A Self-Defense Mission Abroad: Enhancing Japanese peacekeeping forces in South Sudan and beyond

Atsuko Tsuda, MPA


This January, about 300 Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces (JGSDF) will arrive in South Sudan to join the ongoing United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) there. Security challenges are mounting in this newborn country; accordingly, local leaders as well as their international friends face daunting tasks. Stepping up to face these challenges head-on, Japan can turn this PKO mission into a pivotal opportunity to further advance its commitment to peace and stability in the region and to make headway in synergizing the 3Ds – diplomacy, development, and defense – in its foreign policy.

Two months after Japan established diplomatic relations with South Sudan on July 9th, newly-minted Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced Japan’s new commitments to South Sudan at his debut at the UN General Assembly. As a start, Japan sent two JGSDF personnel as staff officers of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) Headquarters in November at the UN’s request. Japan is now preparing to dispatch JGSDF’s engineering unit to Juba, the capital, next year. These efforts are commendable and the government should continue to expand its defense commitment in South Sudan and around the world.

Dispatching more defense forces is an excellent opportunity for Japan to further contribute internationally by combining two areas in which it already excels – Official Development Assistance (ODA) and PKOs. JICA, Japan’s aid implementation organization, has an outstanding presence in South Sudan and has long been contributing to nation-building in the country. But as impressive as Japanese diplomacy and development currently is, expanding its defense efforts could create true co-equal synergies across these components of international assistance.

Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF) has a high reputation both inside and outside Japan. Domestically, SDF increased its public support through its work following the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, and it played a critical role during this year’s natural disaster in the Tohoku area. Regarding international cooperation, the SDF is renowned for its fine-tuned and local-oriented approach, and its engineering units in particular have received special commendation. The technical training provided by Japan’s engineering units is highly regarded and the units are well-known for their diligence and politeness. SDF units have been sent to PKOs in Cambodia, Timor-Leste (East Timor), the Golan Heights, Haiti, and Mozambique.

Granted, in Japan there are legitimate concerns about sending an expanded contingent of SDF to South Sudan. SDF’s operations are constrained by the Constitution – which renounces the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes – and other relevant laws. The 1992 law on Peacekeeping Operations prohibits “the use of force” and constrains the use of small weapons to the minimum: Self-Defense officials may use stipulated weapons “within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives of others or prevent bodily harm to themselves, other SDF Personnel or Corps Personnel who are with them on the scene, or individuals who have come under their control during the performance of duties” (emphasis mine).

Let me paint you a picture as to what this truly means at the operational level. Suppose SDF personnel are facing a heavily-armed group. There is an imminent threat, but they are not allowed to fire immediately. Instead, they have to follow a four-level procedure: oral warning, warning shots, point-blank shots, and only then, finally, sharpshooting.

Yet despite the constraints that the SDF bears, Japan has been seeking to extend its support in the areas of nation-building and PKOs wherever possible. This is a welcome development and should be continued. On the whole, the Japanese public supports Japan’s contribution to PKOs; a public opinion poll conducted last year shows more than 85% of respondents supported the idea that Japan’s cooperation to PKOs should increase or at least remain at the current level. The international community also expects further contributions from Japan, not only because it is the third largest economy but also because of its good work.

There are three UN peacekeeping operations between the two Sudanese republics: UNAMID in Darfur, UNISFA in Abyei, and UNMISS in South Sudan. This not only represents the war-torn history of the two countries but also the attention granted to it by the international community. Although Juba is relatively calm, the border area is still haunted by a possibility of a full-scale war. Therefore, while an ever-growing presence of SDF may be good both for Japan and South Sudan, given the security concerns and the Japanese forces’ severe restrictions, a careful examination of some clauses of the Japanese PKO Act may be necessary to truly fulfill its higher mission.

Atsuko Tsuda is a foreign service officer for the government of Japan. This piece represents the personal observations and opinions of the author. It does not reflect the views, nor represent an official position, of the government of Japan.

Game Changer: Israel’s new calculus on attacking Iran

Jordan Reimer, MPA


After a long hiatus, there is renewed international focus on Iran’s nuclear program, from hyperventilating Israeli media reports last month on an imminent attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities to the recent release of an unprecedented International Atomic Energy Agency report pointing to Iranian activities “relevant to the development of a nuclear device.”

In the international debate on what to do about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, for those who advocate taking military action against the Islamic Republic the conventional wisdom has settled on Israel doing the world’s dirty work – as it did against Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. Those who oppose Iran's nuclear activities but are still circumspect of this course of action advance a counterargument that falls essentially along two lines of thought: logistical infeasibility and geopolitical inadvisability.

The first contention details several obstacles: a) the vast geographic distance between Iran and Israel, b) the fact that Iranian nuclear sites are dispersed throughout the country (a lesson learned no doubt from Iraq’s vulnerability), c) the reality that such sites are situated in hardened bunkers located either underground or deep inside mountain ranges, and d) the possible existence of secret sites unknown to Israeli and American intelligence.

A successful action plan would therefore mandate continuous multi-sortie strikes over several parts of the country by Israeli fighter jets. (Israel does have a long-range missile program, but such a weapon is inappropriate for precision strikes.) However, an attack of this sort would soon fall susceptible to advanced Iranian anti-aircraft capabilities. Israeli airplanes would therefore be limited to execute only a quick once-over before returning home. And, in light of Israel’s deep concern for the lives of its soldiers, given the distance between Jerusalem and Tehran a viable plan would require mid-air refueling to guarantee the pilots’ safe return, a near impossibility considering the non-hospitable airspace Israel must traverse to reach Iran.

With all of these constraints, even if Israel did successfully pull off this type of limited mission, it would hardly improve Israel’s national security: experts assume Israel would set back Iranian efforts only a few years at the most. If anything, it would be merely a strategic victory, signaling the resolve behind Israel’s rhetoric and indicating its sincere desperate determination to prevent Iran from going further in its nuclear work.

For all of these reasons, an Israeli attack with potential to severely cripple Iranian nuclear ambitions was largely considered a fantasy.

No longer. On February 21st, 2010, Israel Aerospace Industries unveiled a new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the Heron TP, nicknamed “Eitan.” Able to fly at medium-to-high altitudes for over 20 hours while carrying a variety of payloads, equipped with a silent engine ensuring stealth, and significantly, capable of reaching Iran, the drone relieves Israeli military logisticians of concerns regarding refueling and the safety of its airmen against anti-aircraft artillery. The drones could be mass-produced and then flown incessantly until all Iranian nuclear sites are obliterated. Even if the drones are shot down, it would come at a relatively modest cost (the price tag might be steep but it would be infinitely better than an Israeli soldier in Tehran’s hands). The UAVs could be equipped with self-detonation devices should they be captured to avoid Iran gaining insight into Israeli military technology.

Importantly, the second line of reasoning against an attack – geopolitical considerations – remains unchanged: bombing Iran is still a terrible idea. It will indefinitely delay the moribund Middle East peace process, inflame the Arab and Muslim world against the US at a time when it has a legitimate chance to turn over a new leaf, force a wedge between both US-Israel and US-Arab/US-Muslim relations, and almost certainly provoke Hezbollah and possibly Hamas to launch retaliatory attacks against the Israeli civilian populace. Not least, it could conceivably convince Iran to finally declare its intention for a nuclear weapon as a deterrent against future Israeli aggression, a stand which it has consistently refused to take.

To (mis)quote Rudy Giuliani, “The use of military force against Iran would be very dangerous. It would be provocative.” Yes. And it shouldn’t be done. (Though it’s outside the purview of this article, let me at least acknowledge that though there is no silver bullet, a healthy mix of sanctions, coalition-building, and containment should be sufficient to keep Iran at bay, should it develop the dreaded weapon.)

The revelation of the “Eitan,” then, is both a blessing and a curse. On the positive side it signals to Iran Israel’s credible conventional deterrent against development of a bomb (no doubt why the UAV’s unveiling was so public), which might induce the ayatollahs to rethink any potential attempts to acquire such a weapon. And yet, on the other hand, it removes the only barrier that Israel’s security hawks faced in their myopic and monomaniacal desire to carry out a strike on Iran. We can only hope that cooler heads prevail and the remaining reasons buttressing the argument not to attack remain foremost in the minds of Israeli policymakers and American interlocutors.

The challenges facing an expanded Japanese role in US-Japan security alliance

Ani Akinbiyi, MPA


Following the conclusion of World War II, Japan became one of the United States’ most important global allies, and ever since the US-Japan security alliance has grown increasingly more important to maintaining the stability of the East Asia. And yet, despite its pivotal role in the US’s global security strategy, there have recently been calls from within the US policymaking establishment to reevaluate America’s security partnership with Japan. Officials claim that Japan has not carried its equal weight within the alliance, and that the Japanese have come to take the American security umbrella for granted. They conclude that Japanese unwillingness to take on more responsibility within the alliance indicates their lack of commitment to the partnership, and that perhaps the US should consider downgrading its military ties to the island nation. However, this view fails to consider the possibility that Japan is simply unable to assume greater responsibility within this relationship because it is bound by domestic political realities and because the two countries may not share the same objectives for the alliance itself. In essence, Japan has yet to decide, one way or the other, what its defense posture will be and what role the US security alliance will play in that strategy.

Since the end of World War II, the Japanese government has had a difficult time galvanizing public support for an increased role for its military, in self-defense matters or otherwise. After the war, not only did the people of Japan have to deal with the consequences of a nuclear attack, they also had to come to terms with the aftermath of a US firebombing campaign in which, according to former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, “50-90% of the people in 67 Japanese cities” were killed, and more than two-thirds of those cities were between 40-99% destroyed. This profound level of physical and human destruction left the nation with a deep-seated mistrust of the military – which many Japanese blamed for taking the country to war – and a sense that their government did not have the capacity to adequately control it.

This sense of mistrust has lingered over the course of the 60 years since the post-war constitution came into effect. During that time, attempts to increase the range and scope of military responsibility have been met with significant popular resistance, and what has emerged is a society where anti-militarism is so profound that successive Japanese governments have gone beyond constitutional restrictions to impose additional restraints on its military potential, such as banning the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the development of power-projection capabilities, and arms exportation. Thus, in the face of such popular support for a debilitated military, it is no surprise that the democratically-elected Japanese government has had trouble mustering the political will necessary to make changes to its military structure.

Japan’s squeamishness with militarism is also evident from its limited overseas operations, which are only approved on a case-by-case basis. In early 2010 the newly-empowered Democratic Party of Japan cancelled its Indian Ocean refueling mission, stationed in support of the US’s war in Afghanistan. While shifts in foreign policy are expected with the introduction of a new administration, such flip-flopping gives the impression that Japan lacks a vision for its military and makes Tokyo’s allies and enemies alike question why Japan seems so intent on remaining defensively castrated.

This is further baffling when one looks at the very real threats in Japan’s front yard. Japan may be taking for granted America’s willingness to remain a regional protector indefinitely, gambling that as long as the US protects its own interests in the region Japan’s interests will also be served. While this gambit has proved successful in the past, there is no guarantee that the US’s strategic configuration will remain unchanged, especially as Washington tries its best to avoid military postures that antagonize China and increase the likelihood of entanglement with its second-largest trading partner.

Given this reluctance for military assertiveness, it is no surprise that there is a disconnect between what Washington wants from its alliance with Japan and what Tokyo is able to provide. The US wants to see the Diet contribute more to Japan’s homeland defense and increase its out-of-area military commitments. Unfortunately, it seems that the US would do well to have Japan focus solely on its domestic defense, as the Japanese parliament has shown diminished capacity to successfully juggle both security objectives. The Liberal Democratic Party, Japan’s former ruling political party, tried to use the success of recent overseas engagements to bolster arguments for an expansion of the Self-Defense Forces mandate. However, it was unable to turn overseas successes into the concrete political will necessary to make the needed changes at home. Exacerbating this dead loss is the fact that these missions have only served to siphon critical resources away from the development of Japan’s domestic defense capabilities.

In sum, Japan’s self-defense policy appears directionless, with policymakers seemingly not knowing where best to focus the government’s efforts. With a new political party in control, an emboldened China, a sabre-rattling North Korea, and an increasingly impatient US, the Japanese need to get their act together and demonstrate some decisiveness about their desired defense posture. Currently it is a hodge-podge of components that together do not make an impressive statement. The new government must also find a way to move the Japanese citizenry past the fear and pacifism that shackle Tokyo’s ability to increase its military capability. Only with these two obstacles behind them will the Japanese be able to support the US-Japan alliance in a meaningful way.

Rebalancing civilian-military operations: A two-way street

Rashad Badr, MPA


There is a great deal of discussion about the need to adjust the balance between civilian agencies and the military in executing U.S. foreign policy and programs. The easiest argument to make is that the vast American defense complex overshadows US diplomatic and developmental efforts in almost every way. The Department of Defense (DoD) budget in 2010 was $691 billion, whereas the State Department’s budget for that year was just $16.4 billion. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the development arm of State, similarly faced a shorter stack in pursuing its goals abroad. However one wants to add it up, defense spending surpasses civilians projects by about 40 to 1.

Other State advocates point to the sprawling manpower that the military possesses when compared to its civilian counterparts. Just one example of this mismatch: the personal staff of the Central Command Combatant Commander (CCDR) – known for previously serving a famous Woodrow Wilson School graduate, General David Petraeus *85 *87 – is larger than many of the embassies that fall into Central Command’s theatre. When CCDRs travel, they normally arrive with a small army of assistants and personnel. When I saw Assistant Secretary of State Jeff Feltman travel to the Middle East last summer, he traveled with a single assistant.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has argued before Congress that the State Department needs more funding. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, with the help of our very own former dean, Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, has pioneered the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QQDR). In it, Clinton and Slaughter aim to remap American diplomatic and developmental efforts, putting them on par with defensive operations, in accordance with President Obama’s “3D” approach to foreign policy: defense, diplomacy, and development. This document has many creative ideas and useful insights. But what have we seen of it so far?

More importantly, we’ve heard all of this before. So what should we do about it?

Unfortunately, the situation is bit more complex than a simple issue of funding parity or even mission creep. But first off, let’s get one thing straight: I’m a big fan of State and a staunch advocate for the need to elevate diplomacy as a tool of national security. That being said, the department needs to critically alter its mission and operations in three ways.

First, State has to get serious about assuming greater risks while conducting diplomacy. Current security measures, left largely in the hands of Regional Security Officers abroad, effectively keep diplomats trapped behind embassy walls. If a country is deemed “dangerous,” then diplomats have to jump through numerous hoops before they are allowed to leave compound – and when they do get permission, they have to be escorted by armed guards and in armored vehicles. There is something counter-intuitive about effectively marginalizing our Foreign Service Officers in the places that need the greatest diplomatic efforts. Of course relaxing these standards will come with attendant risks and dangers, but diplomacy is a dangerous endeavor. Unfortunately, the State Department’s allergy to potentially hostile situations – to which the military is largely immune – has ultimately led to its marginalization.

Second, the department needs to reassert control over peacekeeping, nation building, and wartime operations. The US’s two biggest engagements currently are in Iraq and Afghanistan. A study of peacekeeping operations and nation building efforts in both of these countries reveal DoD dominance in both developmental and diplomatic activities. Diplomats and aid workers argue that they simply don’t have the funding or the operational capacity to work in these environments. Fine, but let’s also not forget that the State Department’s mission has been steadily cut down since the Clinton presidency (without much of a fight might I add) and traditional State and USAID operations have been farmed out to DoD. In fact, one of the biggest complaints I hear from people in uniform (at all levels) is that State and USAID are just not stepping up to the plate. State and USAID will have to not only reassert themselves in these areas on a macro level, but take substantive steps to fund and train civilians in taking over from DoD.

Which brings me to my third point: the State Department needs to implement its goal of “engaging beyond the state,” as referenced in the QDDR. In Iraq and Afghanistan, that means picking up some of the work done by Special Operations in navigating and channeling tribal and ethnic currents. Elsewhere in the world, it means engaging outside of our “comfort zone,” to include more engagement with Islamist groups and opposition movements. American diplomatic efforts will always be limited if we (read: American policymakers) are content engaging with official, traditional government counterparts and Western, liberal thinkers. American diplomacy cannot be considered robust if it is not widened to take into account the full spectrum and picture of political actors operating in today’s complex international environment.

These criticisms may come off as a bit harsh on the State Department and USAID, but these are necessary issues to keep in mind if civilian efforts will ever near parity with military power. Because at the end of the day, American policymakers can’t just ask DoD to give up turf; they need to have a strong and aggressive civilian sector willing to pick up and take over.

The future of US naval primacy: A response to Mark Helprin

Nathaniel Adler, MPA


Earlier this month, Mark Helprin of the Claremont Institute wrote an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal about the decline of US naval dominance. Here I respond to his argument and offer a few thoughts of my own.

In short, I think his case is heavily overstated.

First, there are good legal, logistical, and political reasons that the administration hasn’t attacked Somali pirate bases, so I find Helprin’s suggestion that our restraint is a “symptom of a sickness” both confusing and troubling. The United States Navy (USN) is successfully working with its counterparts all over the world to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, and to interdict pirate ships whenever possible.

Piracy and its disruption of maritime commerce in the region is undoubtedly a growing problem; however, given the fact that these pirates rarely hurt anyone, hunting them preemptively hardly seems like the first step towards re-establishing America’s naval might.

Helprin misses the point that the problem in the Gulf of Aden is not the size of the USN, but rather the lawless and destitute condition of Somalia, an entirely separate issue. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen and General David Petraeus have said in a different context, we can’t kill our way out of this one.

Helprin laments the reductions in US naval forces, and worries about the ability of the USN to defend the seas and to project power globally. However these reductions only look dramatic relative to where our own gargantuan navy used to be. The United States has 11 of the world's 22 aircraft carriers, and no country outside the NATO alliance has more than one. (Note that China has zero.) Additionally, the non-US carriers are largely symbolic, often too small to have much strategic utility outside humanitarian assistance.

This striking asymmetry in US naval power exists not just with carriers, but with other warships as well, so the sense that we are following the Royal Navy “into near oblivion” seems premature. Is the US retiring aging vessels from its massive and immensely expensive navy? Sure. Does it have a peer competitor that is anywhere near challenging it? No.

This brings us to China. I understand that it is a golden rule of all alarmist op-eds on military affairs to always include at least one vague suggestion that China threatens to overtake the US at something sometime in the future, lest the warning sirens not be fully activated. However, the hypothetical naval parity with China that Helprin warns of is very far away (if it ever happens at all).

Is China modernizing its navy? Yes. Should we keep an eye on it? Absolutely. Should we cast the priorities of the United States’ force posture, at exorbitant cost, and at a time of tremendous financial hardship, in terms of an endless effort to maintain past margins of relative global superiority? I’m not so sure.

Finally, Helprin also fails to address the body of evidence suggesting that increasingly capable and cheap anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles (plus advances in submarine technology) will make large surface naval warfare vessels almost obsolete in future conflicts. If this is true, does it really make sense to continue investing billions in maintaining such a massive fleet of large warships? Maybe; but if so, Helprin hasn’t convinced me.

So what are we to make of all this?

Ultimately, the most interesting and thought-provoking thing about Helprin’s piece is that it is not just about the US’s waning margin of naval dominance, but it is also about something larger, the fear of decline. Helprin, whether intentionally or not, seems to use the erosion of the United States’ naval power as a harbinger for a diminishing US posture in the world more broadly.

A continued debate about whether we can or should be maintaining such a robust navy given the financial crisis and our massive deficit will have to be left to comments or later posts, but it seems worth noting that other great naval powers in history have facilitated their own decline by not being dynamic enough to adjust to ebbs in their own capabilities. Rather, they bankrupted themselves by continuing to project force onto far away conflicts that they could not afford, often in an effort to maintain appearances, as if they were still at the height of their capability. In J.H. Elliott’s article “Managing Decline: Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial Spain,” he describes the last throes of the Spanish Empire:

The Mantuan affair illustrates, I believe, the extreme difficulties of disengagement for an imperial power. The sheer extent of its commitments means that almost everything is perceived as affecting its vital interests. Hence the prevalence of the domino theory in the Madrid of the 1630s. But it is legitimate to ask whether anyone in the Spain of Olivares advocated an alternative foreign policy – one that would seek to reduce the area of its vital interests and, if necessary, sacrifice reputation to solvency. In other words, did anyone dare to think the unthinkable, the possibility of a staged retreat from empire?

If anyone nowadays is daring to think the unthinkable, it certainly isn’t Helprin, and for now I probably agree with him. I don’t think the US is teetering on the precipice of decline, and unlike Helprin I don’t think US naval primacy is going anywhere anytime soon. Naval and maritime power is vitally important for a major power like the United States, and sufficiently maintaining that force is currently, and will continue to be, a priority.

Nevertheless, in light of history, it does also seem important to think critically about what exactly we can afford, where our priorities as a nation should be, and what kind of role the United States should play in a contemporary rather than bygone international order.