Chugga Chugga Moo Moo: Developing Cow Power

Carol Lu, MPA


While solar and wind power have become synonymous with renewable energy, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has made it a priority to support the commercialization of a much less glamorous source of energy – dairy biogas from digester systems. Biogas (bio-gas) is gas produced by the biological breakdown of organic matter in the absence of oxygen, and digester systems are industrial structures designed to capture that material. Located on the dairy farms themselves, digesters capture biogas from manure, transforming waste to energy. These systems benefit the environment by reducing water pollution from nutrient run-off. And, they represent a potential business opportunity. Even in this win-win situation, the current nascent digester industry is not economically sustainable: electricity sales to the wholesale market don’t justify capital costs. Entrepreneurs may make inroads to costs through “learning” on operations, but more is needed to push the industry toward profitability.

As a key environmental player with strong connections to local regulatory agencies and regulated entities, the EPA can help to increase digester project revenues in two ways:

• Reduce barriers to co-digestion. Because restaurant grease has high energy potential, co-digestion of these wastes with manure would allow projects to generate double or triple the electricity at nearly the same costs. In addition, digester developers could charge restaurants a tipping fee to dispose of their grease. These additional revenue streams could make a project profitable. Unfortunately, co-digestion in areas like California is nearly impossible because of strict environmental permitting standards. The EPA should work with local agencies to develop a fast-tracked permitting exception for diary digester projects in states where co-digestion is not permitted.

• Facilitate direct partnerships between large electricity end-users and digester projects. By directly providing electricity to an end-user rather than selling electricity to the wholesale market, a project developer is able to obtain a higher price for its renewable energy. Higher prices mean higher revenues. As an agency that regulates both large industrial electricity users and small dairies, the EPA is in a unique position to match these parties together. Thus, the EPA should develop an internal process in which those that work with large electricity users in the air permitting office collaborate with those that work with dairies in the water and agriculture offices. With sufficient support from the top, this intra-agency working group has the potential to bridge this critical gap.

With California’s cap-and-trade program rolling out in 2013, dairy digester projects across the United States may be able to supplement electricity revenues with compliance-offset revenues. Eight percent of emissions reductions by entities regulated under the cap may come from offsets, and livestock manure projects are one of the four approved offset project types. While there are many other factors to ensuring sustained deployment of dairy digester technology, increasing revenue potential is a vital first step.

African Energy Access: Is China a game-changer?

Phillip M. Hannam, PhD candidate


This summer in Nairobi, Kenya, I would often go vegetable shopping at a local open-air market. To my surprise, many of the vendors – native Kenyans – spoke Mandarin with the Chinese clientele, who had a distinct presence throughout the market. Nearby, massive concrete pillars and cantilevered steel beams rising above the city – the first elevated highway system in Kenya, courtesy of China – are a visible manifestation of growing development cooperation between China and Africa. Many Chinese and African scholars regard these investments as “win-win” partnerships, though Chinese state-owned institutions have also garnered criticism over resource interests and the disregard of humanitarian and environmental concerns in project planning.[1]

Beyond highways, hospitals, municipal water and waste systems, stadiums, and government buildings, China is also heavily invested in Africa’s electricity generation infrastructure. The scale of China’s involvement could provide electricity to millions in Africa who need it. And the energy could be renewable. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Seychelles, Jean-Paul Adam, recently expressed his optimism to the UN General Assembly:

“China and Africa have an ideal opportunity to work together to set an example for the world on best practices [in] eco-friendly technology transfer, to enhance the development of renewable energy.”[2]

Approximately 1.4 billion people lack access to electricity globally, and one billion more have unreliable electricity access.[3] Lack of modern energy services impairs attainment of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The World Bank predicts that an underperforming energy system results in a loss of 1-2% of annual economic growth potential.[4] Yet of the US$35-40 billion needed annually from now until 2030 to achieve universal energy access, only about 5% of this amount is expected through traditional development institutions. At this rate, the proportion of people with energy access is unlikely to improve significantly by 2030, the year the UN has called for universal access to modern energy services. Thus, China’s energy investments around the world – though hardly altruistic – could still help bring this goal into reach.

It is too early to tell if China’s investments in Africa will significantly change the outlook for the people of this resource-rich, but chronically energy-poor, continent. Nonetheless, I posit a few initial observations, expanded below:

1. China is a new major player in Africa’s electricity sector: China’s presence in a range of renewable energies across the continent is welcome from the standpoint of increasing energy access and helping to achieve the UN MDGs. Unfortunately, the vast majority is in hydropower, which carries its own deleterious baggage.
2. China views Africa as a growth market: Chinese companies see Africa as a new frontier for renewable energy – using China’s domestically-honed comparative advantages in solar, wind, and hydropower technology to employ Chinese firms, open market opportunities, and base manufacturing capacity within Africa. Western companies reticent to invest in Africa may miss emerging opportunities for renewable energy across the continent.
3. The World Bank is shifting away from coal. China’s focus is likewise migrating to renewables: Chinese energy investments closely parallel those at the World Bank, where the focus is (slowly) shifting away from coal. While this unfortunately means a lot of new hydropower, it could also mean a lower coal and carbon trajectory for African development.

1. China is a new major player for African energy access: According to a study by the World Bank, 34% of Chinese investments in African infrastructure are in electricity.[5] Of this, the vast majority is hydropower. A watchdog group, International Rivers, reports that Chinese financial institutions are building over 250 hydropower projects across the developing world, mostly in Africa and Southeast Asia. Large hydropower projects, on the scale that China builds them, are highly controversial. Chinese dams in Ethiopia, Sudan, Ghana, and elsewhere face intense opposition because of ecosystem damage and displacement of indigenous groups. Chinese developers remain unapologetic, and most African policymakers support the projects. The Gibe III project on the Omo River in Ethiopia, as one example, will provide 1,800MW of electricity – effectively doubling Ethiopia’s generating capacity.[6] The energy access provided by the project is weighted against the dam’s impact on hundreds of thousands of people who rely on the Omo River and its ecosystems for their livelihoods.[7]

Better governance of international development cooperation could make such projects more tolerable. The World Commission on Dams delineates how large hydropower may be sustainable in an environmental, social, and economic context, though the recommendations have largely been dismissed by Chinese developers (and the World Bank, for that matter).

Fortunately, China is investing beyond hydropower. China Longyuan Power Group is investing in several wind power projects in South Africa, on the scale of 100MW.[8] Hydrochina International Engineering Company is building wind farms at two sites in Ethiopia. Another Chinese state-owned company, Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., is supplying the wind turbines for the project.[9] A subsidiary of Chinese oil giant Sinopec has invested US$18.7 million to develop geothermal power potential across Kenya and the Rift Valley. China is also emerging in Africa’s nuclear power sector, exporting its domestic nuclear technology. China National Nuclear Corporation is considering developing a new nuclear power station in collaboration with South Africa. A Chinese-built nuclear power station is also under discussion for east Africa.[10]

2. China views Africa as a growth market: Beyond building new power stations, Chinese firms are investing in renewable energy manufacturing across Africa. Western solar power companies were active in the Kenyan market in the 1990s, but most pulled out due to high costs and low sales.[11] Today, the African renewables market is changing. Policies to incentivize grid-connected solar power are being considered in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda. For now, all solar panels demanded in Africa must be shipped from outside the continent – a financial and logistical problem that stifles growth of the industry.

China’s Tianpu Xianxing Enterprises, a prominent Chinese integrated solar manufacturer with exports around the world, is negotiating a major manufacturing hub in Nairobi. By creating a production base within Africa, shipping costs would be reduced and sale prices for panels may drop from US$310 to US$77 for a typical home system.[12]

In 2010, Suntech, China’s largest solar panel manufacturer, began investing several hundred million US dollars in a manufacturing base in South Africa capable of producing 100MW of capacity annually. The plant is expected to supply the growing South African solar market, which some analysts predict could reach US$1 billion annually. The creation of a manufacturing base within Africa increases the potential for skilled-job creation and technology transfer – desperately needed for the development of Africa’s fledgling electricity sector. It could also keep educated Africans from fleeing to jobs outside the region, as manufacturers within Africa put a premium on local skilled labor and technical skills.

3. Trends in Chinese investments following the World Bank: The World Bank has come under intense scrutiny in recent years regarding its role in financing large carbon intensive projects in energy and extractive industries. Coal is oftentimes the cheapest option when the price of carbon isn’t internalized. As a concession to international pressure, in 2011 the World Bank strictly limited future lending for coal power to the very poorest (non-IDA countries) countries. The World Bank’s energy strategy supports hydropower explicitly, calling it low-carbon electricity (though much evidence contests this) and noting that 90% of the hydropower resource in sub-Saharan Africa remains undeveloped.

Given China’s experience with coal domestically (which supplies 80% of Chinese electricity), Chinese investment in coal projects globally could fill the void left by the Bank’s exit from coal power in some countries. While no complete database exists of Chinese international projects, my own research indicates that Chinese firms have been involved in roughly 4GW of fossil power in Africa since 2000. China has several coal projects in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Senegal, and Botswana, as well as natural gas projects in Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana.[13]

Encouragingly, none of these projects were announced in the past two years, while most of the non-hydro renewable energy projects mentioned above were initiated during that time. It remains to be seen how China’s investment portfolio will change as a result of World Bank policy, but for now I am optimistic that China is investigating opportunities beyond hydropower and coal for its African energy investments.

Conclusion
Renewable energy is playing a growing role in Africa. China is a champion of this trend, particularly as it explores investing in renewable energy manufacturing capacity in southern and eastern Africa. Western firms remain largely absent in this market. Indeed, it appears that in the arena of development aid and development finance – once dominated by western powers – China is increasingly emerging as a leading player.

While huge investments in hydropower are disastrous for biodiversity and have significant human impacts, the electricity generated bodes well for energy access goals. Moreover, while China frequently comes under direct criticism for its development projects, China’s energy investment portfolio seems to be consistent with that of the World Bank. Stronger institutions are needed to ensure that large scale projects, whether invested by China or Western institutions, maximize benefits while eliminating humanitarian and environmental costs to the extent possible.


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References:

[1] Deborah Brautigam at American University is particularly fair and thorough in her treatment of China’s engagements in Africa. Visit her blog here.
[2] UN 65th Session. Quote from AE-Africa (27 September 2010). Link.
[3] International Energy Agency (2010). “World Energy Outlook”. Executive Summary. Link
[4] World Bank (2009). “Africa’s infrastructure, a time for transformation.” World Bank Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic.
[5] Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C. and Pushak, N. (2009). “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financer for Sub-Saharan Africa”. Trends and Policy Options, No.5. Link
[6] BBC, 26 March 2009: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7959444.stm
[7] Last month’s decision by the Burmese Government to shelve the $3.6 billion Myitsone hydropower project being developed by a Chinese parastatal company was celebrated as a victory for local and international activists. Yet by most guesses, Chinese hydropower investment will continue unabated.
[8] Wee, S. and Walet, L. (26 August 2010). “UPDATE 1-Suntech signs MOU to build S.Africa solar plants.” Reuters. Link.
[9] iStockAnalyst (10 January 2011). “Goldwind signs wind poer equipment contract with HydroChina in Ethiopia.” Link.
[10] Reuters (25 May 2011). “China interested in building nuclear power plant in E.Africa, IBI Corp says” Alertnet. Link.
[11] Japan is an exception to recent Western neglect of the African solar market. Japan donated US$7.4 million to Morocco to build a 1MW PV installation, another US$13.7 million for a 1MW station in Botswana, and a grant to Malawi for construction of a solar array on the Kamuzu International airport (AE-Africa 2010b).
[12] Disenyana, T. (February 2009). “China in the African Solar Energy Sector: Kenya Case Study.” South African Institute of International Affairs: Occassional Paper No.25 – China in Africa Project. Link.
[13] Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C. and Pushak, N. (2009). “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financer for Sub-Saharan Africa.” Trends and Policy Options, No.5. Link.; Macauhub (13 June 2006). "China’s CITIC to finance Brazilian thermoelectric power plant in Rio Grande do Sul." Link.

The Colonization of Africa, Part II: Energy

Jared Crooks, MPA


It’s been almost 60 years since the British government gave up its audacious plan to build an African transcontinental railroad from Cape Town to Cairo. The first question that should come to mind is, “How is that even possible?” Well, it was. Just take a look at the map showing the division of the African continent at the height of colonialism. All of the light blue territory belonged to the UK.

I won’t start a lengthy diatribe on territorial rights, because that debate has been over for a long time. The last African country to gain independence did so in the 1990s.

But what was the point of African colonization? Well, certain parts of Africa are rich in natural resources (gold, diamonds, coffee, rubber etc.), which makes them highly desirable and attainable by the militarily-able countries. But now in the technology and information era, countries are in need of a certain kind of natural resource far more valuable than rubber: energy!

Yes, yes, we have all seen the graphs that show the trending line for the world’s energy needs for the next 50 years. But just in case: in a word, the world’s supply of oil is drying up and our demand is ever-increasing. Hence, our concentration on alternative energy solutions. (Well, that and climate change.)

Africa is chock full of potential alternative energy waiting to be tapped. If used correctly, 1/3 of the continent of Africa could be powered by solar energy trapped in the Sahara desert, 1/3 of the continent could also be powered by hydro-energy trapped by its rivers (e.g. the Nile) and amazingly 1/3 of the continent could be powered by geothermal energy (i.e. natural hot springs). Pause for math: 1/3 + 1/3 + 1/3 = 1!

Yes, the whole continent of Africa could be powered by alternative energy alone. Unfortunately, emphasis on “could.” Sadly what we are beginning to see now is the next era of African colonization. The European Union plans to build a huge solar energy plant in the Sahara…and export it back to Europe. Tunisia is setting up to transfer 200 Megawatts of “green energy” to Europe.

If this isn’t enough to make you pause and check the year on your calendar then I don’t know what is. But it isn’t all doom and gloom. Ethiopia is launching a project to take hydro-energy generated from the Nile to help power the country, but sadly this is just one of few examples of African ownership of resources.

The policy practically writes itself:

• To African countries – Wake up and get your act together! Green energy is a great way to create jobs and compete globally.
• To potential energy colonizers – Merely gaining approval from local governments to extract energy doesn’t rid you of obligation. Take precaution so that extraction efforts actually benefit locals and ensure that the domestic population isn’t being denied its rightful access to local energy due to corrupt elites. Either that or harvest Helium from moon dust.

Handing China’s Nuclear Power Report Card to Zhou Enlai, Part II

Editor’s Note: This is the second of a two-part series on China's nuclear energy sector. Part I examines the program's practicality and safety.

Ruiwen Lee, MPA


As the first leader who pushed for China’s nuclear power in the early 1970s, then-Premier Zhou Enlai laid out four key principles for its development: practicality, safety, economic viability, and self-reliance (适用、安全、经济、自力更生). Forty years on, as the nuclear power industry begins taking off at an accelerated pace, these four principles continue to steer nuclear power developments in China.

This two-part blog post discusses the Chinese nuclear power sector’s performance under each of these principles. Last week we discussed the first two of these principles, practicality and safety. This week we look at the latter two, economic viability and self-reliance.

III. Economic viability: Economies of scale vs. technological lock-in
Given that China is coal-rich and has not instituted measures to internalize the negative health and environment externalities from fossil-fuel combustion, nuclear energy is yet to be price-competitive against coal. The estimated 0.05 yuan per unit supplied cost-gap implies that the cost of generating nuclear power remains an important factor in its economic viability.

Economies of scale in construction allow each subsequent unit of a particular nuclear reactor model to be built at a lower cost. This is important for nuclear power plants since the high construction costs are usually the factor working against its economic viability. The downside is that as older reactor designs become cheaper to build, newer models with greater efficiency and improved safety features are kept out of the market as a result of “technological lock-in.” Technological lock-in describes a situation whereby a technology, typically an older, less efficient one, gains such dominance in a market that it prevents newer, better technologies from being adopted. The market could become locked-in when there are increasing returns to adopting existing technology. This is due to a) decreasing costs from economies of scale and learning by doing, and b) increasing benefits arising from factors like network externalities.

Competition is fierce in the Chinese nuclear energy market today. Although the companies allowed to operate and hold majority stakes in nuclear power plants are all state-owned enterprises, they compete against each other for projects. Against the backdrop of the nuclear energy market, economic factors such as the cost of building and operating nuclear power plants are increasingly important in determining which type of reactors are built. It is in such a market that technological lock-in is more likely to occur.

Further, as Generation III+ reactors are being developed, China’s nuclear power market should avoid becoming saturated with or locked into older models so that it has the capacity to absorb newer models when they are released in the future. Of the more than 25 reactors under construction, 16 are the Generation II+ CPR-1000 model. While on the one hand economies of scale can be achieved by using many units of the same reactor model, there could be technological lock-in as newer, better models become less price-competitive to build and operate.

Similarly, small modular reactors (SMR) should be given ample room to compete in the market when they are introduced. Designed to be simpler and safer, SMRs could prove to be more effective in serving smaller load centres in remote areas and inland regions with small electricity grids that are not well-connected to the national grid. If plans to construct nuclear power plants in more remote areas are allowed to proceed before SMRs are introduced, nuclear operators might preclude SMRs from consideration in their eagerness to compete for market share.

IV. Self-reliance: Indigenizing nuclear power technology
Developing indigenous technology has been a key factor in the industry’s direction. Qinshan 1 in Zhejiang Province uses the CNP-300 reactor, designed by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The CNNC subsequently developed the CNP-600 reactor, which is used in Qinshan 2, and is developing the CNP-1000 model, though it has temporary been put on hold. The CNP-1000/600/300 models are all fully Chinese and free from foreign intellectual property rights.

The most popular reactor design in China currently is the CPR-1000. The China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (CGNPC) developed the CPR-1000 based on the French reactor design used in Daya Bay, progressively indigenizing it with each nuclear power plant it builds.

A major acquisition by the Chinese nuclear power industry is Westinghouse’s AP1000, with the CNNC and the China Power Investment Corporation (CPIC) investing in an initial two reactors each. Besides allowing China to become the first country to build an AP1000 reactor, the deal with Westinghouse is significant for the technology transfer involved. As part of the agreement, China will own the intellectual property rights to subsequent larger models it designs based on the AP1000.

Conclusion: Moving forward in a post-Fukushima Asia
China's nuclear power industry has come a long way, and looks set for an increasing role in the future. Having achieved practical use for nuclear power, the industry will continue growing in its self-reliance, while balancing the dual goals of improving economic cost and safety.

Of course, much of China’s nuclear power development plans going forward would be seen by the government, the domestic public, and the international audience through the lens of Fukushima. While predicting China’s intended nuclear power expansion trajectory in the light of Fukushima is difficult, it is fair to expect the government to now give greater emphasis to safety. However, as a consequence, the country’s diversion of resources and expertise to improving safety is likely to apply natural brakes to the growth of nuclear power. How crippling this will be to the industry remains to be seen.

Handing China’s Nuclear Power Report Card to Zhou Enlai, Part I

Editor’s Note: This is the first of a two-part series on China's nuclear energy sector. Part II examines the program's economic viability and self-reliance.

Ruiwen Lee, MPA


As the first leader who pushed for China’s nuclear power in the early 1970s, then-Premier Zhou Enlai laid out four key principles for its development: practicality, safety, economic viability, and self-reliance (适用、安全、经济、自力更生). Forty years on, as the nuclear power industry begins taking off at an accelerated pace, these four principles continue to steer nuclear power developments in China.

This two-part blog post discusses the Chinese nuclear power sector’s performance under each of these principles. This week we look at the first two of these principles, practicality and safety.

I. Practicality: The nuclear component in China’s energy mix
As with other nuclear weapon states, China’s nuclear energy industry has military roots. But given that political reasons were responsible for the country’s first nuclear power plants, China’s nuclear power capacity remained flat for decades. The early 2000s saw more power plants come online for assorted reasons dating back to the mid-1990s, but not because there was a fundamental shift in energy or nuclear policy. A country with abundant and cheap coal resources, China only began seriously considering nuclear energy as a serious alternative when power shortages hit regions nationwide in 2002.

The domestic thirst for energy to fuel the economy’s rapid growth, coupled with mounting international pressure to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions as climate change negotiations gain momentum, are the main drivers of nuclear energy’s recent rise. By 2007, nuclear power contributed only less than 2% of China’s electricity production. However, the Chinese government has plans to greatly expand the country’s nuclear power installed capacity, from the present 10.8 GWe (gigawatt electrical, one gigawatt being equal to one billion watts) to 70GWe by 2020.

Beyond becoming a practical source of energy for China’s booming economy, nuclear power has also emerged as a critical non-fossil fuel source set to reduce the dominance of coal in China’s energy mix, helping China achieve its green goals.

II. Safety: The Fukushima wake-up call
The March 11th Tohoku earthquake and tsunami that struck northeast Japan has given China a timely jolt from the fantasy of its economy growing at an unbridled pace on “clean” nuclear power. Previous nuclear meltdowns at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl occurred in the late-70s and mid-80s respectively, before China had embarked on its nuclear power expansion drive. That, and because it’s been a quarter-century since the previous nuclear crisis might have put significant distance between actual danger and that perceived by the Chinese nuclear authority and industry.

However, in the aftermath of Fukushima, the immediate reaction from the Chinese government was to suspend approvals for proposed nuclear power plant projects while declaring that its plans to develop nuclear energy would not stall. A Ministry of Environmental Protection official has gone as far as to claim that “there is a guarantee for the safety of China’s nuclear power facilities” and that China “will not abandon” its nuclear power plan for “fear of slight risks.”

Before Fukushima, nuclear power enjoyed a generally positive reception from the Chinese public, given its critical role in reducing air pollution and shifting the country to a low-carbon economy. This sentiment quickly vanished as a widespread nuclear scare took hold of China, with people buying large amounts of salt with iodine, mistakenly thinking that it could help ward off any radioactive effects drifting from Japan. The public’s reaction makes it obvious that nuclear power can quickly cease being everyone’s blue-eyed boy, and as such, any positive sentiment toward nuclear—no matter how long-lasting—simply cannot be taken for granted.

Other environmental issues have proven to be sensitive to the Chinese public. Escalating cancer rates associated with environmental pollution caused by factories have incited protest in various provinces. Hydropower dam construction plans have also faced strong and sometimes violent resistance. Within the nuclear industry, a construction project in Rushan, Shandong province was halted after local petitioning. To ensure that nuclear power retains a fair degree of public acceptance, the industry’s clean safety record is of utmost importance.

Next week we’ll tackle economic viability and self-reliance.

Rot in my backyard: The importance of engaging with communities hosting nuclear power plants

Sophia Peters, MPA


More than a month after the devastating earthquake and near meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, on April 22nd the Japanese government finally imposed a mandatory evacuation zone of 12 miles surrounding the plant. Those who lived near the damaged plant flocked to the area before the midnight deadline, collecting whatever they could to bring into their new lives.[1] Some remain, refusing to change the way they have lived for decades.

As the cleanup begins, now is a good time to reflect on the relationship between communities and the nuclear power plants they host.

It was only on April 12th that Japanese officials raised the severity rating of the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima plant to the highest level possible on the international nuclear disaster scale – on par with the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. An official from Tokyo Electric Power Company stated that “the amount of leakage could eventually reach that of Chernobyl or exceed it.”[2] This reality check reinforced the sense that this nuclear emergency will persist longer and cause more problems than first predicted by the government, which had consistently downplayed long-term safety concerns. The Japanese government’s hesitation to be clear about their level of knowledge of what was occurring at the Fukushima plant has troubling implications for the area’s residents and sets a dangerous precedent for how nuclear energy agencies engage with host communities.

The Japanese government owes the local community a rational and reasoned assessment of the impacts of the destabilized reactors and spent fuel storage containers. Yet while the US and Australian governments advised their citizens to remain 50 miles away from the plant and the IAEA issued repeated warnings to expand the evacuation zone, Japan had had consistently refused to do so.[3] Furthermore, officials refuse to admit their confusion as to how much nuclear fuel was released in the initial hydrogen explosions and whether radioactive fuel is leaking into the containment structures.[4] When government officials do engage with the community to share facts about the situation at the plant, they do so by presenting raw data without any explanation of its practical relevance.[5] This has serious and dangerous consequences for the community surrounding the plant.

This behavior is consistent with a larger pattern on the part of the international nuclear industry and its supporters to shield the full truth from communities that host nuclear power plants and a refusal to talk candidly about the risks, costs, and implications of living near a nuclear facility. This originates from the belief of nuclear engineers and utility managers that the less the community knows, the more likely it is to accept the siting of a nuclear facility. Unfortunately, this could not be farther from the truth. From Yucca Mountain in Nevada to Anmyeon Island in South Korea, history has shown repeatedly that this is not the case.

But it does not have to be this way. In fact, recent events show that engaging with the community facilitates the construction of the nuclear power plant or the spent fuel repository. In South Korea, the government was able to site a low and intermediate nuclear waste repository in Wolsong province with a near-90% local approval rate.[6] In Finland, the government entered into an extended dialogue and candid negotiation with several communities in order to find a host for its spent fuel final repository. It was eventually sited in Eurajoki, where it was met with widespread community support and a 20-7 vote in favor of its construction by the local council. Together with Sweden, these two Nordic countries are the only ones that have been able to site final waste repositories.

Barring any major breakthroughs, we will have to heavily utilize nuclear power if we want to avert the unjust and unequal consequences of global climate change. There is no other energy technology that can compete economically with coal as a base load power substitute. But in the world of nuclear physicists and mechanical engineers, conversations about Fukushima still center on the location of the liquid storage pool and the technical specifications of the reactor casing. We need to remember that the reason we care about these important scientific details is because of the impact that they have on the community that houses the nuclear power plant and the people throughout the country that depend on nuclear energy as a source of power. Helping ensure that these communities benefit from hosting power plants, mitigating the risks they could potentially suffer from being close to radioactive waste, and prioritizing their needs in the rare case of a terrible accident should be the focus of policymakers hoping to expand nuclear power in the future.


Editor’s Note: You can read more about this subject in “A Proposal for Spent-fuel Management Policy in East Asia,” a WWS graduate policy workshop final report on current and future spent-fuel management policy in China, Japan, and South Korea. Unfortunately, this work has become more relevant today than when the project began. Available here.

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References:
[1] Andrew Pollack, “Japanese Visit the Nuclear Zone While They Can,” New York Times, April 21, 2011.
[2] Chico Harlan, “Japan Rates Nuclear Crisis at Highest Severity Level,” Washington Post, April 12, 2011.
[3] Hiroko Tabuchi and Keith Bradsher, “Japan Put on Par with Chernobyl,” New York Times, April 12, 2011.
[4] Hiroko Tabuchi and Keith Bradsher, “Lack of Data Heightens Japan’s Nuclear Crisis,” New York Times, April 8, 2011.
[5] Ibid.
[6] “Nuclear Power in South Korea,” World Nuclear Association, March 2011.