Ankit Panda, BA
As early as 1941, historian Henry Luce controversially called the 20th century the “American Century.” And today, just 11 years in, many are ready to bestow the 21st century honors to China. In retrospect, one may argue it makes sense to dub the previous century an “American” one because the United States did, in a sense, singlehandedly drive the normative alignment of modern international institutions and norms, albeit only after Luce’s declaration. So China’s impressive growth and greater face on the international stage should cause at least some change, right? Conventional realist wisdom would have us think so, but there is good evidence that the People’s Republic, and the Chinese Communist Party, have neither the interest nor the ability to do so.
Under any regime of international law (institutional or treaty-based), states have options to 1) comply with statutes and norms, 2) create statues and norms, and 3) “evade” statutes and norms. Starting with the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the PRC has moved more from a rule-evading country towards one more interested in complying with existing institutions. Although conventional wisdom and the media might paint a very different picture of Chinese compliance, a quick look at China’s record at the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in addition to its response to the 2008 financial crisis, provides strong evidence to believe otherwise.
At the IMF, the PRC, once chastised for its stalwart rule-evading (and frankly, rule-ignoring) behavior, has moved towards greater compliance. While the ongoing Article IV consultations on China’s controversial monetary policy and the depreciation of the renminbi remain a source of friction, notably, Chinese rhetoric in defense of this policy emphasizes mutual interests (between the West and China) and demonstrates a real stake in the continued “success” of the global financial system. Similarly, China’s reaction to the financial crisis in 2008 was swift and in line with systematic recommendations from the IMF and the US – a $580 billion asset-relief program similar to TARP in the US. Furthermore, Chinese support of the Eurozone during its sovereign debt woes demonstrates a further willingness to take a stake in the success of the status quo (although this final point may be more politically-motivated than I’m willing to admit in this short post).
The PRC’s short history at the WTO so far also demonstrates a mixed compliance record trending towards greater compliance over the years. Initially, Chinese accession encountered several obstacles, but it ultimately managed to convince the organization that without China, the WTO wasn’t truly a “world” trade organization. The WTO is struggling with China, which, as a mechanically-complex economy based on a particular set of normative principles, refuses in several cases to acquiesce to the exogenous and incompatible norms of the institution. On the other hand, China's victory over the European Union in a December 2010 case demonstrates an example of Chinese rule-taking and compliance with the WTO. Granted, this paints China as a rule-taker when the rules enforce its self-interest. Such victories come at the cost of leverage for the West, but bring with them greater Chinese stakes in the success of the rules-based order. The liberal international order is slowly beginning to accommodate China.
While experts like Robert Kaplan and C. Fred Bergsten may identify the many political and security threats that result from a stronger China, it’s important to consider the less-exciting but equally important economic perspective. It’s difficult to say definitively that there is one lens through which we should view China – frankly that would be an oversimplification – but overall, it’s important to recognize that China has been accommodated into the current system of international political economy and that this accommodation has made it an important stakeholder in the success of that system. Unfortunately for the US, even the liberal international order will move us away from the “American Century” towards a more complex and multi-polar global order.
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Friday, November 18, 2011
Sunday, October 23, 2011
African Energy Access: Is China a game-changer?
Phillip M. Hannam, PhD candidate
This summer in Nairobi, Kenya, I would often go vegetable shopping at a local open-air market. To my surprise, many of the vendors – native Kenyans – spoke Mandarin with the Chinese clientele, who had a distinct presence throughout the market. Nearby, massive concrete pillars and cantilevered steel beams rising above the city – the first elevated highway system in Kenya, courtesy of China – are a visible manifestation of growing development cooperation between China and Africa. Many Chinese and African scholars regard these investments as “win-win” partnerships, though Chinese state-owned institutions have also garnered criticism over resource interests and the disregard of humanitarian and environmental concerns in project planning.[1]
Beyond highways, hospitals, municipal water and waste systems, stadiums, and government buildings, China is also heavily invested in Africa’s electricity generation infrastructure. The scale of China’s involvement could provide electricity to millions in Africa who need it. And the energy could be renewable. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Seychelles, Jean-Paul Adam, recently expressed his optimism to the UN General Assembly:
Approximately 1.4 billion people lack access to electricity globally, and one billion more have unreliable electricity access.[3] Lack of modern energy services impairs attainment of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The World Bank predicts that an underperforming energy system results in a loss of 1-2% of annual economic growth potential.[4] Yet of the US$35-40 billion needed annually from now until 2030 to achieve universal energy access, only about 5% of this amount is expected through traditional development institutions. At this rate, the proportion of people with energy access is unlikely to improve significantly by 2030, the year the UN has called for universal access to modern energy services. Thus, China’s energy investments around the world – though hardly altruistic – could still help bring this goal into reach.
It is too early to tell if China’s investments in Africa will significantly change the outlook for the people of this resource-rich, but chronically energy-poor, continent. Nonetheless, I posit a few initial observations, expanded below:
1. China is a new major player for African energy access: According to a study by the World Bank, 34% of Chinese investments in African infrastructure are in electricity.[5] Of this, the vast majority is hydropower. A watchdog group, International Rivers, reports that Chinese financial institutions are building over 250 hydropower projects across the developing world, mostly in Africa and Southeast Asia. Large hydropower projects, on the scale that China builds them, are highly controversial. Chinese dams in Ethiopia, Sudan, Ghana, and elsewhere face intense opposition because of ecosystem damage and displacement of indigenous groups. Chinese developers remain unapologetic, and most African policymakers support the projects. The Gibe III project on the Omo River in Ethiopia, as one example, will provide 1,800MW of electricity – effectively doubling Ethiopia’s generating capacity.[6] The energy access provided by the project is weighted against the dam’s impact on hundreds of thousands of people who rely on the Omo River and its ecosystems for their livelihoods.[7]
Better governance of international development cooperation could make such projects more tolerable. The World Commission on Dams delineates how large hydropower may be sustainable in an environmental, social, and economic context, though the recommendations have largely been dismissed by Chinese developers (and the World Bank, for that matter).
Fortunately, China is investing beyond hydropower. China Longyuan Power Group is investing in several wind power projects in South Africa, on the scale of 100MW.[8] Hydrochina International Engineering Company is building wind farms at two sites in Ethiopia. Another Chinese state-owned company, Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., is supplying the wind turbines for the project.[9] A subsidiary of Chinese oil giant Sinopec has invested US$18.7 million to develop geothermal power potential across Kenya and the Rift Valley. China is also emerging in Africa’s nuclear power sector, exporting its domestic nuclear technology. China National Nuclear Corporation is considering developing a new nuclear power station in collaboration with South Africa. A Chinese-built nuclear power station is also under discussion for east Africa.[10]
2. China views Africa as a growth market: Beyond building new power stations, Chinese firms are investing in renewable energy manufacturing across Africa. Western solar power companies were active in the Kenyan market in the 1990s, but most pulled out due to high costs and low sales.[11] Today, the African renewables market is changing. Policies to incentivize grid-connected solar power are being considered in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda. For now, all solar panels demanded in Africa must be shipped from outside the continent – a financial and logistical problem that stifles growth of the industry.
China’s Tianpu Xianxing Enterprises, a prominent Chinese integrated solar manufacturer with exports around the world, is negotiating a major manufacturing hub in Nairobi. By creating a production base within Africa, shipping costs would be reduced and sale prices for panels may drop from US$310 to US$77 for a typical home system.[12]
In 2010, Suntech, China’s largest solar panel manufacturer, began investing several hundred million US dollars in a manufacturing base in South Africa capable of producing 100MW of capacity annually. The plant is expected to supply the growing South African solar market, which some analysts predict could reach US$1 billion annually. The creation of a manufacturing base within Africa increases the potential for skilled-job creation and technology transfer – desperately needed for the development of Africa’s fledgling electricity sector. It could also keep educated Africans from fleeing to jobs outside the region, as manufacturers within Africa put a premium on local skilled labor and technical skills.
3. Trends in Chinese investments following the World Bank: The World Bank has come under intense scrutiny in recent years regarding its role in financing large carbon intensive projects in energy and extractive industries. Coal is oftentimes the cheapest option when the price of carbon isn’t internalized. As a concession to international pressure, in 2011 the World Bank strictly limited future lending for coal power to the very poorest (non-IDA countries) countries. The World Bank’s energy strategy supports hydropower explicitly, calling it low-carbon electricity (though much evidence contests this) and noting that 90% of the hydropower resource in sub-Saharan Africa remains undeveloped.
Given China’s experience with coal domestically (which supplies 80% of Chinese electricity), Chinese investment in coal projects globally could fill the void left by the Bank’s exit from coal power in some countries. While no complete database exists of Chinese international projects, my own research indicates that Chinese firms have been involved in roughly 4GW of fossil power in Africa since 2000. China has several coal projects in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Senegal, and Botswana, as well as natural gas projects in Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana.[13]
Encouragingly, none of these projects were announced in the past two years, while most of the non-hydro renewable energy projects mentioned above were initiated during that time. It remains to be seen how China’s investment portfolio will change as a result of World Bank policy, but for now I am optimistic that China is investigating opportunities beyond hydropower and coal for its African energy investments.
Conclusion
Renewable energy is playing a growing role in Africa. China is a champion of this trend, particularly as it explores investing in renewable energy manufacturing capacity in southern and eastern Africa. Western firms remain largely absent in this market. Indeed, it appears that in the arena of development aid and development finance – once dominated by western powers – China is increasingly emerging as a leading player.
While huge investments in hydropower are disastrous for biodiversity and have significant human impacts, the electricity generated bodes well for energy access goals. Moreover, while China frequently comes under direct criticism for its development projects, China’s energy investment portfolio seems to be consistent with that of the World Bank. Stronger institutions are needed to ensure that large scale projects, whether invested by China or Western institutions, maximize benefits while eliminating humanitarian and environmental costs to the extent possible.
---------------------
References:
[1] Deborah Brautigam at American University is particularly fair and thorough in her treatment of China’s engagements in Africa. Visit her blog here.
[2] UN 65th Session. Quote from AE-Africa (27 September 2010). Link.
[3] International Energy Agency (2010). “World Energy Outlook”. Executive Summary. Link
[4] World Bank (2009). “Africa’s infrastructure, a time for transformation.” World Bank Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic.
[5] Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C. and Pushak, N. (2009). “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financer for Sub-Saharan Africa”. Trends and Policy Options, No.5. Link
[6] BBC, 26 March 2009: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7959444.stm
[7] Last month’s decision by the Burmese Government to shelve the $3.6 billion Myitsone hydropower project being developed by a Chinese parastatal company was celebrated as a victory for local and international activists. Yet by most guesses, Chinese hydropower investment will continue unabated.
[8] Wee, S. and Walet, L. (26 August 2010). “UPDATE 1-Suntech signs MOU to build S.Africa solar plants.” Reuters. Link.
[9] iStockAnalyst (10 January 2011). “Goldwind signs wind poer equipment contract with HydroChina in Ethiopia.” Link.
[10] Reuters (25 May 2011). “China interested in building nuclear power plant in E.Africa, IBI Corp says” Alertnet. Link.
[11] Japan is an exception to recent Western neglect of the African solar market. Japan donated US$7.4 million to Morocco to build a 1MW PV installation, another US$13.7 million for a 1MW station in Botswana, and a grant to Malawi for construction of a solar array on the Kamuzu International airport (AE-Africa 2010b).
[12] Disenyana, T. (February 2009). “China in the African Solar Energy Sector: Kenya Case Study.” South African Institute of International Affairs: Occassional Paper No.25 – China in Africa Project. Link.
[13] Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C. and Pushak, N. (2009). “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financer for Sub-Saharan Africa.” Trends and Policy Options, No.5. Link.; Macauhub (13 June 2006). "China’s CITIC to finance Brazilian thermoelectric power plant in Rio Grande do Sul." Link.
This summer in Nairobi, Kenya, I would often go vegetable shopping at a local open-air market. To my surprise, many of the vendors – native Kenyans – spoke Mandarin with the Chinese clientele, who had a distinct presence throughout the market. Nearby, massive concrete pillars and cantilevered steel beams rising above the city – the first elevated highway system in Kenya, courtesy of China – are a visible manifestation of growing development cooperation between China and Africa. Many Chinese and African scholars regard these investments as “win-win” partnerships, though Chinese state-owned institutions have also garnered criticism over resource interests and the disregard of humanitarian and environmental concerns in project planning.[1]
Beyond highways, hospitals, municipal water and waste systems, stadiums, and government buildings, China is also heavily invested in Africa’s electricity generation infrastructure. The scale of China’s involvement could provide electricity to millions in Africa who need it. And the energy could be renewable. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Seychelles, Jean-Paul Adam, recently expressed his optimism to the UN General Assembly:
“China and Africa have an ideal opportunity to work together to set an example for the world on best practices [in] eco-friendly technology transfer, to enhance the development of renewable energy.”[2]
Approximately 1.4 billion people lack access to electricity globally, and one billion more have unreliable electricity access.[3] Lack of modern energy services impairs attainment of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The World Bank predicts that an underperforming energy system results in a loss of 1-2% of annual economic growth potential.[4] Yet of the US$35-40 billion needed annually from now until 2030 to achieve universal energy access, only about 5% of this amount is expected through traditional development institutions. At this rate, the proportion of people with energy access is unlikely to improve significantly by 2030, the year the UN has called for universal access to modern energy services. Thus, China’s energy investments around the world – though hardly altruistic – could still help bring this goal into reach.
It is too early to tell if China’s investments in Africa will significantly change the outlook for the people of this resource-rich, but chronically energy-poor, continent. Nonetheless, I posit a few initial observations, expanded below:
- China is a new major player in Africa’s electricity sector: China’s presence in a range of renewable energies across the continent is welcome from the standpoint of increasing energy access and helping to achieve the UN MDGs. Unfortunately, the vast majority is in hydropower, which carries its own deleterious baggage.
- China views Africa as a growth market: Chinese companies see Africa as a new frontier for renewable energy – using China’s domestically-honed comparative advantages in solar, wind, and hydropower technology to employ Chinese firms, open market opportunities, and base manufacturing capacity within Africa. Western companies reticent to invest in Africa may miss emerging opportunities for renewable energy across the continent.
- The World Bank is shifting away from coal. China’s focus is likewise migrating to renewables: Chinese energy investments closely parallel those at the World Bank, where the focus is (slowly) shifting away from coal. While this unfortunately means a lot of new hydropower, it could also mean a lower coal and carbon trajectory for African development.
1. China is a new major player for African energy access: According to a study by the World Bank, 34% of Chinese investments in African infrastructure are in electricity.[5] Of this, the vast majority is hydropower. A watchdog group, International Rivers, reports that Chinese financial institutions are building over 250 hydropower projects across the developing world, mostly in Africa and Southeast Asia. Large hydropower projects, on the scale that China builds them, are highly controversial. Chinese dams in Ethiopia, Sudan, Ghana, and elsewhere face intense opposition because of ecosystem damage and displacement of indigenous groups. Chinese developers remain unapologetic, and most African policymakers support the projects. The Gibe III project on the Omo River in Ethiopia, as one example, will provide 1,800MW of electricity – effectively doubling Ethiopia’s generating capacity.[6] The energy access provided by the project is weighted against the dam’s impact on hundreds of thousands of people who rely on the Omo River and its ecosystems for their livelihoods.[7]
Better governance of international development cooperation could make such projects more tolerable. The World Commission on Dams delineates how large hydropower may be sustainable in an environmental, social, and economic context, though the recommendations have largely been dismissed by Chinese developers (and the World Bank, for that matter).
Fortunately, China is investing beyond hydropower. China Longyuan Power Group is investing in several wind power projects in South Africa, on the scale of 100MW.[8] Hydrochina International Engineering Company is building wind farms at two sites in Ethiopia. Another Chinese state-owned company, Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., is supplying the wind turbines for the project.[9] A subsidiary of Chinese oil giant Sinopec has invested US$18.7 million to develop geothermal power potential across Kenya and the Rift Valley. China is also emerging in Africa’s nuclear power sector, exporting its domestic nuclear technology. China National Nuclear Corporation is considering developing a new nuclear power station in collaboration with South Africa. A Chinese-built nuclear power station is also under discussion for east Africa.[10]
2. China views Africa as a growth market: Beyond building new power stations, Chinese firms are investing in renewable energy manufacturing across Africa. Western solar power companies were active in the Kenyan market in the 1990s, but most pulled out due to high costs and low sales.[11] Today, the African renewables market is changing. Policies to incentivize grid-connected solar power are being considered in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda. For now, all solar panels demanded in Africa must be shipped from outside the continent – a financial and logistical problem that stifles growth of the industry.
China’s Tianpu Xianxing Enterprises, a prominent Chinese integrated solar manufacturer with exports around the world, is negotiating a major manufacturing hub in Nairobi. By creating a production base within Africa, shipping costs would be reduced and sale prices for panels may drop from US$310 to US$77 for a typical home system.[12]
In 2010, Suntech, China’s largest solar panel manufacturer, began investing several hundred million US dollars in a manufacturing base in South Africa capable of producing 100MW of capacity annually. The plant is expected to supply the growing South African solar market, which some analysts predict could reach US$1 billion annually. The creation of a manufacturing base within Africa increases the potential for skilled-job creation and technology transfer – desperately needed for the development of Africa’s fledgling electricity sector. It could also keep educated Africans from fleeing to jobs outside the region, as manufacturers within Africa put a premium on local skilled labor and technical skills.
3. Trends in Chinese investments following the World Bank: The World Bank has come under intense scrutiny in recent years regarding its role in financing large carbon intensive projects in energy and extractive industries. Coal is oftentimes the cheapest option when the price of carbon isn’t internalized. As a concession to international pressure, in 2011 the World Bank strictly limited future lending for coal power to the very poorest (non-IDA countries) countries. The World Bank’s energy strategy supports hydropower explicitly, calling it low-carbon electricity (though much evidence contests this) and noting that 90% of the hydropower resource in sub-Saharan Africa remains undeveloped.
Given China’s experience with coal domestically (which supplies 80% of Chinese electricity), Chinese investment in coal projects globally could fill the void left by the Bank’s exit from coal power in some countries. While no complete database exists of Chinese international projects, my own research indicates that Chinese firms have been involved in roughly 4GW of fossil power in Africa since 2000. China has several coal projects in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Senegal, and Botswana, as well as natural gas projects in Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana.[13]
Encouragingly, none of these projects were announced in the past two years, while most of the non-hydro renewable energy projects mentioned above were initiated during that time. It remains to be seen how China’s investment portfolio will change as a result of World Bank policy, but for now I am optimistic that China is investigating opportunities beyond hydropower and coal for its African energy investments.
Conclusion
Renewable energy is playing a growing role in Africa. China is a champion of this trend, particularly as it explores investing in renewable energy manufacturing capacity in southern and eastern Africa. Western firms remain largely absent in this market. Indeed, it appears that in the arena of development aid and development finance – once dominated by western powers – China is increasingly emerging as a leading player.
While huge investments in hydropower are disastrous for biodiversity and have significant human impacts, the electricity generated bodes well for energy access goals. Moreover, while China frequently comes under direct criticism for its development projects, China’s energy investment portfolio seems to be consistent with that of the World Bank. Stronger institutions are needed to ensure that large scale projects, whether invested by China or Western institutions, maximize benefits while eliminating humanitarian and environmental costs to the extent possible.
---------------------
References:
[1] Deborah Brautigam at American University is particularly fair and thorough in her treatment of China’s engagements in Africa. Visit her blog here.
[2] UN 65th Session. Quote from AE-Africa (27 September 2010). Link.
[3] International Energy Agency (2010). “World Energy Outlook”. Executive Summary. Link
[4] World Bank (2009). “Africa’s infrastructure, a time for transformation.” World Bank Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic.
[5] Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C. and Pushak, N. (2009). “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financer for Sub-Saharan Africa”. Trends and Policy Options, No.5. Link
[6] BBC, 26 March 2009: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7959444.stm
[7] Last month’s decision by the Burmese Government to shelve the $3.6 billion Myitsone hydropower project being developed by a Chinese parastatal company was celebrated as a victory for local and international activists. Yet by most guesses, Chinese hydropower investment will continue unabated.
[8] Wee, S. and Walet, L. (26 August 2010). “UPDATE 1-Suntech signs MOU to build S.Africa solar plants.” Reuters. Link.
[9] iStockAnalyst (10 January 2011). “Goldwind signs wind poer equipment contract with HydroChina in Ethiopia.” Link.
[10] Reuters (25 May 2011). “China interested in building nuclear power plant in E.Africa, IBI Corp says” Alertnet. Link.
[11] Japan is an exception to recent Western neglect of the African solar market. Japan donated US$7.4 million to Morocco to build a 1MW PV installation, another US$13.7 million for a 1MW station in Botswana, and a grant to Malawi for construction of a solar array on the Kamuzu International airport (AE-Africa 2010b).
[12] Disenyana, T. (February 2009). “China in the African Solar Energy Sector: Kenya Case Study.” South African Institute of International Affairs: Occassional Paper No.25 – China in Africa Project. Link.
[13] Foster, V., Butterfield, W., Chen, C. and Pushak, N. (2009). “Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financer for Sub-Saharan Africa.” Trends and Policy Options, No.5. Link.; Macauhub (13 June 2006). "China’s CITIC to finance Brazilian thermoelectric power plant in Rio Grande do Sul." Link.
Friday, September 23, 2011
Smells Like Teen Xenophobia: Chinese “Angry Youth” and anti-Japanese nationalism
Keqin Wei, MPA
In spite of the growing economic cooperation and cultural exchange between China and Japan in recent years, the number of “Angry Youth” in China is also rising commensurately. The phenomenon of “Angry Youth” refers to young Chinese ultra-nationalists with a visceral hatred of Japan. Since most “Angry Youth” were born after the 1980s, they did not live through the Sino-Japanese War of the 1940s, but nevertheless demonstrate much stronger anti-Japanese sentiment than former generations. Importantly, these youth are generally highly educated and children of the internet age – blogs and chat rooms are often the repository for their anti-Japanese polemics. While there are many reasons for the growing numbers of “Angry Youth,” the most salient are the censored media in China and the way history is taught to students.
“The Modern History of China” is an important course in both Chinese middle school and high school. Stereotypes aside about China’s infatuation with inculcating math and science, great efforts have been made to teach students their national history from the Opium War of the 19th century to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Particular concentration is placed on the eight-year Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s-40s. This curriculum is also included on important exams, such as the College Entrance Exam, in order to encourage students to spend more time learning history. For most Chinese young people, having received the compulsory education, Japanese wartime atrocities are described in such vivid details that it becomes deeply ingrained in their memories. In comparison, other aspects of Japan, such as its culture, economy, and politics, are largely neglected.
Furthermore, the internet provides biased reports of modern-day Japan by amplifying its conflicts with China and reiterating tense historical issues. Just a few months ago, if one searched for “Japan” on Baidu, the most popular Chinese internet search engine, the top three news hits were: “Crisis in Fukushima,” “Japan claims its sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands,” and “Japanese history textbooks deny the Nanjing Massacre.” If it were not for the disaster in Japan, there would also very likely be articles criticizing the “basic quality” of Japanese people among the top news articles. As these “Angry Youth” spend their leisure time on the internet and browsing the websites that host such articles, this kind of information is constantly repeated, which intensifies the stereotype of Japanese brutality and hostility towards China.
Psychological research shows that people often make judgments based on accessible information. Most “Angry Youth” don’t have the opportunity to visit Japan, so the information available to them from textbooks and media is often the main resource to make their judgments. Their attitudes towards Japan are biased based on these historical memories and prejudiced news source.
Social norms also help shape people’s behavior, especially in a country like China which has a strong tradition of collectivism. As framed by former PRC president Jiang Zemin: “Forgetting the humiliating Chinese modern history means betraying your country.” In this environment, forgetting or even forgiving Japanese aggression is tantamount to treason. A second example comes from a popular Chinese movie about the Nanjing Massacre, “Nanjing, Nanjing” (2009). The Nanjing Massacre of 1937 is widely regarded as evidence of Japanese soldiers’ brutality and is still a hot topic given current Japanese leaders’ reluctance to apologize for its occupation of China. Upon the film’s release, one influential movie critic was quoted as follows: “You are not qualified to be Chinese if you do not watch this movie.” The assertion that failure to appreciate a movie about Japanese wartime brutality means losing one’s Chinese identity puts extreme pressure on those who do not plan to see the film.
While these social norms partly explain the expansion of anti-Japanese nationalism, why does the anti-Japanese sentiment in the “Angry Youth” surpass that of other age groups, including older generations who actually lived through the brutality of occupation?
One would not be surprised to find out that peer pressure plays a large role in shaping this attitude for teens. The Chinese internet, which is notorious for its censorship of sensitive political topics, has no problem with the proliferation of nationalist comments. Allowing the “Angry Youth” to be the only outspoken adolescent political group in the country gives the false impression that they are the only politically-oriented youth in China. When “Angry Youth” spread their anti-Japanese comments on internet, people their age with similar education backgrounds tend to take this movement as a reference group, and modify their own attitudes accordingly.
Nationalism proves to be an effective tool for totalitarian states to suppress dissidents and maintain social stability. To date, it seems China has been successful at stoking nationalist themes and training “Angry Youth” to vent their frustrations in politically-acceptable directions. Unfortunately, it seems that these “Angry Youth” have already begun to transform their attitudes into behaviors, as evidenced by frequent anti-Japan demonstrations that have taken place since 2004. One way to assuage the hostile attitudes towards Japan is to expand the information channels about Japan, by introducing Japanese cartoons and movies in China in order to show different aspects of the island nation; and most importantly, to revise Chinese modern history textbooks to show the Chinese people that modern Chinese history is much richer than an eight-year war with its neighbor.
Thanks to Eddie Skolnick for his comments and editing.
In spite of the growing economic cooperation and cultural exchange between China and Japan in recent years, the number of “Angry Youth” in China is also rising commensurately. The phenomenon of “Angry Youth” refers to young Chinese ultra-nationalists with a visceral hatred of Japan. Since most “Angry Youth” were born after the 1980s, they did not live through the Sino-Japanese War of the 1940s, but nevertheless demonstrate much stronger anti-Japanese sentiment than former generations. Importantly, these youth are generally highly educated and children of the internet age – blogs and chat rooms are often the repository for their anti-Japanese polemics. While there are many reasons for the growing numbers of “Angry Youth,” the most salient are the censored media in China and the way history is taught to students.
“The Modern History of China” is an important course in both Chinese middle school and high school. Stereotypes aside about China’s infatuation with inculcating math and science, great efforts have been made to teach students their national history from the Opium War of the 19th century to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Particular concentration is placed on the eight-year Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s-40s. This curriculum is also included on important exams, such as the College Entrance Exam, in order to encourage students to spend more time learning history. For most Chinese young people, having received the compulsory education, Japanese wartime atrocities are described in such vivid details that it becomes deeply ingrained in their memories. In comparison, other aspects of Japan, such as its culture, economy, and politics, are largely neglected.
Furthermore, the internet provides biased reports of modern-day Japan by amplifying its conflicts with China and reiterating tense historical issues. Just a few months ago, if one searched for “Japan” on Baidu, the most popular Chinese internet search engine, the top three news hits were: “Crisis in Fukushima,” “Japan claims its sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands,” and “Japanese history textbooks deny the Nanjing Massacre.” If it were not for the disaster in Japan, there would also very likely be articles criticizing the “basic quality” of Japanese people among the top news articles. As these “Angry Youth” spend their leisure time on the internet and browsing the websites that host such articles, this kind of information is constantly repeated, which intensifies the stereotype of Japanese brutality and hostility towards China.
Psychological research shows that people often make judgments based on accessible information. Most “Angry Youth” don’t have the opportunity to visit Japan, so the information available to them from textbooks and media is often the main resource to make their judgments. Their attitudes towards Japan are biased based on these historical memories and prejudiced news source.
Social norms also help shape people’s behavior, especially in a country like China which has a strong tradition of collectivism. As framed by former PRC president Jiang Zemin: “Forgetting the humiliating Chinese modern history means betraying your country.” In this environment, forgetting or even forgiving Japanese aggression is tantamount to treason. A second example comes from a popular Chinese movie about the Nanjing Massacre, “Nanjing, Nanjing” (2009). The Nanjing Massacre of 1937 is widely regarded as evidence of Japanese soldiers’ brutality and is still a hot topic given current Japanese leaders’ reluctance to apologize for its occupation of China. Upon the film’s release, one influential movie critic was quoted as follows: “You are not qualified to be Chinese if you do not watch this movie.” The assertion that failure to appreciate a movie about Japanese wartime brutality means losing one’s Chinese identity puts extreme pressure on those who do not plan to see the film.
While these social norms partly explain the expansion of anti-Japanese nationalism, why does the anti-Japanese sentiment in the “Angry Youth” surpass that of other age groups, including older generations who actually lived through the brutality of occupation?
One would not be surprised to find out that peer pressure plays a large role in shaping this attitude for teens. The Chinese internet, which is notorious for its censorship of sensitive political topics, has no problem with the proliferation of nationalist comments. Allowing the “Angry Youth” to be the only outspoken adolescent political group in the country gives the false impression that they are the only politically-oriented youth in China. When “Angry Youth” spread their anti-Japanese comments on internet, people their age with similar education backgrounds tend to take this movement as a reference group, and modify their own attitudes accordingly.
Nationalism proves to be an effective tool for totalitarian states to suppress dissidents and maintain social stability. To date, it seems China has been successful at stoking nationalist themes and training “Angry Youth” to vent their frustrations in politically-acceptable directions. Unfortunately, it seems that these “Angry Youth” have already begun to transform their attitudes into behaviors, as evidenced by frequent anti-Japan demonstrations that have taken place since 2004. One way to assuage the hostile attitudes towards Japan is to expand the information channels about Japan, by introducing Japanese cartoons and movies in China in order to show different aspects of the island nation; and most importantly, to revise Chinese modern history textbooks to show the Chinese people that modern Chinese history is much richer than an eight-year war with its neighbor.
Thanks to Eddie Skolnick for his comments and editing.
Friday, May 20, 2011
Handing China’s Nuclear Power Report Card to Zhou Enlai, Part II
Editor’s Note: This is the second of a two-part series on China's nuclear energy sector. Part I examines the program's practicality and safety.
Ruiwen Lee, MPA
As the first leader who pushed for China’s nuclear power in the early 1970s, then-Premier Zhou Enlai laid out four key principles for its development: practicality, safety, economic viability, and self-reliance (适用、安全、经济、自力更生). Forty years on, as the nuclear power industry begins taking off at an accelerated pace, these four principles continue to steer nuclear power developments in China.
This two-part blog post discusses the Chinese nuclear power sector’s performance under each of these principles. Last week we discussed the first two of these principles, practicality and safety. This week we look at the latter two, economic viability and self-reliance.
III. Economic viability: Economies of scale vs. technological lock-in
Given that China is coal-rich and has not instituted measures to internalize the negative health and environment externalities from fossil-fuel combustion, nuclear energy is yet to be price-competitive against coal. The estimated 0.05 yuan per unit supplied cost-gap implies that the cost of generating nuclear power remains an important factor in its economic viability.
Economies of scale in construction allow each subsequent unit of a particular nuclear reactor model to be built at a lower cost. This is important for nuclear power plants since the high construction costs are usually the factor working against its economic viability. The downside is that as older reactor designs become cheaper to build, newer models with greater efficiency and improved safety features are kept out of the market as a result of “technological lock-in.” Technological lock-in describes a situation whereby a technology, typically an older, less efficient one, gains such dominance in a market that it prevents newer, better technologies from being adopted. The market could become locked-in when there are increasing returns to adopting existing technology. This is due to a) decreasing costs from economies of scale and learning by doing, and b) increasing benefits arising from factors like network externalities.
Competition is fierce in the Chinese nuclear energy market today. Although the companies allowed to operate and hold majority stakes in nuclear power plants are all state-owned enterprises, they compete against each other for projects. Against the backdrop of the nuclear energy market, economic factors such as the cost of building and operating nuclear power plants are increasingly important in determining which type of reactors are built. It is in such a market that technological lock-in is more likely to occur.
Further, as Generation III+ reactors are being developed, China’s nuclear power market should avoid becoming saturated with or locked into older models so that it has the capacity to absorb newer models when they are released in the future. Of the more than 25 reactors under construction, 16 are the Generation II+ CPR-1000 model. While on the one hand economies of scale can be achieved by using many units of the same reactor model, there could be technological lock-in as newer, better models become less price-competitive to build and operate.
Similarly, small modular reactors (SMR) should be given ample room to compete in the market when they are introduced. Designed to be simpler and safer, SMRs could prove to be more effective in serving smaller load centres in remote areas and inland regions with small electricity grids that are not well-connected to the national grid. If plans to construct nuclear power plants in more remote areas are allowed to proceed before SMRs are introduced, nuclear operators might preclude SMRs from consideration in their eagerness to compete for market share.
IV. Self-reliance: Indigenizing nuclear power technology
Developing indigenous technology has been a key factor in the industry’s direction. Qinshan 1 in Zhejiang Province uses the CNP-300 reactor, designed by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The CNNC subsequently developed the CNP-600 reactor, which is used in Qinshan 2, and is developing the CNP-1000 model, though it has temporary been put on hold. The CNP-1000/600/300 models are all fully Chinese and free from foreign intellectual property rights.
The most popular reactor design in China currently is the CPR-1000. The China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (CGNPC) developed the CPR-1000 based on the French reactor design used in Daya Bay, progressively indigenizing it with each nuclear power plant it builds.
A major acquisition by the Chinese nuclear power industry is Westinghouse’s AP1000, with the CNNC and the China Power Investment Corporation (CPIC) investing in an initial two reactors each. Besides allowing China to become the first country to build an AP1000 reactor, the deal with Westinghouse is significant for the technology transfer involved. As part of the agreement, China will own the intellectual property rights to subsequent larger models it designs based on the AP1000.
Conclusion: Moving forward in a post-Fukushima Asia
China's nuclear power industry has come a long way, and looks set for an increasing role in the future. Having achieved practical use for nuclear power, the industry will continue growing in its self-reliance, while balancing the dual goals of improving economic cost and safety.
Of course, much of China’s nuclear power development plans going forward would be seen by the government, the domestic public, and the international audience through the lens of Fukushima. While predicting China’s intended nuclear power expansion trajectory in the light of Fukushima is difficult, it is fair to expect the government to now give greater emphasis to safety. However, as a consequence, the country’s diversion of resources and expertise to improving safety is likely to apply natural brakes to the growth of nuclear power. How crippling this will be to the industry remains to be seen.
Ruiwen Lee, MPA
As the first leader who pushed for China’s nuclear power in the early 1970s, then-Premier Zhou Enlai laid out four key principles for its development: practicality, safety, economic viability, and self-reliance (适用、安全、经济、自力更生). Forty years on, as the nuclear power industry begins taking off at an accelerated pace, these four principles continue to steer nuclear power developments in China.
This two-part blog post discusses the Chinese nuclear power sector’s performance under each of these principles. Last week we discussed the first two of these principles, practicality and safety. This week we look at the latter two, economic viability and self-reliance.
III. Economic viability: Economies of scale vs. technological lock-in
Given that China is coal-rich and has not instituted measures to internalize the negative health and environment externalities from fossil-fuel combustion, nuclear energy is yet to be price-competitive against coal. The estimated 0.05 yuan per unit supplied cost-gap implies that the cost of generating nuclear power remains an important factor in its economic viability.
Economies of scale in construction allow each subsequent unit of a particular nuclear reactor model to be built at a lower cost. This is important for nuclear power plants since the high construction costs are usually the factor working against its economic viability. The downside is that as older reactor designs become cheaper to build, newer models with greater efficiency and improved safety features are kept out of the market as a result of “technological lock-in.” Technological lock-in describes a situation whereby a technology, typically an older, less efficient one, gains such dominance in a market that it prevents newer, better technologies from being adopted. The market could become locked-in when there are increasing returns to adopting existing technology. This is due to a) decreasing costs from economies of scale and learning by doing, and b) increasing benefits arising from factors like network externalities.
Competition is fierce in the Chinese nuclear energy market today. Although the companies allowed to operate and hold majority stakes in nuclear power plants are all state-owned enterprises, they compete against each other for projects. Against the backdrop of the nuclear energy market, economic factors such as the cost of building and operating nuclear power plants are increasingly important in determining which type of reactors are built. It is in such a market that technological lock-in is more likely to occur.
Further, as Generation III+ reactors are being developed, China’s nuclear power market should avoid becoming saturated with or locked into older models so that it has the capacity to absorb newer models when they are released in the future. Of the more than 25 reactors under construction, 16 are the Generation II+ CPR-1000 model. While on the one hand economies of scale can be achieved by using many units of the same reactor model, there could be technological lock-in as newer, better models become less price-competitive to build and operate.
Similarly, small modular reactors (SMR) should be given ample room to compete in the market when they are introduced. Designed to be simpler and safer, SMRs could prove to be more effective in serving smaller load centres in remote areas and inland regions with small electricity grids that are not well-connected to the national grid. If plans to construct nuclear power plants in more remote areas are allowed to proceed before SMRs are introduced, nuclear operators might preclude SMRs from consideration in their eagerness to compete for market share.
IV. Self-reliance: Indigenizing nuclear power technology
Developing indigenous technology has been a key factor in the industry’s direction. Qinshan 1 in Zhejiang Province uses the CNP-300 reactor, designed by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The CNNC subsequently developed the CNP-600 reactor, which is used in Qinshan 2, and is developing the CNP-1000 model, though it has temporary been put on hold. The CNP-1000/600/300 models are all fully Chinese and free from foreign intellectual property rights.
The most popular reactor design in China currently is the CPR-1000. The China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (CGNPC) developed the CPR-1000 based on the French reactor design used in Daya Bay, progressively indigenizing it with each nuclear power plant it builds.
A major acquisition by the Chinese nuclear power industry is Westinghouse’s AP1000, with the CNNC and the China Power Investment Corporation (CPIC) investing in an initial two reactors each. Besides allowing China to become the first country to build an AP1000 reactor, the deal with Westinghouse is significant for the technology transfer involved. As part of the agreement, China will own the intellectual property rights to subsequent larger models it designs based on the AP1000.
Conclusion: Moving forward in a post-Fukushima Asia
China's nuclear power industry has come a long way, and looks set for an increasing role in the future. Having achieved practical use for nuclear power, the industry will continue growing in its self-reliance, while balancing the dual goals of improving economic cost and safety.
Of course, much of China’s nuclear power development plans going forward would be seen by the government, the domestic public, and the international audience through the lens of Fukushima. While predicting China’s intended nuclear power expansion trajectory in the light of Fukushima is difficult, it is fair to expect the government to now give greater emphasis to safety. However, as a consequence, the country’s diversion of resources and expertise to improving safety is likely to apply natural brakes to the growth of nuclear power. How crippling this will be to the industry remains to be seen.
Friday, May 13, 2011
Handing China’s Nuclear Power Report Card to Zhou Enlai, Part I
Editor’s Note: This is the first of a two-part series on China's nuclear energy sector. Part II examines the program's economic viability and self-reliance.
Ruiwen Lee, MPA
As the first leader who pushed for China’s nuclear power in the early 1970s, then-Premier Zhou Enlai laid out four key principles for its development: practicality, safety, economic viability, and self-reliance (适用、安全、经济、自力更生). Forty years on, as the nuclear power industry begins taking off at an accelerated pace, these four principles continue to steer nuclear power developments in China.
This two-part blog post discusses the Chinese nuclear power sector’s performance under each of these principles. This week we look at the first two of these principles, practicality and safety.
I. Practicality: The nuclear component in China’s energy mix
As with other nuclear weapon states, China’s nuclear energy industry has military roots. But given that political reasons were responsible for the country’s first nuclear power plants, China’s nuclear power capacity remained flat for decades. The early 2000s saw more power plants come online for assorted reasons dating back to the mid-1990s, but not because there was a fundamental shift in energy or nuclear policy. A country with abundant and cheap coal resources, China only began seriously considering nuclear energy as a serious alternative when power shortages hit regions nationwide in 2002.
The domestic thirst for energy to fuel the economy’s rapid growth, coupled with mounting international pressure to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions as climate change negotiations gain momentum, are the main drivers of nuclear energy’s recent rise. By 2007, nuclear power contributed only less than 2% of China’s electricity production. However, the Chinese government has plans to greatly expand the country’s nuclear power installed capacity, from the present 10.8 GWe (gigawatt electrical, one gigawatt being equal to one billion watts) to 70GWe by 2020.
Beyond becoming a practical source of energy for China’s booming economy, nuclear power has also emerged as a critical non-fossil fuel source set to reduce the dominance of coal in China’s energy mix, helping China achieve its green goals.
II. Safety: The Fukushima wake-up call
The March 11th Tohoku earthquake and tsunami that struck northeast Japan has given China a timely jolt from the fantasy of its economy growing at an unbridled pace on “clean” nuclear power. Previous nuclear meltdowns at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl occurred in the late-70s and mid-80s respectively, before China had embarked on its nuclear power expansion drive. That, and because it’s been a quarter-century since the previous nuclear crisis might have put significant distance between actual danger and that perceived by the Chinese nuclear authority and industry.
However, in the aftermath of Fukushima, the immediate reaction from the Chinese government was to suspend approvals for proposed nuclear power plant projects while declaring that its plans to develop nuclear energy would not stall. A Ministry of Environmental Protection official has gone as far as to claim that “there is a guarantee for the safety of China’s nuclear power facilities” and that China “will not abandon” its nuclear power plan for “fear of slight risks.”
Before Fukushima, nuclear power enjoyed a generally positive reception from the Chinese public, given its critical role in reducing air pollution and shifting the country to a low-carbon economy. This sentiment quickly vanished as a widespread nuclear scare took hold of China, with people buying large amounts of salt with iodine, mistakenly thinking that it could help ward off any radioactive effects drifting from Japan. The public’s reaction makes it obvious that nuclear power can quickly cease being everyone’s blue-eyed boy, and as such, any positive sentiment toward nuclear—no matter how long-lasting—simply cannot be taken for granted.
Other environmental issues have proven to be sensitive to the Chinese public. Escalating cancer rates associated with environmental pollution caused by factories have incited protest in various provinces. Hydropower dam construction plans have also faced strong and sometimes violent resistance. Within the nuclear industry, a construction project in Rushan, Shandong province was halted after local petitioning. To ensure that nuclear power retains a fair degree of public acceptance, the industry’s clean safety record is of utmost importance.
Next week we’ll tackle economic viability and self-reliance.
Ruiwen Lee, MPA
As the first leader who pushed for China’s nuclear power in the early 1970s, then-Premier Zhou Enlai laid out four key principles for its development: practicality, safety, economic viability, and self-reliance (适用、安全、经济、自力更生). Forty years on, as the nuclear power industry begins taking off at an accelerated pace, these four principles continue to steer nuclear power developments in China.
This two-part blog post discusses the Chinese nuclear power sector’s performance under each of these principles. This week we look at the first two of these principles, practicality and safety.
I. Practicality: The nuclear component in China’s energy mix
As with other nuclear weapon states, China’s nuclear energy industry has military roots. But given that political reasons were responsible for the country’s first nuclear power plants, China’s nuclear power capacity remained flat for decades. The early 2000s saw more power plants come online for assorted reasons dating back to the mid-1990s, but not because there was a fundamental shift in energy or nuclear policy. A country with abundant and cheap coal resources, China only began seriously considering nuclear energy as a serious alternative when power shortages hit regions nationwide in 2002.
The domestic thirst for energy to fuel the economy’s rapid growth, coupled with mounting international pressure to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions as climate change negotiations gain momentum, are the main drivers of nuclear energy’s recent rise. By 2007, nuclear power contributed only less than 2% of China’s electricity production. However, the Chinese government has plans to greatly expand the country’s nuclear power installed capacity, from the present 10.8 GWe (gigawatt electrical, one gigawatt being equal to one billion watts) to 70GWe by 2020.
Beyond becoming a practical source of energy for China’s booming economy, nuclear power has also emerged as a critical non-fossil fuel source set to reduce the dominance of coal in China’s energy mix, helping China achieve its green goals.
II. Safety: The Fukushima wake-up call
The March 11th Tohoku earthquake and tsunami that struck northeast Japan has given China a timely jolt from the fantasy of its economy growing at an unbridled pace on “clean” nuclear power. Previous nuclear meltdowns at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl occurred in the late-70s and mid-80s respectively, before China had embarked on its nuclear power expansion drive. That, and because it’s been a quarter-century since the previous nuclear crisis might have put significant distance between actual danger and that perceived by the Chinese nuclear authority and industry.
However, in the aftermath of Fukushima, the immediate reaction from the Chinese government was to suspend approvals for proposed nuclear power plant projects while declaring that its plans to develop nuclear energy would not stall. A Ministry of Environmental Protection official has gone as far as to claim that “there is a guarantee for the safety of China’s nuclear power facilities” and that China “will not abandon” its nuclear power plan for “fear of slight risks.”
Before Fukushima, nuclear power enjoyed a generally positive reception from the Chinese public, given its critical role in reducing air pollution and shifting the country to a low-carbon economy. This sentiment quickly vanished as a widespread nuclear scare took hold of China, with people buying large amounts of salt with iodine, mistakenly thinking that it could help ward off any radioactive effects drifting from Japan. The public’s reaction makes it obvious that nuclear power can quickly cease being everyone’s blue-eyed boy, and as such, any positive sentiment toward nuclear—no matter how long-lasting—simply cannot be taken for granted.
Other environmental issues have proven to be sensitive to the Chinese public. Escalating cancer rates associated with environmental pollution caused by factories have incited protest in various provinces. Hydropower dam construction plans have also faced strong and sometimes violent resistance. Within the nuclear industry, a construction project in Rushan, Shandong province was halted after local petitioning. To ensure that nuclear power retains a fair degree of public acceptance, the industry’s clean safety record is of utmost importance.
Next week we’ll tackle economic viability and self-reliance.
Friday, April 22, 2011
Philanthropy, defender of civil society
Heather Lord, MPP
The term “philanthropy” was first used in the Aeschylus work quoted above, a mythical tale about early humans dwelling in dark caves, living and dying at the whim of the gods. Prometheus shows exceptional philanthropos (love of humanity) when he defies the gods to give humans fire. The gift of fire symbolizes the beginning of all knowledge and optimism for the future – the two key ingredients necessary for improving the human condition. Because Prometheus’s gift was an act of rebellion against tyranny, philanthropia became inextricably associated with the arduous battle for a free and just civil society.
This association holds as true today as it did in ancient Greece. Global philanthropy is a massive international industry of strategic charitable organizations and activities broadly defined as “private initiatives for public good, focusing on improved quality of life.”[1] While laws and government policies generally encourage charities to flourish, philanthropy is often referred to as the “independent sector.” This independence is fiercely important. Ideally philanthropy and the state have a collegial relationship; however, like Prometheus, the philanthropic sector often finds itself fighting to defend a concept of justice and humanity at odds with the goals of the state, an unfortunate reality given the potential benefits of philanthropic causes to advance civil society in all societies.
In the United States, we can see an example of this tension in the government’s post-9/11 anti-terrorism funding guidelines which require that no resources from US non-profits fund terrorist organizations or suspicious individuals in a direct or even indirect way. For major foundations operating hundreds of international programs, following the letter of this law means they have to stay abreast of the multiple suspicious persons lists and run background checks on every conference attendee or every local vendor providing key program services in under-resourced high-risk regions. Charitable foundations and the US Treasury Department certainly share a commitment to combat terrorism, but clearly have a different threat calculus. Is the complex Gordian knot of terrorism really best addressed with such a blunt stroke against US-based foundations? Although it may be necessary for the US to want CYA (cover your assets) laws on the books, surely there is a more efficient way to address this problem than diverting foundation assets away from programs and into legal fees as they try ensure against and quell concerns about terrorism funding largely inapplicable to most US foundations.
There are also tensions in other countries as increased indigenous interest in private philanthropy forces a redefinition of the role between the citizen and the state. For example, in China there is some concern in the government that a robust home-grown independent philanthropic sector could invoke a destabilizing, undesirable “Western-style” democracy. The relative difficulty of officially registering a private foundation in China has resulted in growing informal extra-judicial philanthropic “gray market.” The fledgling Chinese Foundation Center was established in 2010 to build in-country philanthropic capacity, but continued crackdowns on freedom of expression in China may have a harmful effect on the burgeoning sector. In another part of the globe, an example of the tension between philanthropy and government in Africa is evidenced in the in the 2009 laws passed in Ethiopia capping NGOs’ foreign-sourced funding at 10% of their total budget and forcing organizations to go through an onerous re-registration process, effectively putting many of them out of business.
Philanthropy makes governments nervous only in countries where civil society makes those same governments nervous. This is all the more reason to consider the philanthropic sector as an essential civil society safeguard worthy of attention and investment. But putting aside strategic considerations (for once), philanthropy at its best is poised to act as a defender and advocate for the forward-looking goals of civil society in all countries, liberal or repressive. Regardless of the many challenges, human optimism remains unbound and hopefully each society will use the forces of philanthropos to fight its way to a better future for all of us.
E-mail Heather at hlord@princeton.edu or check out her philanthropy blog, www.PhilanthroMeme.com.
--------------------
References:
[1] This definition from Wikipedia condenses excellent and extensive work on philanthropy by leading scholars John W. Gardner, Lester Salamon, and Robert Bremner.
“Chorus: Let not thy love to man o'erleap the bounds
Of reason, nor neglect thy wretched state:
So my fond hope suggests thou shalt be free
From these base chains, nor less in power than Jove.
Prometheus: Not thus — it is not in the Fates that thus
These things should end; crush'd with a thousand wrongs,
A thousand woes, I shall escape these chains.
Necessity is stronger far than art.”
– Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound
The term “philanthropy” was first used in the Aeschylus work quoted above, a mythical tale about early humans dwelling in dark caves, living and dying at the whim of the gods. Prometheus shows exceptional philanthropos (love of humanity) when he defies the gods to give humans fire. The gift of fire symbolizes the beginning of all knowledge and optimism for the future – the two key ingredients necessary for improving the human condition. Because Prometheus’s gift was an act of rebellion against tyranny, philanthropia became inextricably associated with the arduous battle for a free and just civil society.
This association holds as true today as it did in ancient Greece. Global philanthropy is a massive international industry of strategic charitable organizations and activities broadly defined as “private initiatives for public good, focusing on improved quality of life.”[1] While laws and government policies generally encourage charities to flourish, philanthropy is often referred to as the “independent sector.” This independence is fiercely important. Ideally philanthropy and the state have a collegial relationship; however, like Prometheus, the philanthropic sector often finds itself fighting to defend a concept of justice and humanity at odds with the goals of the state, an unfortunate reality given the potential benefits of philanthropic causes to advance civil society in all societies.
In the United States, we can see an example of this tension in the government’s post-9/11 anti-terrorism funding guidelines which require that no resources from US non-profits fund terrorist organizations or suspicious individuals in a direct or even indirect way. For major foundations operating hundreds of international programs, following the letter of this law means they have to stay abreast of the multiple suspicious persons lists and run background checks on every conference attendee or every local vendor providing key program services in under-resourced high-risk regions. Charitable foundations and the US Treasury Department certainly share a commitment to combat terrorism, but clearly have a different threat calculus. Is the complex Gordian knot of terrorism really best addressed with such a blunt stroke against US-based foundations? Although it may be necessary for the US to want CYA (cover your assets) laws on the books, surely there is a more efficient way to address this problem than diverting foundation assets away from programs and into legal fees as they try ensure against and quell concerns about terrorism funding largely inapplicable to most US foundations.
There are also tensions in other countries as increased indigenous interest in private philanthropy forces a redefinition of the role between the citizen and the state. For example, in China there is some concern in the government that a robust home-grown independent philanthropic sector could invoke a destabilizing, undesirable “Western-style” democracy. The relative difficulty of officially registering a private foundation in China has resulted in growing informal extra-judicial philanthropic “gray market.” The fledgling Chinese Foundation Center was established in 2010 to build in-country philanthropic capacity, but continued crackdowns on freedom of expression in China may have a harmful effect on the burgeoning sector. In another part of the globe, an example of the tension between philanthropy and government in Africa is evidenced in the in the 2009 laws passed in Ethiopia capping NGOs’ foreign-sourced funding at 10% of their total budget and forcing organizations to go through an onerous re-registration process, effectively putting many of them out of business.
Philanthropy makes governments nervous only in countries where civil society makes those same governments nervous. This is all the more reason to consider the philanthropic sector as an essential civil society safeguard worthy of attention and investment. But putting aside strategic considerations (for once), philanthropy at its best is poised to act as a defender and advocate for the forward-looking goals of civil society in all countries, liberal or repressive. Regardless of the many challenges, human optimism remains unbound and hopefully each society will use the forces of philanthropos to fight its way to a better future for all of us.
E-mail Heather at hlord@princeton.edu or check out her philanthropy blog, www.PhilanthroMeme.com.
--------------------
References:
[1] This definition from Wikipedia condenses excellent and extensive work on philanthropy by leading scholars John W. Gardner, Lester Salamon, and Robert Bremner.
Wednesday, March 30, 2011
Taiwan, China’s recent foreign policy aggressiveness, and implications for US policy
Ian Aucoin, MPA
With a rising China, a teetering regime in North Korea facing a succession crisis, and increasingly self-reliant and assertive governments in Japan and South Korea, the economic and political order in the Pacific is changing shape. In this emerging new East Asian order, does still Taiwan matter? Does it remain a potential flashpoint of military conflict? Most importantly, should its defense remain an article of US foreign policy?
In the middle of the last century, the US took up the cause of defending the island to ensure that Chang Kai-Shek and our capitalist Kuomintang (KMT) allies would survive long enough for Mao and the communists to lose control of the mainland and subsequently reclaim China for the nationalists. With his horrible mistakes in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Mao came close, but things have now changed. In both capitals the old guard is dead and economies are booming. Both parties still seek a negotiated reconciliation, but neither the “one China, two systems” that Beijing proposes nor the independence that some in Taipei desire is acceptable at present. However, with the continent’s exponentially greater resources and Taiwan’s increasing diplomatic isolation, time does not appear to be on the latter’s side. Any agreement is increasingly likely to come on Beijing’s terms.
The 21st century People’s Republic of China is more robust than ever before and it is starting to throw its weight around, most dramatically within the past year. In 2010, Beijing reacted with unusual venom to a routine American arms deal with Taiwan, brought economic weaponry to bear against Japan after a confrontation near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, repositioned missile batteries to better “encourage” Hanoi to give up its claim on the Paracel Islands, and more or less turned a blind eye to North Korean provocations on the Peninsula while reacting far more strongly to the joint US-ROK military exercises carried out in response. None of this was well received abroad. In 201, there have been indications—from President Hu’s state visit to the US and other sources—that the negative international reaction to this brand of Chinese assertiveness has been taken to heart in Beijing, but in practice we have no guarantees that it will not head down that road again.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, Taiwan and the Taiwanese government largely avoided this wave of bellicosity from Beijing, and in the short term Taiwan does not appear to be a likely flashpoint of military conflict. In fact, since the KMT regained control of the government from the more pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2008, prevailing trends in cross-Strait relations have undergone a significant reversal and are now better than ever before. Direct flights between Taiwan and the mainland resumed in the summer of 2008, the landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement that dramatically lowered barriers between the two economies was signed two years later, and this past November the KMT mayor of Taipei rode to victory over his DPP opponent in an election that was widely seen as a referendum on the KMT’s strategy of engagement with the mainland. At this point, even if the DPP returned to power they would likely have to moderate their tone and accept many of these KMT initiatives as entrenched features of the political landscape.
All that said, the sweeping shifts in policy and rhetoric coming out of both capitals over the last few years and the persistent obstacles to a long-term negotiated solution indicate that it remains a little early to put this conflict to bed. And yet, there is reason for optimism in the recent turmoil in China’s foreign policy. The PRC’s missteps are an indication that it is finding its feet as an emerging power. These are formative years in which China is feeling out its place on the international stage, and while there is no reason to believe that the political, economic, and territorial interests China has recently expressed are going to change, the strategies they will employ to serve them are still highly malleable. Last year China tried to project power in the region by bullying its neighbors, and its actions were roundly rejected. Chinese leaders are going to go back to the drawing board and try to find a more efficient and effective way to get what they want. America’s preeminent position in the East Asian security structure is an invaluable tool to shape the character of Chinese foreign policy by ensuring that force and intimidation remain undesirable means to achieve China’s ends. In time, China’s need to find other avenues to serve its interests will ideally drive it towards greater participation in existing regional diplomatic organizations and the formation of new ones with greater capabilities. Though for a variety of reasons—historical, cultural, political—these institutions will differ markedly from their Western analogs, they still carry the promise of mutual benefits to all participating countries. However in the interim, while there are ongoing changes in the region’s political structure, American relationships with Taiwan and other regional actors will remain relevant as a means of deterring aggression and stimulating cooperation.
In sum, Taiwan matters, but not for the reasons it used to. Ongoing improvements in cross-Strait relations are making military confrontation between the PRC and its “wayward province” increasingly implausible. Today, the US defensive relationship with Taiwan is substantially weaker than in the past, but its value persists as a reminder of the dangers Beijing would face in pursuing an overzealous foreign policy. Additionally, it is a powerful excuse to continue Seventh Fleet operations off the southern coast of Asia, which many states in the area support, though some may be loath to admit it. Were the US to withdraw its support for Taiwan, it would lose a great deal of prestige and influence in the Pacific, with remarkably little gain. Further, Taiwan could not realistically defend itself against the full might of the People’s Liberation Army, and all parties know that. While in the event of American withdrawal of support Taiwan-PRC military confrontation would remain unlikely, this retraction would still greatly limit the Taiwanese options in bilateral negotiations and allow Beijing to commit its military resources elsewhere, better positioning it to pursue a more belligerent vein of diplomacy if it so chose. Maintaining the current American position on Taiwan buys time for other processes of regional integration to operate in an environment already favorable to stability and the interests of the United States.
With a rising China, a teetering regime in North Korea facing a succession crisis, and increasingly self-reliant and assertive governments in Japan and South Korea, the economic and political order in the Pacific is changing shape. In this emerging new East Asian order, does still Taiwan matter? Does it remain a potential flashpoint of military conflict? Most importantly, should its defense remain an article of US foreign policy?
In the middle of the last century, the US took up the cause of defending the island to ensure that Chang Kai-Shek and our capitalist Kuomintang (KMT) allies would survive long enough for Mao and the communists to lose control of the mainland and subsequently reclaim China for the nationalists. With his horrible mistakes in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Mao came close, but things have now changed. In both capitals the old guard is dead and economies are booming. Both parties still seek a negotiated reconciliation, but neither the “one China, two systems” that Beijing proposes nor the independence that some in Taipei desire is acceptable at present. However, with the continent’s exponentially greater resources and Taiwan’s increasing diplomatic isolation, time does not appear to be on the latter’s side. Any agreement is increasingly likely to come on Beijing’s terms.
The 21st century People’s Republic of China is more robust than ever before and it is starting to throw its weight around, most dramatically within the past year. In 2010, Beijing reacted with unusual venom to a routine American arms deal with Taiwan, brought economic weaponry to bear against Japan after a confrontation near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, repositioned missile batteries to better “encourage” Hanoi to give up its claim on the Paracel Islands, and more or less turned a blind eye to North Korean provocations on the Peninsula while reacting far more strongly to the joint US-ROK military exercises carried out in response. None of this was well received abroad. In 201, there have been indications—from President Hu’s state visit to the US and other sources—that the negative international reaction to this brand of Chinese assertiveness has been taken to heart in Beijing, but in practice we have no guarantees that it will not head down that road again.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, Taiwan and the Taiwanese government largely avoided this wave of bellicosity from Beijing, and in the short term Taiwan does not appear to be a likely flashpoint of military conflict. In fact, since the KMT regained control of the government from the more pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2008, prevailing trends in cross-Strait relations have undergone a significant reversal and are now better than ever before. Direct flights between Taiwan and the mainland resumed in the summer of 2008, the landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement that dramatically lowered barriers between the two economies was signed two years later, and this past November the KMT mayor of Taipei rode to victory over his DPP opponent in an election that was widely seen as a referendum on the KMT’s strategy of engagement with the mainland. At this point, even if the DPP returned to power they would likely have to moderate their tone and accept many of these KMT initiatives as entrenched features of the political landscape.
All that said, the sweeping shifts in policy and rhetoric coming out of both capitals over the last few years and the persistent obstacles to a long-term negotiated solution indicate that it remains a little early to put this conflict to bed. And yet, there is reason for optimism in the recent turmoil in China’s foreign policy. The PRC’s missteps are an indication that it is finding its feet as an emerging power. These are formative years in which China is feeling out its place on the international stage, and while there is no reason to believe that the political, economic, and territorial interests China has recently expressed are going to change, the strategies they will employ to serve them are still highly malleable. Last year China tried to project power in the region by bullying its neighbors, and its actions were roundly rejected. Chinese leaders are going to go back to the drawing board and try to find a more efficient and effective way to get what they want. America’s preeminent position in the East Asian security structure is an invaluable tool to shape the character of Chinese foreign policy by ensuring that force and intimidation remain undesirable means to achieve China’s ends. In time, China’s need to find other avenues to serve its interests will ideally drive it towards greater participation in existing regional diplomatic organizations and the formation of new ones with greater capabilities. Though for a variety of reasons—historical, cultural, political—these institutions will differ markedly from their Western analogs, they still carry the promise of mutual benefits to all participating countries. However in the interim, while there are ongoing changes in the region’s political structure, American relationships with Taiwan and other regional actors will remain relevant as a means of deterring aggression and stimulating cooperation.
In sum, Taiwan matters, but not for the reasons it used to. Ongoing improvements in cross-Strait relations are making military confrontation between the PRC and its “wayward province” increasingly implausible. Today, the US defensive relationship with Taiwan is substantially weaker than in the past, but its value persists as a reminder of the dangers Beijing would face in pursuing an overzealous foreign policy. Additionally, it is a powerful excuse to continue Seventh Fleet operations off the southern coast of Asia, which many states in the area support, though some may be loath to admit it. Were the US to withdraw its support for Taiwan, it would lose a great deal of prestige and influence in the Pacific, with remarkably little gain. Further, Taiwan could not realistically defend itself against the full might of the People’s Liberation Army, and all parties know that. While in the event of American withdrawal of support Taiwan-PRC military confrontation would remain unlikely, this retraction would still greatly limit the Taiwanese options in bilateral negotiations and allow Beijing to commit its military resources elsewhere, better positioning it to pursue a more belligerent vein of diplomacy if it so chose. Maintaining the current American position on Taiwan buys time for other processes of regional integration to operate in an environment already favorable to stability and the interests of the United States.
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