Swift and Proper Action Vital to Mali’s Crisis

By William Vu, MPA 2013

The precipitous turns that the country of Mali and its citizens have experienced over the past two weeks have stood in stark contrast to what has been perceived as a stable democracy in the West African region. It has seeped all the joy that was witnessed by Macky Sall’s democratic yet arduous pathway to power last weekend in Senegal.

The infighting between the Malian government and the army has resulted in a Tuareg rebellion by those from the MNLA to reclaim the northern frontier of Mali as the territory of Azawad. The ranks of rebels had swelled from returning fighters from Libya, and this served as the initial catalyst to this rebellion. As of this post, the rebels have succeeded in claiming the strategic towns of Gao, Kidal, and most recently the well-known, ancient town of Timbuktu, where the military held its biggest garrison.

While some may characterize it as the new “African Spring,” the apparent impetus for the coup was the government’s inability to provide soldiers with sufficient resources and ammunition to meet the rebels in the north. This led to a humiliating defeat for the army and a forced retreat. Escalating tensions finally reached a head between the army and the civilian government, and on March 21, President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) was ousted from power by a military junta. In the interim, stepped Captain Amadou Sanogo.

Ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré

Coup leader Captain Amadou Sanogo

At that moment, leaders from all African nations and especially those in the region must have been on the edge of their seats. Although the rebellion had been in full swing for a couple months and reports of soldiers’ complaints against the government had surfaced, the thoughts of a coup would have been far-fetched. Democracy and stability were synonymous with Mali for two decades, a period of time that the track records that countries in the region have failed to emulate (i.e. Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone). It would be a stretch to say democracy was flourishing or that its citizens were completely satisfied with ATT and his government. There were still wide reports of rampant corruption and mismanagement, but relative to the rest of the region, Mali had served as an exemplar.

Furthermore, the presidential election was expected to take place in a little over a month before the coup began, on April 29^th, with ATT expecting to leave office to make way for a new candidate. Such seamless political transitions are an oddity, given several West African leaders’ pre-disposure to extend their terms beyond the limits defined in their constitutions.  Yet with a twist of irony, ATT, who was a military officer himself, would be sacked by the same mechanism that brought him to power two decades earlier, a coup. 

Since Captain Sanogo and the junta have moved into power, the regional bloc of nations, Ecowas and the international community have failed to recognize their legitimacy. They have threatened the junta with financial sanctions, freezing of assets and the closure of land borders. As these sanctions take form, it is likely that their implementation will cripple the economy, especially since the nation’s petrol is imported. There have been reports also that commercial banks are limiting the withdrawal of funds up to $1000, as clients brace for the sanctions.

What might have been conceived as a plot to take over the reins of the government and install a military government has now turned into a chess match, with what concessions Ecowas and the civilian government are willing to offer the junta. Faced with the daily cascade of victories by the Tuaregs and the regional pressure to bow down, Captain Sanogo said on Sunday, that the junta would restore the nation’s constitution, and “organize free, open, and democratic elections” that the military will not participate in. This latter point is central because it is necessary that responsibility be returned to the civilian government. However, the military has still not offered a timeline for departure.

Taureg rebels captured control of major cities in northern Mali following the coup

Map of Mali

In the midst of all this internal turmoil between the President and the military, three discernible things have occurred: (1) The MNLA have gained control of the north, with more citizens likely to be caught in the crossfire as the fighting continues,  (2) the government remains in a state of confusion, (3) and finally the coup and the rebellion will only weaken the government’s ability to deal with the projected food crisis as the hot season approaches.

It is unsure how (1) and (2) will unfold, but it is necessary that the military and civilian government find a swift compromise. Each day that the civilian government and junta fail to find common ground, another day the Tuareg rebellion advances. Assuming that the leaders of the MNLA will not cease fighting unless they gain recognition of their independent homeland, Ecowas and the international community will have to send in reinforcements if they want to preserve the territorial integrity of Mali. Even if the Malian army reconciles its differences with the government, it appears that external military assistance will be necessary given the Malian army’s recent spate of defeats and the MNLA’s unlikeness to compromise. This is a struggle that could last for weeks, if not for months. Hopefully not for years.

(3) Finally, the event that might cause the biggest crisis is the projected food shortage. Some 13 million people in the Sahel region are facing food insecurity in 2012 as poor rains and locust attacks led to a drop in cereal production of 25 percent. Furthermore, over 200,000 people have been displaced since January with many fleeing to neighboring countries. With the conflict, the disruption of local and cross-border food markets have limited food supplies and increased prices, and it is expected that the lives and livelihoods of 3.5 million Malians were to be affected – even before the coup unfolded. Instability in the region will only aggravate the food insecurity. It is imperative that humanitarian aid continues to be ensured and that it reaches the north where the fighting is occurring. If not the stockpiles of dead bodies from starvation might dwarf those killed in any conflict.

As I periodically refresh my computer’s browser, my sense of optimism that a quick resolution between the military and the civilian government remains cautious. In no case is timing more of the essence, as the government and military not only have to deal with the Tuareg rebellion, but the impending food crisis. My thoughts drift not only to the soldier who steps upon the battlefield, but the mother who heads to the market and finds that food prices have increased beyond her budget. Thus, I can only hope that the actors in this show will make the proper decisions and soon…

Establishing an Enduring Peace: A way forward in Darfur

Joshua Owens, MPA


For over five years, peace talks between Darfur rebel groups and the Government of Sudan (GoS) have failed to yield a substantive agreement. Low-level fighting and lawlessness continues, and recent developments indicate a potential relapse into serious conflict. Over the summer major clashes erupted along the North-South border between GoS and Southern-aligned groups (the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North, or SPLM-N) in Kordofan, which was not allowed to secede with the rest of South Sudan. In November SPLM-N and the main Darfur rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice for Equality Movement (JEM), united to establish the “Sudanese Liberation Front,” with the aim of launching coordinated military attacks across Sudan and forcefully overthrowing the Bashir regime. According to a recent International Crisis Group report, “...the growing war on multiple fronts poses serious dangers for the country, for its future relationship with the Republic of South Sudan and for the stability of the region as a whole."

To build enduring peace, the international community must first realize that the current mediation strategy of facilitating negotiations between insurgent groups and the GoS is fundamentally flawed. Peace talks have failed because they have neglected (1) traditional tribal leaders and (2) building civil society. My reflections are based on my two-year experience as a development program manager in rebel-held territory in the heart of Darfur – near the fighting lines between Darfuri rebels and GoS forces (together with their Janjaweed allies). While there, I worked on a UNDP project to study and address root causes of ongoing conflict and recognized these pitfalls in the peace-building process.

1. Breakdown of the Traditional Leadership Structure
According to local accounts, a strong tribal leadership structure facilitated relatively stable relations between African and Arab tribes in Darfur for decades before the war. Tribal elders led this structure, and it provided the mechanism for maintaining the balance of power equilibrium between tribes and mediating occasional conflicts.

However, during the 1990s, a new group of young, political activists emerged from the African tribes (Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit) to protest their enduring socio-economic marginalization under Arab hegemony from Khartoum. As this group (Sudanese Liberation Movement or SLM/SLA) amassed support from neighboring Chad and the people in the isolated tribal areas of Darfur, the balance of power shifted from legitimate tribal elders to young insurgent leaders.

When the SLM finally militarized and attacked Sudanese Armed Forces in early 2003, the GoS responded by arming Arab tribes in Darfur and authorizing them to eradicate African tribes. This intervention further disrupted the delicate balance of power that had long existed between Darfuri tribes.

Nevertheless, peace talks are framed primarily as a negotiation between the GoS and rebel groups. Though these insurgents purport to represent the best interests of the African tribes, their primary concern is their own survival. SLA and JEM present unreasonable demands in peace talks and perpetuate the conflict because peace would deprive these young, zealous rebels of their raison d’être and the basis of their authority. Rebel groups continue to wield considerable power and maintain popular support only because local populations are wholly dependent on them for protection.

Therefore, effective peace negotiations and reconciliation must also engage the traditional tribal leaders. These elders are the only legitimate representatives of the best interests of the tribes, and their continued exclusion will undermine any settlement attempt.

2. Shoring Up Civil Society
Second, in order to facilitate long-term peace-building, the international community must help these areas build strong, village-level civil society institutions. According to conventional social science definitions, civil society is the space that (a) exists between the family and the state, (b) connects different families and individuals, and (c) is independent of the state. (Varshney 2001) Civil society organizations are modern and voluntary and generally take the form of cultural, social, economic, or political associations. For example, in Darfuri villages, we attempted to establish agricultural extension networks, community water and health committees, women’s trade groups, and English classes.

Most scholars of conflict agree that civil society play an important role in mitigating violence because these associations connect people from diverse backgrounds, build trust and reciprocity, and facilitate the exchange of view on public issues. In Darfur, building civil society now is vital for peace-building for two reasons: First, civilian-led organizations will help offset the power and voice of armed rebel groups and promote the legitimate leadership of civilian tribal leaders. Second, these organizations can facilitate the ethnic reconciliation process in Darfur by gradually establishing links with civil society groups in rival tribes with similar interests.

Conclusion
Taken together, these steps will help resolve the impasse of negotiations over Darfur. Though international attention has shifted in the past year to the plight of South Sudan, this lingering crisis in the country is no less important.

Kenya's Operation Protect the Nation: Yet another foreign intervention in Somalia

Beza Tesfaye, MPA


What is the first thing that comes to mind when someone mentions Somalia? Failed state. Sadly Somalia is indeed the epitome of what state failure entails—a weak government with power limited to the capital Mogadishu, a famine that threatens the lives of millions, rampant piracy and lawlessness, and an amorphous militia claiming to control most of the country under a strict version of Sharia Law. Yet Somalia’s recent and historical problems can only be fully understood in light of external involvement in Somali politics. The recent move by the Kenyan government to send troops into Somalia to fight Al Shabab warrants a brief discussion of how foreign invasions contribute to the perpetual crisis in Somalia.

Many of us vaguely remember seeing images of dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu on the evening news. Before this decisive turning point, a UN humanitarian mission backed by US forces was involved in a large-scale humanitarian intervention to bring famine relief to starving Somalis. At the time, the US made an imprudent decision to kill and/or capture Somalia’s most powerful warlord, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The mission ended in failure and embarrassment for the US government and with a tacit agreement to no longer directly interfere in the volatile nation’s affairs.

Some time passed and it seemed Somalia had fallen off everyone’s radar, with new crises emerging in other African countries like Rwanda, Liberia, and Congo. The popular image of Somalia remained, a “basket-case” country without a fixed state and governed by clan-based warlords. However, it was during this time that a semblance of stability and governance began to emerge under a network of Islamist courts known as the Islamist Courts Union (ICU). This loosely-organized group was able to bring peace and began to provide basic social services such as education and healthcare that had been non-existent for years.

Despite this brief window of stability in the early 2000s, the situation in Somalia has deteriorated far worse than anyone could have imagined. For reasons that have never been well articulated, the Ethiopian army – with financial and military support from the US – invaded Somalia in 2006, destabilizing the ICU. Three years later, the Ethiopian forces gave up the intractable military mission having achieved nothing and inadvertently fueling the growth of an unmanageable force that has since consumed Somalia—Al Shabab.

Less than three years after Ethiopia’s failed invasion and departure, Kenya has now joined the class of nations that try to “fix” the Somali problem through force. On October 16th, Kenya launched Operation Protect the Nation, sending hundreds of troops across the border into neighboring Somalia. Despite the Kenyan government’s rationalization that sending troops into Somalia was for the purpose of maintaining territorial sovereignty after a recent string of kidnappings within Kenya, this action has been met with mixed reactions. Below I highlight a few issues of concern that question the rationality of this decision:

1) First, it is important to note that Al Shabab has not claimed responsibility for the recent kidnappings of foreign tourists and aid workers along the Somalia/Kenya border (a rare precedent for an organization that has never shied away from limelight when it comes to acts of terror it has committed—e.g. the July 2010 bombings in Kampala, Uganda). More likely, the crimes were committed by Somali pirates or bandits seeking ransom rather than any type of political statement. This raises the important point that the problem with Somalia is not just Al Shabab—it is also lawlessness, underdevelopment, poverty, and a lack of institutions to effectively govern the fragmented society. A foreign invasion, even if it is able to rid Somalia of Al Shabab, is probably unlikely and unwilling to address these deeper-rooted structural sources of conflict and instability in Somalia that have inevitably spilled over into neighboring countries like Kenya.

2) The Kenyan government for some time has maintained a hands-off approach towards Somalia, seeking to secure its porous border areas, rather than involving itself directly in Somali internal affairs. Kenya has also been accommodating towards hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees and the beleaguered transitional government of Somalia. It is surprising, then, that Nairobi should suddenly make such an unpredictable policy change at this point—possibly opening the nation up for retaliatory attacks from aggrieved extremists. It should be noted, for example, that northwestern Kenya has been plagued for years by attacks from Ethiopian Toposas and Merrile cattle raiders, but the idea of invading southern Ethiopia to stop these killings has never been entertained. Succinctly put, Kenya is not an aggressive nation, and the recent declaration of war raises important questions about what or who urged the Kenyan government to invade Somalia.

3) Most importantly, what will this new foreign intervention mean for Somalis who are already suffering from the worst famine to hit the region in 50 years? The implications are hard to predict but what is certain is that fighting between Al Shabab and Kenyan troops as well as Kenyan air raids are likely to result in civilian casualties. Inevitably, this is a common cost of any armed conflict but one that is often justified by clear positive outcomes. In this situation, it is unclear what end results the Kenyan government seeks to achieve. If the aim is to completely eradicate Al Shabab, then Kenya is setting itself up for a long and potentially unwinnable conflict against a militant group that may be able to diffuse into Somali society and remerge even stronger. This is particularly likely if Somalis perceive the invasion as an unwelcome foreign incursion on their homeland, as was the case with the Ethiopian and U.S. military interventions. By attacking Somalia when Al Shabab was beginning to lose legitimacy and control in the country (having retreated from Mogadishu just this summer), Kenya may have grant the extremist group an unexpected lifeline. Without speculating too much of what will happen in the coming months, it suffices to say that war is detrimental to Somalis, especially a poorly-planned invasion with only vague objectives.