a reference group, and modify their own attitudes accordingly.

Nationalism proves to be an effective tool for totalitarian states to suppress dissidents and maintain social stability. To date, it seems China has been successful at stoking nationalist themes and training “Angry Youth” to vent their frustrations in politically-acceptable directions. Unfortunately, it seems that these “Angry Youth” have already begun to transform their attitudes into behaviors, as evidenced by frequent anti-Japan demonstrations that have taken place since 2004. One way to assuage the hostile attitudes towards Japan is to expand the information channels about Japan, by introducing Japanese cartoons and movies in China in order to show different aspects of the island nation; and most importantly, to revise Chinese modern history textbooks to show the Chinese people that modern Chinese history is much richer than an eight-year war with its neighbor.


Thanks to Eddie Skolnick for his comments and editing.

Friday, May 13, 2011

Guess Who’s Coming to Breakfast? And Lunch, and Dinner?

Jenn Onofrio, MPA


Earlier this month the Food and Drug Administration issued guidelines for food manufacturers on recommended decreases in the level and frequency of sugar-sweetened cereals marketing to children. The guidelines, though voluntary, remind us again of the pervasive place of the food industry at the kitchen table.

Ask a parent who has tried to get her child to eat the boring oatmeal instead of the Cocoa Puffs before dashing out the door—the task is daunting to say the least. Food research tells us, though, that this is not entirely a matter of children’s taste buds being so normalized to sugar that they just hate oatmeal—it’s also the product of millions of dollars of targeted advertising that reminds children over and over again through television and internet commercials that Tony the Tiger is “grrrrrrreat!”

According to the Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity at Yale University, “food marketing to youth has been shown to increase preference for advertised foods; consumption of advertised foods; overall calorie consumption; requests to parents to purchase advertised foods (known as “pester power”); and snacking.”

The food industry has literally wedged itself between parents and children.

I studied food policy this fall as part of a working group preparing recommendations for the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s Childhood Obesity Group. We researched and visited programs all over the country that were tackling the issue of childhood obesity. I was fortunate to be able to meet with leadership in San Francisco about the hot topic of the time, the so-called “Happy Meal ban.” What was amazing was that it wasn’t a ban at all, but rather a requirement that fast food companies could not hand out a free toy with a meal that contained over 600 calories (with more than 35% derived from fat), and more than 640mg of sodium. It was actually an incentive for companies to increase their nutritional standards. Make it healthier, and add a serving of fruit and veggies. So long as they complied, they could reintroduce the toy.

But that wasn’t the argument heard ’round the world. Frustrated parents accused the government of trying to take the happy out of the meal. Parent after parent protested, “But my kid wants the Happy Meal.”

Without greater regulation of marketing standards, we’re getting our battles confused. Kids (with the help of the food industry) rebel against adults; adults rebel against government initiatives because of what their kids want. (Conveniently, it’s also what the food industry wants.) It creates a lot a noise and not a lot of change in the fact that the childhood obesity rate has tripled since 1980. According to the Centers for Disease Control, 17% of American children are obese.

Regulation won’t cure everything. Our research found that the most effective programs implemented a mix of bans, incentives, and education. To complement this troika, it may be time to think about setting one less place at the kitchen table. Tony the Tiger, you’re out.


Editor’s Note: You can read more about this subject in “Tipping the Scales: Strategies for Changing How America’s Children Eat,” a WWS graduate policy workshop final report presented to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Available here.

Wednesday, April 6, 2011

New clear thinking about nuclear weapons

Alex Bollfrass, MPA


The dangers from nuclear weapons are often explained as terrible outgrowths of inhuman rationality. Dr. Strangelove stands as the paragon symbol of the madness in MAD, in which detached and logically consistent decision-making leads to catastrophe. But the trouble with nuclear weapons today is exactly the opposite. Instead of rational choices leading to irrational outcomes, now we find that it is irrational psychological processes that are leading nuclear policymakers astray.

To implement a sustainable strategy to protect Americans from nuclear dangers, decisions cannot be distorted by the psychological idiosyncrasies from which we all suffer. These foibles can be overcome, but first we must understand how they can impact the way national security decision-makers view their nuclear choices.

A Clear and Present Risk

Applying lessons from psychological research, the biggest scope for miscalculation is in deciding between present and future risk. As humans, we have a difficult time understanding risk and making decisions on questions with complex trade-offs. Studies have shown that that we are especially vulnerable to postponing difficult actions if the consequences of inaction – however grave – are in the future. Thus, when deciding how to mitigate the nuclear threat we end up overvaluing the US nuclear weapon arsenal at the expense of pushing for universal denuclearization, the only true way to protect against nuclear annihilation.

But such a course correction invariably produces short-term risks and trade-offs. The product of our reluctance to embrace these short-term obstacles is a nuclear weapons policy that implicitly accepts that weapons will continue to spread to more nations. The problem with that is that the likelihood that they will be used increases with the number of states deploying such weapons, as does the danger that they will fall into the arms of terrorist organizations.

There are steps we could take to shift the proliferation danger into a lower gear, but these come at a cost. Placing all uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities under multinational control would be an enormous nonproliferation achievement, but would be vehemently resisted by the nuclear industry. Similarly, the implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s “Additional Protocol” safeguards would prevent the exploitation of nationally-controlled nuclear reactors for building nuclear weapons. Getting more than the current 94 countries (all without nuclear weapons) to sign up and agree to these intrusive “anytime, anywhere” inspections would require significant concessions from the US and other nuclear weapon states, such as limiting their weapons’ capabilities as well as reducing their numbers.

Despite President Obama’s “Nuclear Security Summit” denuclearization initiative, given the difficulty of these short-term measures and the nebulous distance of their benefits, it is unlikely the administration and Congress will act to protect Americans from this gathering threat. This difficulty of translating good intentions for the future into unpleasant action today is familiar to everyone from dieters to well-intentioned savers.

The Final Count-up

We habitually take on more risk if we stand to gain something, but suddenly develop much greater caution if there is a chance of a loss. This status-quo bias also finds expression in what psychologists call an “endowment effect,” which was first demonstrated in a lab with subjects who consistently believed that the value of coffee mugs they owned were worth more than mugs they had no ownership claim over.

The same phenomenon exists in our nuclear debates and policies. We think about how many weapons we are willing to give up, which feels like a major security sacrifice, instead of surveying the strategic landscape and counting up the number of nuclear warheads necessary to fulfill the missions assigned to them.

This irrational overvaluation makes it hard to agree to the nonproliferation measures that aim to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the wrong hands. To see this fallacy in motion, witness the favorite talking point of nuclear weapons hawks: our arsenal is at the lowest level since the Eisenhower administration. Referencing such an absurdly high baseline has little analytical use, while it creates the impression that we have very few nuclear weapons and any reductions would therefore be dangerous.

Fortunately, we can overcome these psychological impediments to a smarter nuclear strategy that balances the trade-offs of risks today and in the future. Several nations have demonstrated that it is possible. South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus went so far as to dispose of their nuclear arsenals. Throughout the nuclear age, more governments have started nuclear weapons programs and abandoned them than brought the programs to completion.

The US need not go that far, but the next time a senator denounces an arms control measure with Russia or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as too big a concession, it is worth asking which part of the Senator’s brain this judgment comes from.