Buying local: Will the US troop pullout pull the afghan out from under the Afghan economy?

Andrew Shaver, MPA


American military officials have initiated plans to withdraw the first contingent of US forces from Afghanistan this year despite the Afghan government’s dependence upon US operations for its own security and political survival. No less important, though infrequently mentioned, is the very uncertain economic future for Afghanistan in the wake of American withdrawal. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee cautioned earlier this summer that, without proper planning, Afghanistan “could suffer a severe economic depression when foreign troops leave…” Meanwhile, the Congressionally-mandated Commission on Wartime Contracting (an independent, bipartisan group established to study wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan) warned in its final report this summer that many social and security programs developed in Afghanistan by the US government likely cannot be sustained by the government of Afghanistan.

While significant investigation has been done into the nature and possible effects of the significant State, Defense, and USAID spending in Afghanistan, similar scrutiny has not been applied to a major Department of Defense (DoD) program established in 2006 under which many billions of dollars have been spent on goods and services procured from Afghan firms.

Last month, Defense officials provided me with data recently made public on all contractual obligations made to Afghan firms by US Central Command’s primary contracting entity. The data are impressive. Based on commitments already made this year, DoD is on track to make more than $2 billion in obligations with Afghan firms by in fiscal year 2011. (To put matters in perspective, Afghanistan’s 2010 gross domestic product was roughly $27 billion.) While the US military begins to reduce its presence in Afghanistan, CentCom spending on goods and services provided by Afghan firms continues to increase significantly – obligations this fiscal year are 100% greater than 2009 and are set to exceed 2010 obligations by more than half a billion dollars.

Policymakers should consider possible effects on Afghanistan’s security conditions of terminating, quickly or slowly, billions of dollars in business with local firms. Has DoD business with local firms created industries that will remain functional in the years following America’s withdrawal? Has military spending created bubbles of economic activity that threaten to implode as the war effort grinds to a halt, leaving ranks of young males unemployed and susceptible to terrorist recruiting?

It is possible that the effect will be minimal. Of the roughly $1.7 billion already committed this fiscal year, nearly $1 billion are slated for purchases of various commodities. Because contracting guidelines do not require that Afghan businesses satisfy strict local-content or local-hiring requirements, little deters these firms from importing such commodities from abroad. Thus, the cessation of spending in Afghanistan may do little more than sound the death knell for an inflated market of Afghan middlemen. My discussions with contracting officials deployed in theater tend to corroborate this possibility. However, no formal study has been undertaken in this regard.

However, on the services side, data indicates that there may be jobs at stake, albeit within a somewhat narrow set of industries. Of the remaining approximately $700 million obligated this fiscal year, most are designated for the provision of “professional, administrative and management support services,” “utilities and housekeeping services,” and “transportation, travel, and relocation services.” Central Command also reported recently employing over 46,000 Afghans and estimated that a further 18,000 Afghans are employed as private security contractor personnel. Granted, many of these jobs may remain in place following a draw-down. But research into the way such industries have developed through US military spending is needed to provide policymakers with better understanding of how the timing and magnitude of troop withdrawal might ultimately affect Afghanistan’s economy.

Getting at such a question may not be as challenging as might otherwise be the case. Last year, now-retired General David Petraeus *85 *87 and Admiral Mike Mullen established Task Force 2010 to examine whether the Department’s contractual spending in Afghanistan is undermining efforts to stabilize the country. So far, this mandate has translated into investigations into whether funds have fallen into the hands of insurgency members, culminating with this summer’s finding that that the Taliban has extracted rents on US transportation spending. Yet, as an organization created to “follow the money,” as Petraeus testified to Congress, Task Force 2010 not only enjoys senior-level support but employs the type of civilian and military experts qualified to consider the broader effects of major contract spending on the country and the implications for its withdrawal. If properly resourced and directed, the task force could offer policymakers a unique way forward. Let’s hope.


A version of this article was published earlier this month by the Small Wars Journal blog, and is accessible here.

The challenges facing an expanded Japanese role in US-Japan security alliance

Ani Akinbiyi, MPA


Following the conclusion of World War II, Japan became one of the United States’ most important global allies, and ever since the US-Japan security alliance has grown increasingly more important to maintaining the stability of the East Asia. And yet, despite its pivotal role in the US’s global security strategy, there have recently been calls from within the US policymaking establishment to reevaluate America’s security partnership with Japan. Officials claim that Japan has not carried its equal weight within the alliance, and that the Japanese have come to take the American security umbrella for granted. They conclude that Japanese unwillingness to take on more responsibility within the alliance indicates their lack of commitment to the partnership, and that perhaps the US should consider downgrading its military ties to the island nation. However, this view fails to consider the possibility that Japan is simply unable to assume greater responsibility within this relationship because it is bound by domestic political realities and because the two countries may not share the same objectives for the alliance itself. In essence, Japan has yet to decide, one way or the other, what its defense posture will be and what role the US security alliance will play in that strategy.

Since the end of World War II, the Japanese government has had a difficult time galvanizing public support for an increased role for its military, in self-defense matters or otherwise. After the war, not only did the people of Japan have to deal with the consequences of a nuclear attack, they also had to come to terms with the aftermath of a US firebombing campaign in which, according to former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, “50-90% of the people in 67 Japanese cities” were killed, and more than two-thirds of those cities were between 40-99% destroyed. This profound level of physical and human destruction left the nation with a deep-seated mistrust of the military – which many Japanese blamed for taking the country to war – and a sense that their government did not have the capacity to adequately control it.

This sense of mistrust has lingered over the course of the 60 years since the post-war constitution came into effect. During that time, attempts to increase the range and scope of military responsibility have been met with significant popular resistance, and what has emerged is a society where anti-militarism is so profound that successive Japanese governments have gone beyond constitutional restrictions to impose additional restraints on its military potential, such as banning the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the development of power-projection capabilities, and arms exportation. Thus, in the face of such popular support for a debilitated military, it is no surprise that the democratically-elected Japanese government has had trouble mustering the political will necessary to make changes to its military structure.

Japan’s squeamishness with militarism is also evident from its limited overseas operations, which are only approved on a case-by-case basis. In early 2010 the newly-empowered Democratic Party of Japan cancelled its Indian Ocean refueling mission, stationed in support of the US’s war in Afghanistan. While shifts in foreign policy are expected with the introduction of a new administration, such flip-flopping gives the impression that Japan lacks a vision for its military and makes Tokyo’s allies and enemies alike question why Japan seems so intent on remaining defensively castrated.

This is further baffling when one looks at the very real threats in Japan’s front yard. Japan may be taking for granted America’s willingness to remain a regional protector indefinitely, gambling that as long as the US protects its own interests in the region Japan’s interests will also be served. While this gambit has proved successful in the past, there is no guarantee that the US’s strategic configuration will remain unchanged, especially as Washington tries its best to avoid military postures that antagonize China and increase the likelihood of entanglement with its second-largest trading partner.

Given this reluctance for military assertiveness, it is no surprise that there is a disconnect between what Washington wants from its alliance with Japan and what Tokyo is able to provide. The US wants to see the Diet contribute more to Japan’s homeland defense and increase its out-of-area military commitments. Unfortunately, it seems that the US would do well to have Japan focus solely on its domestic defense, as the Japanese parliament has shown diminished capacity to successfully juggle both security objectives. The Liberal Democratic Party, Japan’s former ruling political party, tried to use the success of recent overseas engagements to bolster arguments for an expansion of the Self-Defense Forces mandate. However, it was unable to turn overseas successes into the concrete political will necessary to make the needed changes at home. Exacerbating this dead loss is the fact that these missions have only served to siphon critical resources away from the development of Japan’s domestic defense capabilities.

In sum, Japan’s self-defense policy appears directionless, with policymakers seemingly not knowing where best to focus the government’s efforts. With a new political party in control, an emboldened China, a sabre-rattling North Korea, and an increasingly impatient US, the Japanese need to get their act together and demonstrate some decisiveness about their desired defense posture. Currently it is a hodge-podge of components that together do not make an impressive statement. The new government must also find a way to move the Japanese citizenry past the fear and pacifism that shackle Tokyo’s ability to increase its military capability. Only with these two obstacles behind them will the Japanese be able to support the US-Japan alliance in a meaningful way.

Rebalancing civilian-military operations: A two-way street

Rashad Badr, MPA


There is a great deal of discussion about the need to adjust the balance between civilian agencies and the military in executing U.S. foreign policy and programs. The easiest argument to make is that the vast American defense complex overshadows US diplomatic and developmental efforts in almost every way. The Department of Defense (DoD) budget in 2010 was $691 billion, whereas the State Department’s budget for that year was just $16.4 billion. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the development arm of State, similarly faced a shorter stack in pursuing its goals abroad. However one wants to add it up, defense spending surpasses civilians projects by about 40 to 1.

Other State advocates point to the sprawling manpower that the military possesses when compared to its civilian counterparts. Just one example of this mismatch: the personal staff of the Central Command Combatant Commander (CCDR) – known for previously serving a famous Woodrow Wilson School graduate, General David Petraeus *85 *87 – is larger than many of the embassies that fall into Central Command’s theatre. When CCDRs travel, they normally arrive with a small army of assistants and personnel. When I saw Assistant Secretary of State Jeff Feltman travel to the Middle East last summer, he traveled with a single assistant.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has argued before Congress that the State Department needs more funding. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, with the help of our very own former dean, Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, has pioneered the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QQDR). In it, Clinton and Slaughter aim to remap American diplomatic and developmental efforts, putting them on par with defensive operations, in accordance with President Obama’s “3D” approach to foreign policy: defense, diplomacy, and development. This document has many creative ideas and useful insights. But what have we seen of it so far?

More importantly, we’ve heard all of this before. So what should we do about it?

Unfortunately, the situation is bit more complex than a simple issue of funding parity or even mission creep. But first off, let’s get one thing straight: I’m a big fan of State and a staunch advocate for the need to elevate diplomacy as a tool of national security. That being said, the department needs to critically alter its mission and operations in three ways.

First, State has to get serious about assuming greater risks while conducting diplomacy. Current security measures, left largely in the hands of Regional Security Officers abroad, effectively keep diplomats trapped behind embassy walls. If a country is deemed “dangerous,” then diplomats have to jump through numerous hoops before they are allowed to leave compound – and when they do get permission, they have to be escorted by armed guards and in armored vehicles. There is something counter-intuitive about effectively marginalizing our Foreign Service Officers in the places that need the greatest diplomatic efforts. Of course relaxing these standards will come with attendant risks and dangers, but diplomacy is a dangerous endeavor. Unfortunately, the State Department’s allergy to potentially hostile situations – to which the military is largely immune – has ultimately led to its marginalization.

Second, the department needs to reassert control over peacekeeping, nation building, and wartime operations. The US’s two biggest engagements currently are in Iraq and Afghanistan. A study of peacekeeping operations and nation building efforts in both of these countries reveal DoD dominance in both developmental and diplomatic activities. Diplomats and aid workers argue that they simply don’t have the funding or the operational capacity to work in these environments. Fine, but let’s also not forget that the State Department’s mission has been steadily cut down since the Clinton presidency (without much of a fight might I add) and traditional State and USAID operations have been farmed out to DoD. In fact, one of the biggest complaints I hear from people in uniform (at all levels) is that State and USAID are just not stepping up to the plate. State and USAID will have to not only reassert themselves in these areas on a macro level, but take substantive steps to fund and train civilians in taking over from DoD.

Which brings me to my third point: the State Department needs to implement its goal of “engaging beyond the state,” as referenced in the QDDR. In Iraq and Afghanistan, that means picking up some of the work done by Special Operations in navigating and channeling tribal and ethnic currents. Elsewhere in the world, it means engaging outside of our “comfort zone,” to include more engagement with Islamist groups and opposition movements. American diplomatic efforts will always be limited if we (read: American policymakers) are content engaging with official, traditional government counterparts and Western, liberal thinkers. American diplomacy cannot be considered robust if it is not widened to take into account the full spectrum and picture of political actors operating in today’s complex international environment.

These criticisms may come off as a bit harsh on the State Department and USAID, but these are necessary issues to keep in mind if civilian efforts will ever near parity with military power. Because at the end of the day, American policymakers can’t just ask DoD to give up turf; they need to have a strong and aggressive civilian sector willing to pick up and take over.

New clear thinking about nuclear weapons

Alex Bollfrass, MPA


The dangers from nuclear weapons are often explained as terrible outgrowths of inhuman rationality. Dr. Strangelove stands as the paragon symbol of the madness in MAD, in which detached and logically consistent decision-making leads to catastrophe. But the trouble with nuclear weapons today is exactly the opposite. Instead of rational choices leading to irrational outcomes, now we find that it is irrational psychological processes that are leading nuclear policymakers astray.

To implement a sustainable strategy to protect Americans from nuclear dangers, decisions cannot be distorted by the psychological idiosyncrasies from which we all suffer. These foibles can be overcome, but first we must understand how they can impact the way national security decision-makers view their nuclear choices.

A Clear and Present Risk

Applying lessons from psychological research, the biggest scope for miscalculation is in deciding between present and future risk. As humans, we have a difficult time understanding risk and making decisions on questions with complex trade-offs. Studies have shown that that we are especially vulnerable to postponing difficult actions if the consequences of inaction – however grave – are in the future. Thus, when deciding how to mitigate the nuclear threat we end up overvaluing the US nuclear weapon arsenal at the expense of pushing for universal denuclearization, the only true way to protect against nuclear annihilation.

But such a course correction invariably produces short-term risks and trade-offs. The product of our reluctance to embrace these short-term obstacles is a nuclear weapons policy that implicitly accepts that weapons will continue to spread to more nations. The problem with that is that the likelihood that they will be used increases with the number of states deploying such weapons, as does the danger that they will fall into the arms of terrorist organizations.

There are steps we could take to shift the proliferation danger into a lower gear, but these come at a cost. Placing all uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities under multinational control would be an enormous nonproliferation achievement, but would be vehemently resisted by the nuclear industry. Similarly, the implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s “Additional Protocol” safeguards would prevent the exploitation of nationally-controlled nuclear reactors for building nuclear weapons. Getting more than the current 94 countries (all without nuclear weapons) to sign up and agree to these intrusive “anytime, anywhere” inspections would require significant concessions from the US and other nuclear weapon states, such as limiting their weapons’ capabilities as well as reducing their numbers.

Despite President Obama’s “Nuclear Security Summit” denuclearization initiative, given the difficulty of these short-term measures and the nebulous distance of their benefits, it is unlikely the administration and Congress will act to protect Americans from this gathering threat. This difficulty of translating good intentions for the future into unpleasant action today is familiar to everyone from dieters to well-intentioned savers.

The Final Count-up

We habitually take on more risk if we stand to gain something, but suddenly develop much greater caution if there is a chance of a loss. This status-quo bias also finds expression in what psychologists call an “endowment effect,” which was first demonstrated in a lab with subjects who consistently believed that the value of coffee mugs they owned were worth more than mugs they had no ownership claim over.

The same phenomenon exists in our nuclear debates and policies. We think about how many weapons we are willing to give up, which feels like a major security sacrifice, instead of surveying the strategic landscape and counting up the number of nuclear warheads necessary to fulfill the missions assigned to them.

This irrational overvaluation makes it hard to agree to the nonproliferation measures that aim to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the wrong hands. To see this fallacy in motion, witness the favorite talking point of nuclear weapons hawks: our arsenal is at the lowest level since the Eisenhower administration. Referencing such an absurdly high baseline has little analytical use, while it creates the impression that we have very few nuclear weapons and any reductions would therefore be dangerous.

Fortunately, we can overcome these psychological impediments to a smarter nuclear strategy that balances the trade-offs of risks today and in the future. Several nations have demonstrated that it is possible. South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus went so far as to dispose of their nuclear arsenals. Throughout the nuclear age, more governments have started nuclear weapons programs and abandoned them than brought the programs to completion.

The US need not go that far, but the next time a senator denounces an arms control measure with Russia or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as too big a concession, it is worth asking which part of the Senator’s brain this judgment comes from.

Taiwan, China’s recent foreign policy aggressiveness, and implications for US policy

Ian Aucoin, MPA


With a rising China, a teetering regime in North Korea facing a succession crisis, and increasingly self-reliant and assertive governments in Japan and South Korea, the economic and political order in the Pacific is changing shape. In this emerging new East Asian order, does still Taiwan matter? Does it remain a potential flashpoint of military conflict? Most importantly, should its defense remain an article of US foreign policy?

In the middle of the last century, the US took up the cause of defending the island to ensure that Chang Kai-Shek and our capitalist Kuomintang (KMT) allies would survive long enough for Mao and the communists to lose control of the mainland and subsequently reclaim China for the nationalists. With his horrible mistakes in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Mao came close, but things have now changed. In both capitals the old guard is dead and economies are booming. Both parties still seek a negotiated reconciliation, but neither the “one China, two systems” that Beijing proposes nor the independence that some in Taipei desire is acceptable at present. However, with the continent’s exponentially greater resources and Taiwan’s increasing diplomatic isolation, time does not appear to be on the latter’s side. Any agreement is increasingly likely to come on Beijing’s terms.

The 21st century People’s Republic of China is more robust than ever before and it is starting to throw its weight around, most dramatically within the past year. In 2010, Beijing reacted with unusual venom to a routine American arms deal with Taiwan, brought economic weaponry to bear against Japan after a confrontation near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, repositioned missile batteries to better “encourage” Hanoi to give up its claim on the Paracel Islands, and more or less turned a blind eye to North Korean provocations on the Peninsula while reacting far more strongly to the joint US-ROK military exercises carried out in response. None of this was well received abroad. In 201, there have been indications—from President Hu’s state visit to the US and other sources—that the negative international reaction to this brand of Chinese assertiveness has been taken to heart in Beijing, but in practice we have no guarantees that it will not head down that road again.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, Taiwan and the Taiwanese government largely avoided this wave of bellicosity from Beijing, and in the short term Taiwan does not appear to be a likely flashpoint of military conflict. In fact, since the KMT regained control of the government from the more pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2008, prevailing trends in cross-Strait relations have undergone a significant reversal and are now better than ever before. Direct flights between Taiwan and the mainland resumed in the summer of 2008, the landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement that dramatically lowered barriers between the two economies was signed two years later, and this past November the KMT mayor of Taipei rode to victory over his DPP opponent in an election that was widely seen as a referendum on the KMT’s strategy of engagement with the mainland. At this point, even if the DPP returned to power they would likely have to moderate their tone and accept many of these KMT initiatives as entrenched features of the political landscape.

All that said, the sweeping shifts in policy and rhetoric coming out of both capitals over the last few years and the persistent obstacles to a long-term negotiated solution indicate that it remains a little early to put this conflict to bed. And yet, there is reason for optimism in the recent turmoil in China’s foreign policy. The PRC’s missteps are an indication that it is finding its feet as an emerging power. These are formative years in which China is feeling out its place on the international stage, and while there is no reason to believe that the political, economic, and territorial interests China has recently expressed are going to change, the strategies they will employ to serve them are still highly malleable. Last year China tried to project power in the region by bullying its neighbors, and its actions were roundly rejected. Chinese leaders are going to go back to the drawing board and try to find a more efficient and effective way to get what they want. America’s preeminent position in the East Asian security structure is an invaluable tool to shape the character of Chinese foreign policy by ensuring that force and intimidation remain undesirable means to achieve China’s ends. In time, China’s need to find other avenues to serve its interests will ideally drive it towards greater participation in existing regional diplomatic organizations and the formation of new ones with greater capabilities. Though for a variety of reasons—historical, cultural, political—these institutions will differ markedly from their Western analogs, they still carry the promise of mutual benefits to all participating countries. However in the interim, while there are ongoing changes in the region’s political structure, American relationships with Taiwan and other regional actors will remain relevant as a means of deterring aggression and stimulating cooperation.

In sum, Taiwan matters, but not for the reasons it used to. Ongoing improvements in cross-Strait relations are making military confrontation between the PRC and its “wayward province” increasingly implausible. Today, the US defensive relationship with Taiwan is substantially weaker than in the past, but its value persists as a reminder of the dangers Beijing would face in pursuing an overzealous foreign policy. Additionally, it is a powerful excuse to continue Seventh Fleet operations off the southern coast of Asia, which many states in the area support, though some may be loath to admit it. Were the US to withdraw its support for Taiwan, it would lose a great deal of prestige and influence in the Pacific, with remarkably little gain. Further, Taiwan could not realistically defend itself against the full might of the People’s Liberation Army, and all parties know that. While in the event of American withdrawal of support Taiwan-PRC military confrontation would remain unlikely, this retraction would still greatly limit the Taiwanese options in bilateral negotiations and allow Beijing to commit its military resources elsewhere, better positioning it to pursue a more belligerent vein of diplomacy if it so chose. Maintaining the current American position on Taiwan buys time for other processes of regional integration to operate in an environment already favorable to stability and the interests of the United States.