A Self-Defense Mission Abroad: Enhancing Japanese peacekeeping forces in South Sudan and beyond

Atsuko Tsuda, MPA


This January, about 300 Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces (JGSDF) will arrive in South Sudan to join the ongoing United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) there. Security challenges are mounting in this newborn country; accordingly, local leaders as well as their international friends face daunting tasks. Stepping up to face these challenges head-on, Japan can turn this PKO mission into a pivotal opportunity to further advance its commitment to peace and stability in the region and to make headway in synergizing the 3Ds – diplomacy, development, and defense – in its foreign policy.

Two months after Japan established diplomatic relations with South Sudan on July 9th, newly-minted Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced Japan’s new commitments to South Sudan at his debut at the UN General Assembly. As a start, Japan sent two JGSDF personnel as staff officers of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) Headquarters in November at the UN’s request. Japan is now preparing to dispatch JGSDF’s engineering unit to Juba, the capital, next year. These efforts are commendable and the government should continue to expand its defense commitment in South Sudan and around the world.

Dispatching more defense forces is an excellent opportunity for Japan to further contribute internationally by combining two areas in which it already excels – Official Development Assistance (ODA) and PKOs. JICA, Japan’s aid implementation organization, has an outstanding presence in South Sudan and has long been contributing to nation-building in the country. But as impressive as Japanese diplomacy and development currently is, expanding its defense efforts could create true co-equal synergies across these components of international assistance.

Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF) has a high reputation both inside and outside Japan. Domestically, SDF increased its public support through its work following the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, and it played a critical role during this year’s natural disaster in the Tohoku area. Regarding international cooperation, the SDF is renowned for its fine-tuned and local-oriented approach, and its engineering units in particular have received special commendation. The technical training provided by Japan’s engineering units is highly regarded and the units are well-known for their diligence and politeness. SDF units have been sent to PKOs in Cambodia, Timor-Leste (East Timor), the Golan Heights, Haiti, and Mozambique.

Granted, in Japan there are legitimate concerns about sending an expanded contingent of SDF to South Sudan. SDF’s operations are constrained by the Constitution – which renounces the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes – and other relevant laws. The 1992 law on Peacekeeping Operations prohibits “the use of force” and constrains the use of small weapons to the minimum: Self-Defense officials may use stipulated weapons “within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives of others or prevent bodily harm to themselves, other SDF Personnel or Corps Personnel who are with them on the scene, or individuals who have come under their control during the performance of duties” (emphasis mine).

Let me paint you a picture as to what this truly means at the operational level. Suppose SDF personnel are facing a heavily-armed group. There is an imminent threat, but they are not allowed to fire immediately. Instead, they have to follow a four-level procedure: oral warning, warning shots, point-blank shots, and only then, finally, sharpshooting.

Yet despite the constraints that the SDF bears, Japan has been seeking to extend its support in the areas of nation-building and PKOs wherever possible. This is a welcome development and should be continued. On the whole, the Japanese public supports Japan’s contribution to PKOs; a public opinion poll conducted last year shows more than 85% of respondents supported the idea that Japan’s cooperation to PKOs should increase or at least remain at the current level. The international community also expects further contributions from Japan, not only because it is the third largest economy but also because of its good work.

There are three UN peacekeeping operations between the two Sudanese republics: UNAMID in Darfur, UNISFA in Abyei, and UNMISS in South Sudan. This not only represents the war-torn history of the two countries but also the attention granted to it by the international community. Although Juba is relatively calm, the border area is still haunted by a possibility of a full-scale war. Therefore, while an ever-growing presence of SDF may be good both for Japan and South Sudan, given the security concerns and the Japanese forces’ severe restrictions, a careful examination of some clauses of the Japanese PKO Act may be necessary to truly fulfill its higher mission.

Atsuko Tsuda is a foreign service officer for the government of Japan. This piece represents the personal observations and opinions of the author. It does not reflect the views, nor represent an official position, of the government of Japan.

Non-Communicable Diseases: The Sword of the Damocles for developing countries

Siddharth Chatterjee, MPP ’11
Dr. Ayham Alomari


Thanks to the excellent work done by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, governments, and other institutions to ramp up immunization for vaccine-preventable diseases, it is having the desired effect in reducing infant and child mortality. This important initiative has to be kept up and would contribute greatly to achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

But there is another threat that looms like the Sword of the Damocles: non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as cardiovascular, cancer, diabetes, and lung diseases. To some extent, of course, the increasing prevalence of NCDs is an arithmetic consequence of reducing morbidity and mortality from communicable diseases. If people do not suffer and die from communicable diseases, they typically will die from an NCD. The tragedy, however, is that humans around the world suffer and die from NCDs prematurely, long before the natural limit to which modern medicine and non-medical interventions, including community-based efforts, can push the onset of suffering and the occurrence of death. In addition, the high burden of NCDs makes them a laden threat to health and development. NCDs are barriers to poverty reduction, health equity, economic stability, and human security.

A recent issue of the Economist states: “Indeed, of the 36m people killed by NCDs [annually], some 80% live in low- and middle-income countries. These diseases are associated with increased prosperity and longevity, and the results are costly. The World Economic Forum estimates that NCDs will cost low- and middle-income countries $7 trillion over the next 15 years.”

The most striking feature of NCDs is that, contrary to what most people think, it’s not just the rich that are feeling the damaging effects of physical inactivity, obesity, and poor diets. Far from it, the poor and middle class within the developing world are facing NCDs-related deaths exponentially. According to the statistics above, each day there are 100,000 deaths from NCDs, with 80% occurring in the world’s poorest countries. And unless we act collectively and with conviction the future looks ominous. According to WHO, NCD deaths are projected to increase by 15% globally between 2010 and 2020.

With the lives of 36 million people annually at stake, we all know what it takes to prevent NCDs – healthy lifestyles. NCDs could be preventable by eliminating shared risk factors such as tobacco use, unhealthy diet, physical inactivity, and harmful use of alcohol. Those risk factors are the main contributors to the magnitude and scale of NCDs worldwide. But many hurdles stand in our way, most stemming from a lack of urgency as well as political will to deal with this growing scourge.

To find ways to engage broader community involvement in NCDs, prevention through dialogue and concrete action were the topic of an event co-hosted by the IFRC and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (IFPMA) at this year’s UN General Assembly in September. The panelists – who represented leaders among Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies, WHO, the private sector, and academia (including the active participation of two prominent members of Princeton University) – reinforced the call for integrated multi-sector and multi-partner NCD prevention initiatives.

Greg Vickery, President of the Australian Red Cross, shared his experience in working with Indigenous Australians, who are among the most vulnerable to NCDs. “Our response is threefold – through the ‘Save-a-Mate’ resuscitation and education program tackling the alcohol problem they face; breakfast clubs that teach school children healthy eating habits; and the ‘Food Cents Programme’ that shows families how to eat healthily on a tight budget, i.e. simple strategies to support healthy eating habits.” Professor Uwe Reinhardt, James Madison Professor of Political Economy at the Woodrow Wilson School, reminded the audience that part of this community-based effort must be to make the individual be both able and willing to play an active role in the management of his or her own health.

So basically, the message we want to stress is simple. Says IFRC’s Secretary General, Mr. Bekele Geleta, “Humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross Red Crescent, whose staff and close to 13 million active volunteers world-wide work closely with local communities, play an enormous role in bringing about changes in behavior and attitudes towards health and lifestyle.” We at the IFRC strongly believe that including NCDs in our health programs is consistent with our Red Cross Red Crescent Strategy 2020 to enable healthy and safe living. Our Framework for NCDs focuses on prevention, innovation & research, monitoring & evaluation, partnership, and advocacy.

But we cannot do it in silos or on our own. To make a real difference for those who are not on a health services radar screen, it is critical that we forge robust partnerships not only with governments, the UN, and NGOs but also with important thought leaders and opinion leaders like Princeton University. This has to be a collective and well-orchestrated endeavour to prevent what the UN has called “a public health emergency in slow motion” from spreading. Simple lifestyle change is the key. Resources – intellectual and financial, as well as partners from the public and private sectors alike – need to come together.

The IFRC is keen to move forward on this important initiative. In the words of Professor Reinhardt, “One thinks of the Red Cross Red Crescent more in connection with earthquakes, tsunamis, and other spectacular and sudden natural disasters. I was surprised and encouraged to learn how much the organization is doing in response to another, albeit slowly developing, natural disaster, the growing burden of premature deaths due to NCDs, much of that burden the result of people’s inability or unwillingness, or both, to manage their own health better.”

The actions, then, appear to be simple, and the outcomes desirable. But it will take a significant investment of time and money to strengthen the ties that bind the Sword above us.



Siddharth Chatterjee is the Chief Diplomatic Officer and Head of International Relations at the IFRC. Dr. Ayham Alomari is a Senior Health Officer, Community Based Health and First Aid, NCDs at the IFRC.

Another one bites the dust: A new beginning for the Ivory Coast

Jake Velker, MPA


As of April 11th, Laurent Gbagbo has been deposed as president of Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast). Gbagbo ruled the West African country since taking power in a chaotic election in 2000, weathering several coup attempts and a civil war. In his place will be Alassane Ouattara, a former IMF official who observers agree rightfully won the election held in November 2010. Until now, Gbagbo had refused to concede.

It is hard not to view the recent events with a measure of optimism. Gbagbo was, by all accounts, the kind of strongman that Africa needs to eliminate from its politics sooner rather than later. Despite strong growth in per capita GDP, Gbagbo did nothing in his ten years in power to heal the ethnic, religious, and economic rifts that divide the northern and southern portions of Cote d’Ivoire. Instead, he pursued a relentlessly clientelist political program and subverted democratic expression and civil society opposition wherever possible. In the most recent election, he chose to return the country to the cusp of civil war rather than step down.

Ouattara, on the other hand, appears to be a sincere reformer. He is from Cote d’Ivoire’s long-marginalized north. Much like the successful post-war leader of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, he is a western-educated technocrat with a background in economics and bureaucratic experience as Cote d’Ivoire’s former prime minister.

Some caution is in order, however. There are already circumstantial reports that pro-Ouattara forces committed atrocities against civilians in their march from the north toward Abidjan, the economic capital. Gbagbo also started as a western-educated professor and trade unionist before resorting to dirty politics. Any number of African presidents has come to power on sincere reform platforms, only to find that their countries are woefully difficult to govern effectively. Those who hope to stay in office often find the temptations of pandering to the country’s entrenched ethnic and business elite difficult to resist. Let’s hope that Ouattara is more immune to that siren song than Gbagbo.

Perhaps most intriguing for the future of Africa’s notoriously chaotic and corruption-ridden electoral systems is the relative ease with which Gbagbo’s ouster occurred, once the political will solidified. In uncharacteristically robust language, the UN refused to recognize any version of the election results that did not definitively hand Ouattara the victory. Furthermore, the Security Council unanimously condemned Gbagbo’s intransigence and strengthened the mandate of the UN Operation Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to vigorously protect the peace. It helped that the African Union—typically the defender of the continent’s despots—supported Ouattara from the start. There was no ambiguity in this attempted fraud.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the international community stepped in at a critical time to force the issue via military means. On April 4th, combined UN and French units began attacking pro-Gbagbo forces occupying the presidential compound in Abidjan. Within 24 hours, Gbagbo’s generals were negotiating terms for his surrender. Although he hung on for another week in a spiteful attempt to render Cote d’Ivoire ungovernable for Mr. Ouattara, Gbagbo was finished.

This underscores how comparatively easy it is to secure election results in the world’s poorest countries if there is a political will. UNOCI’s modest presence of 10,000 peacekeepers was sufficient to secure the election result with only a minimum of civilian casualties. In its seven-year deployment, UNOCI has suffered only 72 fatalities.

After the hundreds of billions spent on democracy-promotion in the Middle East, one wonders whether the West might use its resources more cost-effectively simply making sure that elections in Africa don’t spark civil wars. This doesn’t need to always involve costly ground occupations, but just enough force to tilt a precarious situation in the right direction.

Recent attempts to steal elections in Africa have gone a variety of ways. In Kenya (2007) and Zimbabwe (2008), the incumbent presidents blatantly rigged election results. However, each caused enough violence, confusion, and instability to necessitate power-sharing agreements with the opposition winners. After the international community’s fickle attention flagged, they of course consolidated power, marginalized their “unity governments,” and proceeded to once again rule by fiat.

Gbagbo was unlucky to fail in similar mischief. It was of course fortunate that the UN already had a robust peacekeeping presence in Cote d’Ivoire and that France has consistently demonstrated a willingness to intervene in the affairs of its former West African colonies. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these events are the harbinger of a new, cost-effective, and (relatively) peaceful model for the enforcement of election results in Africa.

More importantly, it is entirely unclear if Ouattara will lead more responsibly than his predecessor. Indeed, there is little to suggest that African opposition parties have coherent platforms, beyond deposing the current holders of power. In the absence of independent institutions, competent bureaucracies, and equitable growth, one is forced to wonder who—other than the winner—is benefited by such nasty contests.

When a strongman is justifiably dethroned, it is democracy that wins, or just another strongman-to-be?